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The study focuses on the question Should the Integrated

Arts Experience

(

IAE) be used to facilitate conceptual learn-

ing and development?

The IAE is defined as an activity which

induces in the learner an emotional and/or kinestnetic state

which is in some way analogous to the concept being taught,
the
and which occurs through heightened sensory awareness on

part of the learner.

The term integrated is used to imply

learning prothe integration of the arts experience into the
cess.

are
Precedents for the use of the arts in this fashion

and
identified in the works of Read (1958), Lowenfeld
Eisner (1972) and other
Brittain (1947), R. A. Smith (1971a),
issue of whether it is
Part I of the study addresses the
to facilitate contheoretically possible for arts activities

ceptual learning and development.
basis of Part

I:

1)

Three questions form the

learned?;
How is it that any concept is

VI

(2) What are the characteristics of the IAE that might
allow

it to facilitate the learning of concepts?; and (3)
What is

the process by which the IAE might facilitate the learning
of concepts?

Although there are differing views concerning

concept formation, conceptual growth and development are

described in terms of the construct proposed by David Ausubel.
He identifies two criteria by which learning can be said to
be meaningful, nonarbitrariness and substantiveness.

Non-

arbitrariness "... implies some plausible or reasonable basis
for establishing the relationship between new material and

the relevant ideas in question (1966, p. 60).

Substantive

implies, "... the same concept or proposition expressed in

synonomous language would induce substantially the same

meaning (1966,

p.

60).

The IAE is defined and described in its curricular func-

tion is examined.

Three characteristics that might allow the

IAE to facilitate conceptual learning are identified.

The IAE

provides opportunities for the following processes to occur:
(1)

perceptual cognition; (2) metaphorical modes of thinking;

(3)

use of alternative forms of communication.

which
A model is presented which identifies the degree to

conceptual
the IAE might theoretically be able to facilitate

growth and development.

Wherever possible, the three charac-

facilitate concepteristics of the IAE that might allow it to

criteria for meaningful
tual learning are connected to the two
It is shown that allowing
learning as identified by Ausubel.

related to both
for perceptual cognition to occur is
vii

nonarbitrary and substantive learning.

It

is shown further*

allowing for metaphorical modes of thinking to occur

is

related to nonarbitrary learning, but not necessarily to substantive learning.

Finally, it is shown that allowing for

the use of alternative forms of communication is related to

substantive learning

but it is unclear as to whether or not

it is related to nonarbitrary learning.

Therefore, the answer

to the question Is it theoretically possible for the IAE to

facilitate conceptual learning is, yes.
In Part II of the study, the focus is on the question

Should the IAE be used to facilitate conceptual learning and

development?

The critique is based on three works from the

reform movement of the late 1960’s and early ’70s:

Educat ion

and Ecstacy (1968) by George Leonard, Fantasy and Feeling in

Education (1969) by Richard Jones, and Crisis in The Classroom
(1968) by Charles Silberman.

In each instance criteria are

selected by which the author identifies positive attributes
of education.

The extent to which the use of the IAE meets

these criteria is then examined.
In summary, the IAE is seen as a pedagogical technique

which has a sound theoretical base and which is likely to
by
facilitate many of the educational improvements advocated

recent reformers.

vm
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The arts and public education have both existed as

integral parts of western civilization for many years.

Attempts to combine the two, in one form or another, date
back almost as far as the practices themselves.
Republic

,

In his

Plato devoted an entire section to the role the

arts might play in educational development.
The perceived relationship between the arts and educa-

tion has varied greatly.

At certain times each has stood

alongside the other with a common goal:

to be a more "human"

human being, a person needs to be both educated and somewhat
skilled in the use of the arts.

within the other as a component:

At other times, one stood

to be an educated person,

one must be trained in the production and interpretation of

the arts.

At still other times, critics like Herbert Read

(1958) have proposed that the arts exist as a vehicle through

which people can be educated, and/or that people are educated
available
when they have gained the insights that are only

through the arts.
resurgence of this
In recent years there has been a
Federal programs and
latter view, as evidenced by certain
in Education Program"
programs like the JDR 3rd Fund's, "Arts

2

(K.

Bloom, 1971).

Although there is no clear agreement on the

role of the arts in education and the justification for their

inclusion in the educative process, Elliot Eisner (1972,

p.

2)

points out that at least one view, ”... emphasizes the conse-

quences of arts in work and utilizes the particular needs of
the students or the society as a major basis for forming its

objectives."
justification.

Eisner refers to this view as the contextualist
He describes it as the counter-part to the

essentialist justification which, ”... emphasizes the kinds
of contributions to human experience and understanding that

only art can provide."

Although Eisner supports the essentialist view, he explains that proponents of the contextualist justification
argue that art activities can play an important role in

developing a student’s understanding of academic subject
areas.

The implication, then, is that arts activities con

be used as
tribute to concept formation and therefore, should

an important resource in teaching.

contains many
The literature on aesthetic education
activities enhancing
other references to this notion of arts
A. Smith (1971a) has
cognitive devr lopment and learning. R.
and their relationidentified different types of aesthetics
"AesIn his article entitled,
ship to the teaching of arts.

thetic Foundations of Education,

'

he also indicates

well,
teaching of other subjects as
vance of aesthetics to the
of teaching and learnin e
and to the generic process
.

3

Lowenf eld and Brittain include emotional, intellectual, per-

ceptual and aesthetic experiences as the elements of an
"integrated" creative experience and indicate the importance
of that experience in having the student identify with certain

ideas personally.

Statement of the Problem
We see, then, that writers such as Eisner, Lowenfeld

and Brittain, Smith and others have identified the fact that

there is at least some intuitive support for the notion of
arts activities enhancing cognitive development and learning.
The problem is that the use of arts activities in this way has
not been examined within the context of a systematic analysis

of the processes involved in conceptual learning and development, nor has it been critiqued on the basis of criteria from

outside the realm of arts education.
Purpose and Organization of the Study
is the purpose of this study,

It

therefore, to ask the

be used to
question: Should the Integrated Arts Experience
and to attempt
facilitate conceptual learning and development?;

to above.
to answer it within the contexts referred

According-

two major sections.
ly, the study will be divided into

In

it is theoretical
will address the issue of whether
learnto facilitate conceptual
ly possible for arts activities
relationship
Within the context of the
ing and development.

Part I,

I
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between the arts and learning, and using the learning of
concepts as an example area to investigate, in Part

I

I

will

deal with the following three questions:

(1)

any concept is learned?;

characteristics of

(2) What are the

the Integrated Arts Experience

(

How is it that

IAE ) that might allow it to

facilitate the learning of concepts?; and

(3)

What is the

process by which the IAE might facilitate the learning of
concepts?
Each of the three questions will be the focal point of
one chapter.

In Chapter 2, the question. How is it that any

concept is learned?, will be asked.
I

In answering the question

will attempt to define concepts in their purest form, dis-

cuss the essential process upon which conceptual behavior is

based, and then look at two more complex views of what the

concepts we teach in school are like.

The focus of the dis-

cussion will then shift to examining the dynamics involved in

learning the concept.

Finally,

I

will put that conglomerate

view into the context of a more pedagogical view of the proces
of learning, one that will supply criteria upon which we can

judge the effectiveness of any approach to facilitating the

learning of concepts.
Chapter

3

will deal with the second question, What are

Experience (IAE)
the characteristics of the Integrated Arts
learning of concepts?
that might allow it to facilitate the
will be to _-f
The first step in answering the question
how it grows out or the
the IAE and indicate, to some degree,

.
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literature and thought which deals with the impact of arts

activities on learning.

The second step in answering the

question will be to describe the IAE
be given and then discussed.

.

Three examples will

The third step will be to indi-

cate the curricular function of the IAE.

In the fourth step,

each of the three characteristics that might allow the IAE
to facilitate the learning of concepts will be discussed.

The processes involved in these characteristics will also be

examined
Finally, in Chapter IV, the relationships between the

criteria which must be fulfilled for the learning of concepts
to occur and the characteristics of the IAE that might allow

for the meeting of those criteria will be examined.

After

those relations are discussed, they will be incorporated into
a model.

Part II of the study will address itself more directly
to the question, Should the Integrated Arts Experience be used

tofacilitate conceptual learning and development?
a

It will be

critique, based on criteria which are applicable to the

educative process in general, of the use of arts activities
to facilitate conceptual learning and development.

In order

recent, yet have
to reflect those educational views that are
not to be regarded
stood the test of time at least long enough
as a passing vogue,

I

have chosen works written during the

1960's and early
educational reform movement of the late
as the basis of the critique.

vri
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The critique will be broken down into three sub-sections.
In Chapter V, George Leonard's Education and Ecstacy

,

will be

used as the basis of a discussion of the role society plays
in setting the expectations that educational systems attempt
to meet.

The changing expectations society has, and will

have today and in the future, and the role that the IAE can
play in meeting those new expectations will then be discussed.

Chapter VI will deal with the new importance that is
being given to the role of feelings and emotions in education
in general and in conceptual learning in particular.

Fantasy

and Feeling in Education by Richard Jones will be used as the

major reference in this sub-section.

Jones'

arguments con-

cerning the role of emotions in conceptual learning, combined

with a discussion of how the IAE can help a student deal with
emotional material, will allow for an opportunity to evaluate
one of the most important arguments which support the use of
arts activities in facilitating conceptual learning and

development Charles Silberman's Crisis in the Classroom will be the

major point of reference for Chapter VII.

This work, acLually

the Education
the chairman's report of the Carnegie Study of
as well as
of Educators, discussed pedagogical methodology
structure on indithe effects of the educational system and

vidual learners.

oe
The focal point of the discussion will

methodology, and its
the role of the IAE in that pedagogical
the educational system
ability to ameliorate the effects of

7

and structure on the learner.

The final chapter of the study

will contain a section on the implications of what has been

discussed and identification of some further steps that might
be taken in order to foster the use of the Integrated Arts

Experience as a pedagogical technique.
Delimitations of the Study
This study will deal with the Integrated Arts Experience
as it is defined here.

The theoretical feasibility of its

facilitating the learning of concepts will be examined as will
the relative value of its use.

The study will not include

other uses of the arts in education, such as using the arts
to promote psychological growth per se or adopting an essen-

tialist approach to teaching arts.

Nor will

I

attempt to

explain or systematically identify in the study other approachconcepts.
es that might or might not facilitate the learning of

Significance of the Study
activities
Many educators have proposed the use of arts
Generally,
development.
to facilitate conceptual learning and
without a systematic
these recommendations have been made
activities have to the
understanding of the relationship arts

development takes place.
processes by which this learning and
as a means of promoting
Also, the use of arts activities
evaluated in terms of criteria
ceptual learning has not been
and
view of the educative process
that reflect a more global

8

which come from outside the realm of art education.

The

significance of this study lies in the fact that it attempts
to fill, to some degree, the gap in our understanding of the

role arts activities can play in facilitating conceptual

learning and development.

It should enable educators to

make more logical and informed decisions as to the value of
and most efficient procedures for using arts activities in
this way.

Additional Note
The following model (see Fig. 1) is presented here as
a guide for the reader.

The model is a diagramatic represen-

tation of the theoretical configuration by which

I

will con-

nect the Integrated Arts Experience (IAE) to conceptual learning.

In the model, conceptual learning, as viewed through

Ausubel

’

s

theory of meaningful learning, is connected to the

Integrated Arts Experience to the degree that the two criteria
with
for meaningful learning can be shown to be in accordance

applicable to
the three characteristics of the IAE that are

this process.

The ensuing discussion will describe the theo-

retical foundations which support this model.

The model is

reader as a point
offered here so that it may be used by the

of reference throughout the study.

9

Figure

1;

A Model of How The

IAE Facilitates Conceptual Learning and Development

Development

Experience

and

Arts

Learning

Integrated

Conceptual

The
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CHAPTER

II

THEORIES OF CONCEPTUAL LEARNING AS
THEY RELATE TO THE INTEGRATED ARTS EXPERIENCE
If it is the purpose of this study to evaluate the value

of the use of arts activities to facilitate conceptual learn-

ing and development, then, of necessity,

I

must first come to

grips with a major question that is subsumed within this

problem.

Namely,

I

must answer the question, Is it theoreti-

cally possible for arts activities to facilitate conceptual

learning and development?

This question can itself be broken

down into three sub-questions:
is learned?;

(1)

How is it that any concept

(2) What are the characteristics of the Integrated

Arts Experience (IAE) that might allow it to facilitate the

Teaming of concepts?; and

(3)

What is the process by which

the IAE might be able to facilitate the learning of concepts?

This chapter addresses itself to the first of these sub-

questions, How is it that any concept is learned?

It

seems

around the
most logical to me that the chapter be organized
themselves to
major theoretical positions which both address
use in describing Lhe
the above question and are also of some
in facilitating this con
role that arts activities might play

ceptual learning.

which
Therefore, after a preliminary section

the ch^pt^r
a concept?
deals with the question, "What is
classif icatory and
will then consist of sections on
,

1
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categorization behavior, Vygotsky and Gagne's views of concept formation, Piaget's argument against a stimulus-response

paradigm for conceptual learning and Piaget's processes of
assimilation and accommodation and Ausubel's theory of meaningful versus reception learning.

What Is A Concept?

There are certain words that are used so many times in
our daily vocabulary that a person who was unfamiliar with our

language system would surmise that' these words have developed,
by necessity, distinct and commonly accepted meanings.

How

else could they be used so often without creating complete

confusion between speaker and listener?

And yet, if we

examine some of these words carefully we find

a wide range of

meanings which different people attach to them.
fabulous

,

love

.

words are qualitative, e.g.

,

great

are abstract, e.g., freedom

,

democracy

,

,

Some of these

aw f u

.

Others

But even some

words which we commonly would agree have concrete meanings
fall into this same category of words which mean something

different to almost everyone who uses them.
This is the case with the term concept
cept?

.

What is a con-

educaAsk a number of psychologists, philosophers or

different answers.
tors and you are sure to get a number of
however, Klausmeier
Why this is true is not known for certain;
the importance of
and his associates indicate that despite

1

"

,
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concepts

,

formal definitions of the word concept vary so

widely that communication across and even within disciplines
is difficult

.

According to Klausmeier and his associates

(Note 1) definitions vary apparently for three reasons. First,

the number of entities called concepts is very large.

Second-

ly, there are real differences in the nature of concepts both

across and within disciplines.

And finally, they point out

that an individual’s concept of the thing or classes of things

changes markedly with increasing maturation and learning.
Some of those who define the term concept strive to

capture the essence of the term in a simple statement.
Harre (1966) states, "What are concepts?

vehicles of thought"

(p.

3).

Rom

Concepts are the

Others strive for slightly more

clarity with the addition of a key word or two.
a "...

Titchner defined a concept as

In 1896

symbol which holds a

large number of particular ideas together" (Sills, 1968,
p.

206).

However, with the addition of key words and

a

move

toward clarity comes more discrepancy from others’ definitions.
For Archer (1966

,

p.

37) the term symbol is not precise enough.

He substitutes the term labe
"...

,

and defines a concept as

in
the label- of a set of things that have something

common.
it is impossible
Of course, other theorists believe that

as a concept in a
to completely define so complex an entity
(1S72,
For Walter Brugger and Kenneth Baker
simple statement.
p.

form of thought in contrast
67), "The concept is the simplest

13

"to

judgment and influence which are thought patterns composed

of a number of concepts.

While a judgment expresses

a cer-

tain reality as existing, the concept is a thoughtful or

abstract-spiritual expression of 'whatness;

for it grasps an

'

object, represents ’what' it is without making a statement

about it."
ed,

In addition, as the Klausmeier statement indicat-

it may seem most logical to any theorist to define the

term concept in the language of his or her own discipline.

Accordingly, for
dia of Philosophy

P.
,

some exceptions),
(b)

L.

Heath (1967), author of The Encyclope-

"To have a concept
(a)

x

is

we may say (with

,

to know the meaning of the word

x;

to be able to pick out or recognize a presented x (distin-

guish non-x

’

s

,

etc.), or again to be able to think of (have

images or ideas of) x (or x's) when they are not present;
(c)

to know the nature of x

,

to have grasped or apprehended

the properties (universlas, essences, etc.) which characterize
x's and make them what they are"

(p.

177).

In order to understand the term concept

,

however, we are

better served if we look to the utilitarian, rather than
based definitions.

pure

Indicative of this view is Bruner, Goodnow

behavior.
and Austin's (1956) approach to defining conceptual
inThey did not seek explanation in terms of learning theory,

formation theory, or personality theory.

Instead, they sought

explain what happens
to describe and in some small measure to
into significant
when people seek to sort the environment
"discriminably different
classes of events and end up treating

.
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things as equivalents"

(p.

viii.).

a starting point, Bruner, et.

al

,

With this definition as
went on to do an extensive

study of conceptual behavior and to eventually describe that

behavior in terms of class.if icatory or categorization behavior.

Since classif icatory behavior is viewed as a process by

which the learner learns to identify significant aspects of
an object or event and then identify those same aspects in

other objects or events, the definition of the term concept
that theorists of this inclination use, reflects that general

process.

Accordingly, Bruner and his associates state, "We...

regard a concept as a network of significant inferences by

which one goes beyond a set of observed criterial properties

exhibited by an object or event to the class identity of the
object or event in question, and then to additional inferences
about other unobserved properties of the object or event"
244

(p.

)

Many theorists who support the "classif icatory behavior"
concurview of concepts and concept formation are advocates,

rently, of stimulus -response theory.

This, of course, is a

can readily
logical situation, since stimulus-response theory
Stimulusbehavior.
be seen as the basis of classif icatory
concept formation more
response "purists," however, describe

narrowly.

view, one
Perhaps the clearest statement of this

conin any research in the
that is persistently encountered
She
that of T. S. Kendler.
cept formation literature, is

15

states that "Concept formation is taken to imply the acqui-

sition of utilization, or both, of a common response to

dissimilar stimuli..."

(H.

Kendler, 1964,

p.

218).

There

are significant problems in using such a narrow view, however.

Howard Kendler indicates that, although

T.

S. Kendler's

definition seems intuitively obvious, if one shifts his
frame of reference to that of Piaget's work with concepts
(1953), it becomes evident that a definition that emphasizes
"a common response to dissimilar stimuli"

hardly relevant.

(p.

219)

seems

This view will be examined more closely in

a later section of this chapter.

There are, however, other views of conceptual behavior.
One of these other views is identified by Bobby

L.

Rowe.

While Rowe (1974) describes the classif icatory approach to

describing conceptual behavior as the behaviorist view, he
also identifies a view he calls the perceptual view.

Stud-

ies which adopt this perspective base the meaning of concept

on assumptions of an affectively oriented process with less

precision in measurement on an interval scale or by quantifying comparisons.

Rowe terms these studies "perceptual.

He

indicates that perceptually-oriented psychologists might describe a concept as "a combination of meaning, feeling and

symbols which involves internal processing of information

obtained through our senses."

Finally, he states, "The per-

make a specific
ceptual process does not involve learning to

response such as giving a name.

According to Woodruff

s

16

(Clairzio, et al.
(p.

,

1970

),

it is more like giving a reaction"

19).

This differentiation between behaviorist and perceptual

views of conceptual behavior is very important to my own posi-

tion concerning conceptual learning and development.

Whereas

my own view does not characterize one type of behavior as do-

minating or even necessarily being distinct from the other,
it does call for the existence of both classif icatory and

perceptual concept formation.

Support for the existence of

concept formation during perception comes from the work of

Rudolph Arnheim.

In his work entitled Visual Thinking

(

1969

),

he states, "Strictly speaking, no percept ever refers to a

unique, individual shape but rather to the kind of pattern of

which the .percept consists... There is, therefore, no difference in principle between percept and concept, quite in keeping with the biological function of perception."

Arnheim’

view of conceptual behavior as being composed of perceptual

imagery is supported by Rom Harre’s

(

1966

kinds of conceptual analysis exist.

)

view that two main

The first answer is

by
arrived at by connecting concepts with images, the second

connecting concepts with language.
that will
What then is the definition of the term concept
be most useful in this study?

Whatever it is, it must allow

a part of perceptual
for conceptual behavior to be viewed as
concept
be in agreement with viewing

behavior.

It must also

formation as classif icatory behavior.

Therefore, it must allow

17

for enough flexibility to encompass a number of different

types of concepts, and yet still indicate a particular type

of relationship between its component parts.

Accordingly,

I

have chosen to use a definition formulated by Klausmeier and
his associates on the grounds that it does, in fact, fulfill

those criteria which
a concept is "...

I

have just described.

It states that

ordered information about the properties

of one or more things -- objects, events, or processes --

that enables any particular thing or class of things to be

differentiated from, and also related to, other things or
classes of things" (Note 2).

Classif icatory and Categorization Behavior
The human body is a truly wonderous machine.

Through

its five major modes of sensory perception, hearing, seeing,

feeling, tasting and smelling, it collects an incredible

amount of information about the world around it.

It is cap-

able of making, almost simultaneously, large numbers of dis-

criminations of amazing subtlty.

In fact, if its powers of

discrimination were used to their full potential,

it would

information
supply the mind it serves with such a wealth of
doing any
that it would literally prohibit that mind from
the senses.
work other than simply receiving messages from
ability
Therefore a paradox exists in that the very

need to adapt to
which supplies us with the information we

.
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and negotiate our environment is itself capable of destroying our ability to function in that environment.

paradox resolved?
seeming paradox

How is this

Bruner attributes the resolution of this

— the

existence of discrimination capabilities

which, if fully used, would make us slaves to the particular,
to man's capacity to categorize.

It is obvious that this

capacity and process is of no small importance.

In speaking

of concepts as categories and of their function as such, John

Flavell (1970) states that, "First and foremost, concepts
have the absolutely essential function of reducing the com-

plexity of sensory input to manageable proportions.... This

simplification function has important consequences.

For one

thing, it allows the organism a viable economy of time and

effort in dealing with the world....

For another, it leads

to the possibility of a highly adaptive anticipation of future

events from present events"

(p.

985).

In summarizing the achievements which categorization

makes possible, Bruner et al
points:

(1)

environment
fied;
(4)

(3)

;

(1956) make

the following

categorization reduces the complexity of the
(2)

it is a means by which objects arc identi

learning;
it reduces the necessity of constant

activity;
it provides direction for instrumental

(5)

events; and
allows for ordering and relating classes of
the events and
offers a way of going beyond the realm of
of the possible.
objects we encounter an d into the realm

it
(b

)

it
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What, then, do psychologists mean when they use the

terms categorization or classif icatory behavior?

As Bruner

puts it, "To categorize is to render discriminably different

things equivalent, to group the objects and events and people

around us into classes, and to respond to them in terms of
their class membership rather than their uniqueness"
In other words it is a process by abstraction:

(p.

1).

first in the

sense of abstracting from the particular instance those aspects which identify to what class this given object, event
or process belongs; and secondly in the sense of abstractly

applying a model of those aspects to other objects, events
or processes in order to discern the relationship between
the particular instance and other instances in general.
But are all concepts, or classes, of the same nature-?

Apparently not.

Many different psychologists have useu

different criteria to divide concepts or classes into types.
One basic division was made by Osgood in 1953

.

He suggested

that there are two kinds of classif icatory behavior.

"One

kind occurs when an organism responds to a common specific

element in different stimulus patterns

The other kind of

occurs
classif icatory behavior, the ’true' conceptual type

containing
when varying stimulus patterns, not necessarily
mediating abstract
any features in common, elicit a common
behavior" (Sill-,
response that serves as a cue for conceptual
two types
Osgood's differentiation between the
1968, p.

208).

of the ability to form
highlights the importance and power
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classes or categories of objects, events or processes,
that
are not discriminably similar.

Robert Clascr and William Cooley (1973) divide concepts
into three different types.

According to them, the first type

of concept is "...defined by presence or absence of certain

properties and the joint presence of certain properties and
absence of others"

844).

(p.

This is the simplest type of

format around which concepts, or categories, are formed.

A

shape fits the category of rectangles because its sides are

formed by four right angles.

Or, a shape fits the category

of squares because its sides are formed by four right angles

and they are all of equal length.
A second type of concept that Glaser and Cooley identify
is based on a more complex format.

cept, "...

This second type of con-

involves relational propositions, such as the con-

cepts of 'many,’

'few,'

and 'average;' this requires the learn-

er to think in terms of relationships between a base quantity

and a reference quantity in order to understand the rule or

abstraction that defines the concept"

(p.

844).

The third type of concept identified by Glaser and

Cooley involves the process of abstraction.
"...

concept they write:

Of this type of

as new instances are encountered by

the learner, the concepts constantly undergo revision"
844).

(p.

Examples of this type of concept are the concepts of

justice and gravity

.
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Of course, Glaser and Cooley's use of the term abstracti° n

this way highlights one of the problems any reader

faces in examining the work of different psychologists in
this field.

According to some authors, abstraction is an

integral part of any classif icatory behavior.
and Cooley it identifies only one type.

But for Glaser

In other words,

it

is the particular frame of reference that any author uses

which determines the shape his or her definition assumes

It

.

is incumbent upon the student interested in concepts and con-

cept formation to familiarize him or herself with enough

different views of this process to begin to get

a

conglomer-

ate view of all the different aspects involved.

Returning to Bruner and his associates, we see that

they,

too, identify different types of concepts; the principle dis-

tinction they make is between conjunctive, disjunctive and

relational concepts, each involving a different mode of combining attributes.

We see that this division is similar to,

although not exactly the same as, Glaser and Cooley's diversion.

For Bruner and his associates, a conjunctive category

of
is defined by the joint presence of the appropriate value

several attributes, while a disjunctive category meets one
set of appropriate values or another.

Sometimes we find that

the two
there is an arbitrariness about the combination of

disjunctive category.
sets of attributes which identify the
concept is the New York
An example of this disjunctive type of

City taxpayer.

or work s
He or she lives in New York City

New York City, or both.

m
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Obviously those two categories are sub-divisions of
the first category identified by Glaser and Cooley.

We see,

that the third category identified by Bruner and his

3.1sOj

associates is exactly the same as Glaser and Cooley’s second
Named the relational category by Bruner et al., it is

type.

defined by a specifiable relationship between defining attributes.

The fact that Bruner, et al.

,

do not isolate the

function of abstraction, at least in their 1956 publication,
only reminds us once again of the effects of the frame of

reference that is brought to bear in the work of any psychologist

.

In moving beyond the topic of dividing categories into

types, we come to a system of classes which cuts across all
the types of categories.

Identified by Bruner, et al

.

,

these

are referred to as classes of equivalence categories, and

are distinguished by the kind of response each calls for.
The three categories of equivalence are called affective

,

functional and formal.
Often we say to ourselves that something "reminds me
of

.

..," or "makes me think of ...” something else.

This type

commonly
of affective response is a dimension upon which we
class.
designate things as equivalent or as being of the same
in our lives.
This category or equivalence is learned early
it pre-dates the full deIn fact, it is learned so early that

and may, therefore,
velopment of language in the individual

resist conscious verbal insight.

Categorizing activity at
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the preverbal stage "... appears to be predominantly non-

representat ional

depending not so much on the common external

,

properties of objects as on the relation of things encountered
to intern al needs, to fol low Piaget

*

s

argument (1951), or, to

follow Schactel's, on idiosyncratic and highly personalized

impressions"

(p.

41).

Secondly, there is the category of equivalence that is

based on function.

This is also one of the earliest categor-

ies we learn, consisting during infancy of such simple and

constantly changing categories as, "things that make noise,"
and "things that are fun to chew on."

In short, the objects

of a functional category fulfill some sort of concrete and

specific task requirement.
In contrast to functional equivalence is formal equiva-

lence.

Formal categories are constructed by the act of

specifying the attribute properties that are intrinsically required by the members of a class.

It is this form of equival-

ence that allows us to operate in this world in other than a

strictly utilitarian and functional context.
In discussing the different categories of concepts and

of equivalence,

I

have alluded to the "things" we examine when

object,
we make decisions about the class membership of any

event or process.

The usual terminology used by psychologists

attributes
to designate these "things" is the term

.

A full

within which they
discussion of attributes and the categories
for me to follow
fall is not the most productive course

m
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this study.

It will suffice for us to identify the fact that

an attribute is clarified by Bruner, et al. as ”... any dis-

criminate variation from event to event"

(p.

26); and that,

"Any attribute which when changed in value alters the likeli-

hood of an object being categorized in a certain way

cntenal

is

...

a

attribute for the person doing the categorizing"

(Italics added)

(p.

31).

There is, however, one important distinction that needs
to be made concerning attributes.

That distinction, one that

will prove important later in the study, is the difference

between a criterial attribute and a defining attribute.

A de-

fining attribute is one that comes down to us from "official"
sources.

One of those "official" sources is often society.

Host of our behavior is defined as being in the class of

acceptable behavior because it meets the criteria set by
society.

There may, however, be a more immediately pragmatic

reason for using "official" criteria for classifying objects.
If people insisted on making their own decisions about which

foods were edible or not, they could easily designate their

own criterial attributes:

those foods which do not induce ill-

ness or cause death fit the category

e dible

foods

.

Unfortun-

out
ately, those people might pay a dear price for finding

the category
that a given substance was a non-exemplar of

edible foods

.

the same
"In sum, one specifies definingness in

attribute, the criterms as one specified criteriality of an
case one refers
tical difference being that the former
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official

cat e gori za.1i ion and in the latter to the categori-

zations made by a given individual or sample of individuals"
(Bruner, et al.

,

p.

32).

The Processes Underlying Classif icatory

And Categorization Behavior

Having looked at what classif icatory behavior is like
and into what categories concepts and conceptual behavior
fall, we need now to know about the underlying processes in-

volved in this behavior.

Following a discussion of those

processes, we will look at what use this view of conceptual

behavior will be for us in understanding the role the arts
might play in facilitating conceptual learning.

There are three processes which are both essential to

classif icatory behavior and of interest to us in understanding the role of arts activities in learning.

The first two

of these, the two that combine to formulate the major dynamic
of classif icatory behavior, are discrimination and generalization.

"Discrimination learning is the process by which par-

ticular situations set the occasion for the occurance of parA learner is said to

ticular behaviors in that situation.

when
have learned to discriminate between stimulus situations
and does so
he responds differently in different situations

reliably" (Glaser and Cooley, 1973,

p.

843).

Conversely,

of responses
"Generalization refers to making the same kind
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to different stimuli or

ilar

performing similar behavior in sim-

situations; it involves learning common elements and

disregarding differences so that the behavior occurs in new
situations which are in some ways similar to the situations
in which previous learning occurred"

(p.

843).

Therefore, in looking at the basic processes involved
in classif icatory behavior, we see a constant pattern of

testing and examining.

We see the learner trying, not always

successfully, to identify those objects, events, or processes
that are similar to each other and those that are dissimilar.

More importantly, for our purposes in this study, is the
fact that the learner is constantly struggling to know on

what grounds an object, event or process should be classified
as similar to another object, event or process.

The problem

derives from the fact that at any given moment the object,
event or process in question holds class membership in a
Therefore,

number of different, often unrelated, classes.

when Glaser and Cooley state, "Concept learning involves gen-

eralizing within classes and discriminating between classes,"
(p.

844

)

they may be only partially correct.

They may be

difficult
omitting the part of the problem that is often most

for the learner to solve.
involved
This brings us to the third process

ficatory behavior.

m

classi-

Bruner, et _a l
It is brought out clearly by

do not
"Science and common-sense inquiry alike

c^_o£o_ver

in the world; they inven ^
ways in which events are grouped
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ways of grouping.

The test of the invention is the predict-

ive benefits that result from the use of the invented categories"

(Italics added)

(p.

7).

It is this process of invention

that is so often over-looked in studies of classif icatory

behavior.

The realization that this process is a part of

classif icatory behavior allows us to see more clearly the role
that the arts activities might play in facilitating conceptual learning and development.

Because the subject will be

examined in more depth in a later chapter, let it suffice here
to say that the more levels at which a learner examines any

object, event or process, the more likely he or she will be
to see as many of the inherent connections it has to other

objects, events, or processes as possible.

It is the fact that

arts activities allows the student an opportunity to examine

subjects through many different modes of perception and with
a less constrained frame of reference that increases the like-

lihood that arts activities can facilitate exactly this kind
of connection making.
We have now defined a concept as ordered information

about the properties of one or more things

objects, events

class of
or processes- -that enables any particular thing or

things to be differentiated from, and also related
things or classes of things.

to,

o«_her

We have now seen that it is

behavior that we
through the process called classif icatory
processes
give order to the objects, events and

m

our lives

contrast these things in
and through which we compare and

.
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order to form new combinations of them which help us
to better accomplish our daily goals.

We have not yet, however,

adequately answered the question, how is any concept learned?
To do that we must look at a number of other views

Gagne’s and Vygotsky's Views
Of Conceptual Learning
In dealing with the nature of concepts it has been my

hope to sift through a number of different notions concerning
the definition of the term concept, and to eventually decide

upon one definition that would describe, accurately and com-

pletely, what a concept is in its purest form.

It was essen-

tial that we deal with concepts at that level first because
that is the level of definition from which most of the studies of classif icatory behavior operate.

Had we developed a

more complex view of the nature of concepts it might easily

have stood in the way of our viewing the classif icatory behavior studies within the same frame of reference used by the

authors of those studies.
At this point we should take a second look at the nature
of concepts

j

this time with an eve toward questions like,

"Are
"What kinds of concepts are taught in the schools?", or

all levels of conceptual learning the same?"

In looking at

innumerable amount
the world around us, and in recognizing the

hard to imagine that
of things we learn in a lifetime, it is
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the most efficient and accurate way of describing the
manner
in which that learning takes place is to characterize it
in

terms of one simple process.

Perhaps there is an underlying

process which can be traced throughout the various kinds of

learning situations in which we find ourselves.

Perhaps, buf

it is not necessarily true that viewing all learning as a

direct result of that process gives us an accurate account
of the way, or ways, in which we learn.

Many theorists hold that there is not one way in which
we learn, but several.

According to Robert Gagne (1965),

"There are as many different varieties of learning as there
are distinguishable conditions for learning.

These varieties

may be differentiated by means of descriptions of the factors

that comprise the learning conditions in each case"(p. 22).
He believes that in order to identify these varieties we must

look at both the capabilities internal to the learner, and
the stimulus situation outside the learner.

Based on these two conditions, the internal state of
the learner and the external state of the stimulus situation,

Gagne has identified eight distinct types of learning.

The

typology is hierarchial in nature because the conditions that
define any given type of learning become, in turn, the pre-

conditions for the consequent type of learning.

A cursory

following Gagne
view of the stages preceding and immediately

type of learning, called concept learning

,

may help us to

their nature
better understand his view of concepts and

s
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The simplest form of learning identified by Gagne is

signal learning.

As indicated above, Gagne defines signal

learning, and every other type of learning, by describing
the internal state of the learner and the external stimulus

situation that comprise the conditions under which the learning takes place.

lishment of

...

He states:

"The conditions for the estab-

signal learning seem fairly clear.

There

must be nearly simultaneous presentation of two forms of

stimulation:

(1)

the stimulus producing a generalized react-

ion of the sort one is interested in establishing; and (2)

the stimulus providing the signal" (p.

34).

Gagne emphasizes

that the responses that are typical of this type of learning
are usually general, diffuse and emotional, and that this

learning has an involuntary character.
Very similar to signal learning is the type of learning

identified by many theorists as the basis of all learning,
namely, stimulus-response learning

.

Gagne, however, different-

iates clearly between signal learning and stimulus-response

learning

.

He states:

"Obviously, this kind of learning is

distinguishable from signal learning in terms of its outcome.
fairly precise, cir
The response acquired by this means is a
from the
cumscribed, skeletal muscular act, far different

characterized the
generalized emotional responding that

Pavlovian kind of signal responding"

(p.

55).

The four con-

defining conditions for
ditions that Gagne indicates are the
(1) there is a gradualness
stimulus-response learning are:
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of learning;

(2)

more precise;

the learner’s response becomes gradually

(3)

the controlling stimulus becomes slowly

more precise; and (4) the learning is based on reward.

A third type of learning identified by Gagne is called

chaining

.

He describes this form as "extremely simple and

widely occurring,"

39)

(p.

and states, "In brief terms, it is

a matter of connecting together in a sequence two (or more)

previously learned Ss--R’s"
is clearly,

(p.

59).

This type of learning

then, based on preceding forms of learning.

conditions which define chaining are as follows:

(1)

The

the in-

dividual links in the chain must have been previously established;

(2)

there must be a continuity of each link with the

next following one; and (3) when the two previous conditions
are fully met, it appears that the acquisition of a chain is
not a gradual process, but one which occurs on a single occa-

sion

.

The fourth type of learning identified by Gagne is

verbal association

.

The conditions essential to this type of

learning are more easily seen if we refer to Gagne’s example
of how a person learns the French word for match, alumette.

The conditions are as follows:

(1)

there must be a

match and an internal response or visual image of
(2)

there must be a Ss

—R

Ss— R

for

a match;

for that response or image and the

differentiation
word fragment ”lum" (in other words, response
connection" must
must have previously occurred); (3) a "coding
code by the individual
also be available (the selection of this
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depends on his or her own previous experiences); and

(4)

the

chain must be "reeled off" in a sequence so that each Ss

R

is contiguous in time with the next.

Multiple discrimination

,

the fifth type of learning

identified by Gagne is of a slightly different nature.

As

Gagne puts it, "... the prominent characteristic of multiple

discrimination is not the acquisition of new entities... (it)
is the interference that must be overcome if retention is to

be assumed"

(p.

47).

The conditions involved in multiple dis-

crimination are as follows:

(1)

individual chains connecting

each distinctive stimulus with each identifying response must
be learned.

This, of course, implies that the individual

Ss--R’s that differentiate the stimuli must have been pre-

viously learned, as well as the response names themselves:
(2)

In order to ensure retention, measures must be taken to

reduce interference.
This brings us at last to the type of learning called

concept learning

,

which Gagne describes as, "... a kind of

learning that appears to be critically dependent on internal
neural processes of representation for its very existence"
(p.

47).

While, admitting that the process of forming concepts

be
is so complex that it causes any attempt to describe it to

tentative and susceptible to refute, he states:

Whatever

concept
the process may be, there can be little doubt that a

enables the inlike cube is learned, and that its possession

physical
dividual to classify objects of widely differing
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being described by Gagne, a stimulus pattern, discriminated
from others and chained to a label, that is presented a number of times in different situations?
are.
is.

Certainly some of them

Children do go to school and learn what

a

parallelogram

They are told about, or discover for themselves

,

what

the criterial attributes of parallelograms are, and they

usually do attach this idea to a verbal label.

In fact, they

probably do accomplish this by encountering parallelograms in
a number of different situations from which they are able to

discriminate what those criterial attributes of parallelograms are.

In addition, this process is aided by the teacher

giving them the proper definition of parallelograms.
But do all concepts fit this description?

Do we spend

most of our time in school learning about things of which we

have no prior knowledge at all?
supply and demand

,

When we study democracy or

does the process fit the single model that

Gagne would have us use?

Probably not!

The concepts we learn

model
in school are much more complex than Gagne's simple

would lead us to believe.

We learn that a silo full of grain

combustion.
can erupt into flame as a result of spontaneou s

and we know what
But we already know what spontaneous means

combustion is.

know,
If we grew up on a farm we might even

of spontaneous co m^
and possibly have even seen, the results
simple matter of identibustion in this context. This is no
of
No, this is a complex process
fying criterial attributes.

about the
overlaying one "set of ordered information

35

properties of an object, event or process that enables that

particular thing or class of things to be differentiated from,
and related to, other things or classes of things,” over ano-

ther set of ordered information, etc.

This is a process of

combining two "knowns" to arrive at a third "known" within

a

"newly realized" context.
To this point Gagne's formulation has left us short of

our goal of describing the process by which real people learn
However, examine carefully Gagne's next type

real concepts.
of learning.

He describes it as, "... a chain of two or more

concepts"

53).

(1)

(p.

The conditions which define it are:

the individual must already understand the concepts to

be chained;

(2)

it requires only a statement of the major re-

lationship involved; (3) the learning occurs on
sion.

a single occa-

Now this model seems to coincide fairly closely with

the way in which we learn about spontaneous combustion.

It

previous
seems to take into account the tremendous amount of
It
concept.
learning that we brought to bear in learning the
information,
also allows for the overlaying of sets of ordered

etc.

within newly realized contexts.

type of learning as principle learning

Gagne refers to this
.

In
caused confusion.
We see, then that terminology has
concepts, Gagne refers
effect, what we commonly refer to as

to as principles.

that
What is more important, however, is

concepts or anything
whatever we call them, principles or

children in school are much
else, these things that we teach
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more complex and are members of much more complicated
inter-

relationships than our view of conceptual behavior as classificatory behavior would have led us to believe.

Flavell, in

discussing the viability of thinking of concepts as equivalence
responses states; "There is one further property which surely

characterizes all ’higher-order' equivalence responses -- at
least, that is, all responses everyone would be comfortable
in calling 'concepts;'

the contents of the individual's con-

ceptual repertoire are complexly inter-related to form

conceptual systems" (1970,

p.

986).

He goes on to say; "The

argument was made earlier that an equivalence-response charac-

terization of concepts fails to convey all that we sense to
be important about them.

.

.

One thing it fails to convey is

this extraordinary inter-dependence among concepts"

(p.

986).

If, according to Gagne, conceptual learning and principle

learning are the result of development through
model, what of the learner?

a

hierarchial

Is he or she born with the capa-

city to function at any of the levels of learning if the

stimulus situation and his or her prior history meets the re-

quired conditions of that type of learning?

This question

brings us to another view of concepts and conceptual behavior

believe is important to this discussion,

which

I

L.

Vygotsky.

S.

the view of

It is developmental in nature and has great

relevance to any discussion of how children learn concepts.
at
An appropriate point of departure for our look

concluding
Vygotsky's work is the statement he made after
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extensive studies of concept formation in children from
to adolescence (1962).

infarcy

"The principal findings of our study

may be summarized as follows:

The development of the pro-

cesses which eventually result in concept formation begins
in earliest childhood, but the intellectual functions that in
a specific combination form the psychological basis of the

process of concept formation ripen, take shape and develop
only at puberty" (p.

53).

He attributes this phenomenon to

the fact that it is not until adolescence that children learn
to use words as a tool for concept formation:

ificative use of the word, its use as

a

"The new sign-

means of concept

formation is the immediate psychological cause of the radical
change in the intellectual process that occurs on the threshold of adolescence"

(p.

59).

Assuming this to be an accurate account, the question
that must interest us is, what is the nature of conceptual

behavior before the onset of puberty?

Vygotsky characterizes

conceptual behavior during this period as consisting of three
discrete phases, two of which combine to result in

true

con-

It will serve us well to take a brief look

cept formation.

grounds that,
at the developmental stages he proposes, on the
kinds of learnif they are correct, they prescribe both the
that are
ing that are possible and the kinds of teaching

appropriate during those stages.
is the stage of
The first stage identified by Vygotsky
During
sub-stages.
syncretic images and consists o f three
,

.
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this stage, the young child takes the first step toward
concept formation when he or she puts together a number of

objects in an u norganized congries

,

or "heap,” in order to

solve a problem that adults might normally solve by forming
a new concept.

Words are used by the child to denote classes

of objects but not in the same way adults use them.

"At that

stage, word meaning denotes nothing more to the child than a

vague syncretic conglomeration of individual objects that have

somehow or other coalesced into an image in his mind"
GO).

59-

(pp.

Also, words reflect objective characteristics of objects

only to the degree that they coincide with the more subjective percepts and impressions the child has of those objects.

Therefore, many words have, in part

,

the same meaning to the

child and. the adult, especially words referring to concrete

objects
The three sub-stages identified by Vygotsky are termed,

trial and error, organization of the child's visual field

,

and elements taken from different groups or heaps that have

already been formed by the child.

In trial and error

,

any

group of objects is created at random, and each object that
is added is a mere guess or trial.

child’s visual field

,

In organization of the

"The syncretic image or group is formed

as a result of the single elements’

contiguity in space or

complex
time, or of their being brought into some other more

relationship by the child's immediate perception"

(p.

title.
The final sub-stage is described aptly by its

60).
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the child takes elements from groups he or she has already

formed by using one or the other of the above mentioned processes.

The importance of this sub-stage is that the child

now goes through a two-step operation, but this more elaborate operation remains syncretic and results in an order that
of heaps.
is no more sophisticated than the simple assembling

The second stage of conceptual behavior identified by

Vygotsky is the stage of using complexes

.

Perhaps it is

this stage by
easiest to describe the child’s thought during

during this
indicating the typical behavior of the child
task exercise.
stage as he or she takes part in a sorting
geometric shapes into
The task is to sort variously colored
sub-categories.
The behavior will fall into five
categories.
level of associative complexes
As the child functions on the

nuclear object because it
the child may add one block to the
color or size,
the nuclear object in shape, or
is similar to

•

happens to strike him or her.
or any other dimension that
In this stage, objects
ns.
Later the child forms collectio
they
basis of some trait in which
the
on
together
placed
are
complement one another
differ and therefore they
child will evince will
Another form of grouping the
joining of
These are a consecutive
complexes.
chain
involve
carconsecutive chain with meanings
a
into
links
individual
from
An example pattern
next.
the
to
link
one
ried over from
green
triangle, red triangle,
yellow
be:
this category might
square, etc.
blue square, yellow
triangle,
blue
triangle,
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the child’s thinking reflects the use of diffuse
complexes

they are marked by the fluidity of the attribute that
unites
the single elements of the group.

An example of this would

be trapezoids being grouped with triangles because they

remind the child of triangles with their tops cut off.
The final type of complex identified by Vygotsky is

the pseudo-complex

.

In this instance, "... the generaliza-

tion formed in the child’s mind, although phenotypical ly

resembling the adult concept, is psychologically very different from the concept proper; in its essence, it is still a

complex"

(p.

66).

In other words, while the categorization

the child makes is identical to the one made by an adult,
it is made for reasons other than the ones used by adults;
it

is often based on the processes involved in one of the

other types of complexes previously mentioned.
The third stage of conceptual development, as identi-

fied by Vygotsky, does not occur after the second stage, but

rather, it occurs concurrently with the second stage.

As the

child moves through the stage of thinking in complexes he or
she also moves through the stage of developing abstraction

.

The importance of abstraction is indicated by Vygotsky when
he states, "... the advanced concept presupposes more than

unification.

To form such a concept it is also necessary to

abstract, to single out elements, and to view any abstracted
experience
elements apart from ^he totality of the concrete
in which they are imbedded"

(p.

76).
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The stage of abstraction is also divided into substages.

The first of these is the stage of maximally-similar

groupings.

In these, "The attributes which, added up, make

an object maximally similar to the sample become the focus
of attention and are thereby, in a sense, abstracted from

the attributes to which the child attends less"

(p.

77).

Although these relationships are vague, Vygotsky reminds us
that, "... the global character of the child's perception

has been breached.

An object's attributes have been divided

into two parts unequally attended to -- a beginning of posi-

tive and negative abstraction"

(p.

77).

The second and final sub-stage of the abstraction stage
is the use of potential concepts

.

During this period, group-

ing is done on the basis of a single attribute.

Potential con-

cepts are very similar to pseudo- concepts in that they also

phenotypically resemble true conceptual groupings while being
formulated on abstractions other than those used in true concepts.
is

The importance attached to this sub-stage by Vygotsky

reflected in this statement:

"In potential concepts proper,

a trait once abstracted is not easily lost again among other

traits.

The concrete totality of traits has been destroyed

through its abstraction, and the possibility of unifying the
traits on a different basis opens up"

marizes with the statement:

(p.

78).

Vygotsky sum-

"Only the mastery of abstraction,

the child to
combined with advanced complex thinking, enables

progress to the formulation of genuine concepts.

He
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continues:

"The decisive role in this process... is played
by

the word, deliberately used to direct all the past processes
of advanced concept formation” (p.

78

).

What then is the picture of pre-conceptual behavior
that we derive from examining Vygotsky's work?

We see that

the earliest thought is both syncretic and egocentric.

Things are grouped together on the basis of fluid rules

which derive more from

a

child's subjective experience with

objects than from their actual attributes.

As this charac-

teristic fades it is replaced by grouping based on objective
attributes, but the procedures used for grouping are still
fluid and lack stability.

It is not until this basis for

grouping begins to stabalize and the child simultaneously
learns to. abstract relevant from irrelevant attributes does
the child begin to take part in true conceptual behavior.

Vygotsky's view of language as the key process in concept formation is challenged by theories that will be examined

later in this study.

As we will see, the issue will be an

important factor in determining the potential the arts have
for facilitating conceptual learning and development.
As we conclude this discussion of the work of Gagne and

Vygotsky, we must remember why their ideas have been discussed.
about the
We have seen that a concept is ordered information

enables any
properties of an object, event, or process, that
from,
particular thing or class of things to be differentiated

of things.
and also related to, other things or classes

We
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have seen that conceptual behavior relies on the basic function of categorization.

But now, we have also seen that

concepts are complex and exist within complicated systems of

inter-relationships.

And, we have also examined an argument

which proposes that conceptual growth is governed by

opmental progression.

a

devel-

This brings us to our next step in

answering the question, How is any concept learned?

Piaget’s View of Conceptual Behavior
In the section on classif icatory and categorization

behavior,

I

mentioned briefly the stimulus-response paradigm

for conceptual learning and more specifically, T.

S.

Kendler's

definition, ’’Concept formation is taken to imply the acquisition or utilization, or both, of a common response to dissi-

milar stimuli

”

(H.

Kendler, 1964,

p.

218).

In the sub-

sequent section we saw that Gagne described a type of learning
he called stimulus-response learning

,

and that, based on the

hierarchial nature of his typology, he viewed this type of
of learning
learning as the basis for all the consequent forms

he described.

On the other hand,

Howard Kendler's comment on the

T.

I

have also referred to
S.

Kendler definition.

In

the stimulus-response
that comment, he indicated that although
conceptual b„h
paradigm seemed adequate for describing

inspection it was found to be
at first glance, on further

with the work Piaget had
lacking, especially if contrasted
the
In order to fully appreciate
done in this field.
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importance of this distinction we must carefully
examine

Piaget’s view of conceptual behavior.

In examining it

I

hope we will come to both recognize the dynamics of
learning

that Piaget considers are the underlying basis of the process
itself, and, also, to see more clearly the validity, or lack

thereof, of using the stimulus-response paradigm to explain

conceptual behavior.
In the 1970 formulation of his views

,

Piaget begins

his discussion of conceptual behavior by explaining his view
of the relationship between subject and object in the process

of learning.

Initially he states that the external world is

commonly viewed as entirely separate from the subject.

There-

fore, any objective knowledge appears to be simply the result
of a set of perceptive recordings, motor associations, verbal

descriptions and the like which all participate in producing
a sort of figurative copy of objects and the connections be-

tween them.

Later he continues:

"In such an empiricist pros-

pect, the content of intelligence comes from outside, and the

coordinations that organize it are only the consequences of
language and symbolic instruments"

(p.

703).

But Piaget disagrees with this view of knowledge exist-

ing independently of the learner.

He believes that knowledge

and the
is the product of an interaction between the subject

object of knowledge.

"Actually," he states, "in order to

therefore
know objects the subject must act upon them and

transform them..."

(p.

704).

He explains.

"From the most

•
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elementary sensorimotor actions (such as pulling and
pushing)
to the most sophisticated intellectual operations, which
are

interorganized actions, carried out mentally (e.g., joining
together, putting in order, putting into one-to-one corres-

pondence), knowledge is constantly linked with actions or

operations, that is, with transformations "

(p.

704).

But what is it that Piaget means when he says that

learning is linked with transformation?

Is he trying to

indicate that the actual object itself is transformed?

In

order to understand Piaget’s use of the term transformation
in this context, we must take the time to understand the

three processes upon which he bases conceptual learning.

Those three processes are ass imilat ion

adaptation

,

accommodation and

.

In describing the process by which we learn any concept,

Piaget indicates that the fundamental connections that occur
as a result of development cannot be considered attributable

to association; rather they must, be considered as biological

and intellectual assimilations

assimilation?

He continues:

.

But what is the process of

"From a biological point of

view, assimilation is the integration of external elements

into evolving or completed structures of an organism
(p.

707).

.

.

He goes on to say that it is also appropriate to

including
view this general process as applying to behavior,
structure.
conceptual behavior, as well as morphological

essential it
In fact, Piaget goes on to point out how

learning in particular,
is to view behavior in general, and

.
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as a product of this process of assimilation.

He indicates

that no behavior, even if it is new to the individual, con-

stitutes an absolute beginning.

It is always grafted onto

previous behaviors and experiences and therefore amounts to

assimilating new elements into already constructed structures.
Logically, then, to lose sight of the fact that new behavior
is not adopted without being attached to, or taken into by,

previous forms of behavior, in some way, is to lose sight of
one of the most important dynamics underlying the processes

involved in learning.
It is upon this idea that Piaget bases his refutation

of the use of the stimulus-response paradigm to explain con-

ceptual behavior.

He believes that the stimulus-response

theory is .inadequate as general formulation of behavior
when taken in this context.

He states, "When we say an or-

ganism or a subject is sensitized to a stimulus and able to
make a response to it, we imply it already possesses a scheme
or a structure to which this stimulus is assimilated.

.

.

This scheme consists precisely of a capacity to respond"
(p.

What does this imply about the stimulus-response

707).

should
paradigm? "Hence, the original stimulus-response scheme
S--.R form, but in the
not have been written in the unilateral

form:

assimilation of
S4-> R or S-*(AT)~>R where AT is the

the stimulus
If

I

S

to the structure T"

(p.

707).

may digress from Piaget's ideas for

a

moment, it

point out briefly an
seems appropriate, here, for me to
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argument made by Flavell concerning the view of concepts as

equivalence responses, since it also refutes the use of the

stimulus-response paradigm to explain conceptual behavior.
The view of concepts as equivalence responses is usually

based on the stimulus-response paradigm, and as one view
stands or falls, so, often, does the other.
out that "...

Flavell points

it is uncertain whether all concepts literally

entail equivalence responses, and more generally, whether

a

description in terms of ’equivalence’ and ’response’ always
gets to the heart of what is really involved in concept making and concept using"

(1970, p.

984).

In stating his arguments against the "equivalence res-

ponse" view of concepts, Flavell begins with the following

statements which seem to be true of at least some prima
facie concepts: "(1) the concept need not be acquired at
all;

(2)

if acquired, it need not be acquired through a pro-

cess of successive common responding to the different relevant

objects;

(3.)

there may in fact be only one such object to

which the concept can apply, and hence the 'equivalence'
part of the characterization is not literally applicable."

attention
Flavell strengthens his argument by directing his

equivalence resto those entities which are most definitely
reac"... It is similarly questionable whether all
ponses.
responses are equally
tions which are indisputably equivalence

indisputably concepts."
bers of one diverse

c lass

He explains:

"I respond to all mem-

of stimuli by sneezing; any
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member of another group of inputs makes me drowsy

.

.

.

These

and many other humble reactions appear to fit the definition
of equivalence response, but most people would be loathe to

apply the designation ’concept’ to them”

(p.

984).

Piaget and Flavell both give us strong arguments for
not viewing conceptual behavior in the simplistic stimulus-

response, or equivalence response scheme.

It is important

to remember however, that these arguments in no way negate

the role of classif icatory behavior in concept formation.

What they do imply, along with the ideas of Gagne and

Vygotsky, is that classes are formed in a more dynamic and

complex manner than the stimulus-response paradigm might
lead us to believe.
In .regard to Piaget's work the question arises, does

the process of assimilation alone describe what occurs in

learning?
no.

The answer, as

I

have indicated previously, is

Along with the process of assimilation, Piaget proposes

two other processes

,

accommodation and adaptation

describes accommodation in the following manner.

.

Piaget
...

in the

modification
field of behavior we shall call accommodation any
the elements it
of an assimilatory scheme or structure by
In other words, when any structure,
708).

assimilates”

(p.

new element, it
morphological or behavioral, assimilates any
becomes part of
transforms that element while that element

the structure itself.

Therefore, not only is the element

itself.
transformed, so, also, is the structure

The process

..
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can be characterized as one of mutual transformation.

This notion of mutual transformation is the basis of
the process Piaget refers to as adaptation

adaptation in the following manner:

.

He describes

"Hence, cognitive adapt-

ation, like its biological counterpart, consists of an equi-

librium between assimilation and accommodat ion
no assimilation without accommodation

emphasize the fact that accommodation
simultaneous assimilation either"

(p.

.

•

•

There is

•

But we must strongly

does not exist without
708).

In examining the work of Piaget we get a view of learn-

ing through interaction, a picture of interplay between the

learner and the learned.

A view of knowledge neither aris-

ing from objects nor from the subject, but rather, from

And what

interactions between the subject and the object.

does this view imply to us concerning the facilitation of the

learning of concepts?
which

I

We are reminded of Bruner's statement

referred to before, "Science and common sense inquiry

alike do not discover the ways in which events are grouped
in the world; they invent ways of grouping"

1956, p.

7).

(Bruner, et al

,

Piaget extends the notion with the statement:

"The problem we must solve in order to explain cognitive de-

velopment, is that of invent ion and not of mere copying
the concepts of assimilation and accommodation

•

.

.

are oriented

all
toward this inventive construction which characterizes

living thought" (p. 714).

And to me, at least, all of this

of a conimplies that if we are to facilitate the learning
to manipul
cept, we must allow the student an opportunity
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the psychological referents of the concept in a way that

maximizes the opportunity for the concept to be transformed
and thereby assimilated into the cognitive structure that

already exists within him or her.

This, in turn, will

facilitate the accommodation of that cognitive structure
to the concept.

In later chapters

I

hope to show that it

is possible that arts activities might allow that very type

of manipulation to occur.

For now, let us examine a theory

of learning that grows very directly out of the theoretical

position Piaget has established.

Ausubel’s Theory of Meaningful Learning
We have travelled a long, sometimes circuitious, route
in attempting to answer the question,

How is any concept

Our final leg of the journey will entail a dis-

learned?

cussion of a more pedogogically oriented theory, one that is
This theory

very similar in nature and content to Piaget’s.
is David Ausubel’s theory of meaningful learning

.

Ausubel (1966) divides learning into types along two
dimensions.

The first dimension consists of reception and

discovery learning.

The second dimension consists of mean-

ingful and rote learning.

The two dimensions intersect to

theoretically form four combinations:

meaningf ul reception

reception learn
learning; meaningful discovery learning; rote

mg; and

rote discovery learning.

.

.
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Although the differentiation between meaningful and
rote learning is the aspect of this theory which is most

germane to our discussion, it will be useful if we take a

brief look at the difference between reception and discovery
learning
Perhaps the most common form of learning that takes
place as a result of traditional schooling practices is

reception learning.

Ausubel describes reception learning

in the following manner:

"In reception learning the prin-

cipal content of what is learned is presented to the learner
in more or less final form.

.

.

He is only required to inter-

nalize or incorporate the material... that is presented to

him so that it is available for reproduction, or other use
at some future date"

(p.

158).

Memorizing formulas, defini-

tions and rules of punctuation, etc., are all prime examples
of reception learning (although it is important to remember
it is not the formulas,

definitions, or rules themselves

that define this as reception learning; it is the process of

memorization)

Antithetical to the process of reception learning
the process of. discovery learning.

Ausubel states.

is

The

essential feature of discovery learning, on the other hand,
be learned is
is that the principal content of what is to

before he
not given but must be discovered by the learner
can internalize it"

(p.

158).

In other words, an activity

through which the learner identifies

a

concept as a result
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of having abstracted its criterial attributes on his or
her

own would be characterized as a discovery learning activity.

The terminology, reception and discovery learning, has

enjoyed fairly common use by educators over the last several
years.
ing

.

This is especially true of the term discovery learn-

For a while, discovery learning was the hottest educa-

tional approach around, and authors produced tremendous
amounts of material singing the praises of the approach in
general or of a specific "discovery method" in particular.
As this material proliferated, however, there grew up with
it a misconception.

People began to associate meaningful

learning with discovery learning, and rote learning with

reception learning.
Ausubel is very adamant about clearing up this misconception.

For him, in no way does reception learning necess-

arily result in rote learning nor discovery learning

necessarily result in meaningful learning.
in both instances

,

He believes that

meaningful learning takes place if the

learning task is related in a nonarbitrary and nonverbatim
fashion to the existing cognitive structure of the learner.
In further discussing this issue, he says, of meaningful

learning:

"This presupposes (a) that the learner manifests

a meaningful learning set

,

that is, a set to relate the new

what he
learning task nonarbitrarily and substantively to

itself is poten already knows and (b) that the learning task
his structure
tially meaningful to him, namely, relatable to

.
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of knowledge on a non-arbitrary and nonverbatim
basis”
158).

(p.

Thus, no matter how much potential there is for
some

material to be meaningful for the learner, he or she has
tc
bring the proper intent to the learning situation if meaningful learning is to occur.

Conversely, no matter what the

learner's intent is, the material has to be potentially

meaningful if meaningful learning is to take place.
Ausubel defines meaningful learning in terms of its

meeting two criteria.

First, meaningful learning must be

nonarbitrary as evidenced by its concepts being related to
existing ideas in a particular subject's cognitive structure
as examples, derivatives, subcategories, special classes,

extensions or qualifications, or as combinations of the new
material and existing ideas.

Nonarbitrariness "... implies

some plausible or reasonable basis for establishing the

relationship between the new material and the relevant ideas
in question"

(p.

160).

Secondly, meaningful learning must

be substantive as evidenced by the fact that an equivalent

symbol or group of symbols could be similarly related to the
same relevant ideas without resulting in any change in

meaning
An example will help us to clarify this lengthy definition.

The meaningful learning of the concept run-on sentence

will serve nicely.

According to this definition, a student

has meaningfully learned this concept when:

(1)

he or she

two
comes to view it as a derivative of the combination of
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previously held concepts -- sentence and to over-flow
(2)

;

and

that relationship is not stated only as a verbatim verbal

proposition.

The conditions of Ausubel’

definition are met

s

because if a particular subject already holds the concepts
sentence and to over-flow, then the combination of those two

concepts to form a third is a logical and relatively simple
Therefore, there is some reasonable relation between

step.

the new material and the subject’s existing cognitive structure.
I

have discussed previously Ausubel

’

s

belief that for

meaningful learning to take place two conditions must be
met:

the learner must assume a meaningful learning set, and

the material must be potentially meaningful.

Now that we

have examined more closely exactly what it is that Ausubel

means by meaningful learning

,

it is not difficult for us to

understand what a meaningful learning set is.
potential meaning ?

But what about

Do we have enough information about what

it is that Ausubel means when he uses this term for us to

really understand it?

It will serve us well to examine this

topic more closely.

Within the larger context of meaningful learning,
logical
Ausubel also differentiates between psychological and

meaning.

He states:

"Psychological meaning is the actual or

phenomenological product of a meaningful learning process.
content that results
It refers to the idiosyncratic cognitive

meaningful learning
when a particular learner, employing a

:
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set, relates potentially meaningful material to
relevant ideas
in his cognitive structure."

He continues:

"Logical mean-

Ocher hand, refers only to the potential meaning

ill 6>

inherent in symbolic material, that is, whether it is relat—
able on a nonarbitrary and substantive basis to the relevant
ideas in any appropriately mature hypothetical cognitive

structure" (p. 161).
to be learned.

Logical meaning resides in the object

It is evidenced by a potential to be related

to a given learner's existing cognitive structure.

The com-

bination of logical meaning with a meaningful learning set
facilitates meaningful learning, the product of which

is

psychological meaning.
Having made our way through this sometimes confusing
maze of definitions,

I

would like to pose three questions

that might enable us to bring this discussion into perspective.

They are:

(1) What is the significance of meaningful

learning as Ausubel sees

it?*,

(2)

What is the relevance of

this formulation to our discussion?; and (3) If this formula-

tion of meaningful learning is both significant and relevant,

how do we go about facilitating meaningful learning?
It appears that the most logical way of answering the

first question is to allow Ausubel to speak for himself.

He

states
Hence, the tremendous efficiency of meaningful learning as an information-processing and storing mechanism
that
can be largely attributed to the two properties
First,
make learning material potentially meaningful.
meaningful
by nonarbitrarily relating potentially
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to established ideas in his cognitive
structure, the learner can effectively exploit his
existing knowledge as an ideational and organizational matrix for the incorporation of new knowledge.
Nonarbitrary incorporation of a learning
task into relevant portions of cognitive structure
so that new meanings are acquired, implies that
the new learning material becomes an organic part
of an existing, hierarchially organized ideational
system.
Thus, as a result of this type of anchorage to cognitive structure, the newly learned
material is no longer dependent for its incorporation and retention on the frail human capacity for
assimilating and retaining arbitrary associations.
This anchoring process also protects the newly
incorporated information from the interferring
effects of previously learned and subsequently
encountered similar materials that are so damaging in rote learning.
The temporal span of retention is, therefore, greatly extended.
Second, the
substantive or non-verbatim nature of thus relating new material to and incorporating it within
cognitive structure, circumvents the drastic limitations imposed by the short item and time spans
of verbatim learning on the processing of information.
Much more can obviously be apprehended and
retained if the learner is required to assimilate
only the substance of ideas rather than the verbatim
language used in expressing them (p. 161-162).
If we accept Ausubel’s view as accurate, that leads us

to our second, and more important question, what is the rele-

vance of this information to our discussion?
this question,

I

In answering

would say, first, this formulation

definitely relevant to our larger discussion.

is_

most

For all of our

growing understanding of the nature of concepts and concept
formation, we have not, until now, dealt with a theoretical

position which afforded us insights into effective ways of
that
teaching the kind of complex and interrelated concepts

conceptual teaching
we have discovered make up the majority of
we do in the schools.

Ausubel’s formulation allows us to see

.
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s

processes of assimilation end accommodation

might look like when they are applied to the problem of

teaching concepts like spontaneous combustion

.

It describes

assimilation in terms of an existing cognitive structure
which, already holding the concepts of spontaneous and com-

bustion, assimilates the concept spontaneous combustion as a

derivative of the combination of both previously held concepts.

The accommodation of that existing cognitive struc-

ture is implied in the fact that

,

where it once contained

only two concepts with the potential of being combined to
form a new concept, it now, in fact, contains that new
concept
For all of this formulation's relevance to our discussion, however, it is still important for us to take one step

further if we are to conclude this chapter more able to

answer the question
were when we started.

than we

How is any concept learned?
I

must answer our third question, how

do we go about facilitating meaningful learning?

Fortunately,

Ausubel is well prepared to help with the task.
The way that Ausubel answers the question, How do we

facilitate meaningful learning?, is by asking the question,
meaningwhat makes a learner more ready to learn a concept

fully?

him to
This, of course, is a logical perspective for

him
take since meaningful learning is viewed by
a new concept,

m

terms of

usually a given in the equation (e.g., spon-

structure, the part of
taneous combustion), and a cognitive

.

:
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the equation upon which he feels we can make impact.

There-

fore, since we cannot change the concept to fit the cognitive

structure, we

win

have to make the cognitive structure more

ready to accept the concept.

Gagne shared this view and

attributed this "readiness" to the presence of prerequisite
subordinate capabilities that form the foundation for the
learning of more complex superordinate abilities (Hunt and
Sullivan, 1974,

149).

p.

Before we go on,

I

should point out that although it

is possible to conceive of readiness as being determined by

maturation, this is not the stance that Ausubel takes.

Readi-

ness, as Ausubel conceives of it, presupposes appropriate

maturation
Readiness, according to Ausubel, refers to the
adequacy of existing cognitive capacity or level of
cognitive functioning ... On the other hand, maturation has a different and much more restricted meaning that includes those increments in a capacity
that take place in the demonstrable absense of specific practice experience, that is, those increments
that are attributable to genic influences and/or
Maturation, therefore, is
incidental experience.
not the same as readiness but is merely one of the
two principle factors (the other being learning)
that contribute to or determine the organism’s
developmental readiness for coping with new learnReadiness, therefore, does not necessaring tasks.
ily depend on maturation alone but may result irom
cumulative prior learning experience (Hunt and
Sullivan, 1974, p. 188).
Given the appropriate level of maturation, how do we

accomplish readiness?
adv ance organizer

manner

,

Ausubel proposes that the use of an

which can be described in the following

material
"An advance organizer is introductory
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presented in advance of, and at a higher
level of generality,
inclusiveness, and abstraction than the
learning task itself

mat

is designed to provide a cognitive
anchor for the learn-

ing task"

(Hunt and Sullivan, 1974, p.

195).

Later he states:

"An advance organizer is also intended to
increase the dis-

criminability between the new ideas and related ideas in
cognitive structure"

(p.

a

195).

What does this discussion of meaningful learning and

advance organizers imply for us?

One of the things it implies

is that if arts activities can function as advance organizers

or facilitate meaningful learning in some other way, then

they could be of great use in facilitating the learning of
concepts.

What would they have to do to function in this

capacity?.

They could be considered advance organizers if

they could make clear to the learner, in some way, the super-

ordinate-subordinate relation between the concept they are
learning and concepts they already hold.

They could also be

considered advance organizers if they could increase the dis-

criminability between similar concepts.

They could facilitate

meaningful learning in general if they could contribute to
learning being nonarbitrary and substantive.
ties have the power to do these things?

Do arts activi-

That is a question

which will be the focal point of the next chapter.
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Summary

How is it that any concept is learned?

This is an

essential question in that no approach to
conceptual learning
and development can be evaluated without
first being put into
the context of the process by which any concept
is learned.
In answering the question, our view of what
a concept is has

moved from a simple "pure" definition, through the
essential
process upon which conceptual behavior is based, to a more

complex view of what the concepts we teach in school are
like.

We then came to grips with clarifying the dynamics

involved in learning a concept, and finally have put the

conglomerate view into the context of

pedagogical approach

a

to the process of learning concepts.

As a result of the examination of so many views, we

hope to be more able to answer the question, is it theore-

tically possible for arts activities to facilitate conceptual
learning and development?

I

believe that by using Ausubel’s

theory we will now have configuration that adequately describes how that learning takes place.

I

have chosen to use

Ausubel's configuration because it adequately encompasses the

major dynamics upon which other appropriate configurations
were based and because it is nicely suited to serve as a

point of reference as we examine the Integrated Arts Experience

(

IAE ) and its relation to conceptual learning.

We have seen that classif icatory or categorization be-

havior, as it is described by Bruner and others, plays an
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important part in conceptual learning.

We have also seen

from the work of Robert Gagne, however, that that theoretical formulation does not adequately describe the real

concepts that real children learn in school.

It has also

been shown that while Gagne's formulation of principle learning,

does give us a more accurate view of the kind of learning

that goes on in schools, it does not speak to the issue of
the interaction between the learner and the learned as it
is described by Piaget.

It is Ausubel's theory of meaning-

ful learning which combines all of these views and then applies

them in a form that addresses pedagogical concerns.

As such,

when we use Ausubel's configuration as our operational representation of the process by which conceptual learning takes
place,

we.

use a formation which both maintains the integrity

of and goes beyond each of the above-mentioned positions.

The other major advantage of using Ausubel's configura-

tion is that it gives us two well-def ined criteria to meet if
we are to assume that meaningful conceptual learning will take

place.

These two criteria are that learning is non-arbitrary

and substantive.

Therefore, in Chapter IV we will be able to

theoretically evaluate the ability of the IAE to facilitate
conceptual learning by determining the degree to which it
can facilitate learning being nonarbitrary and substantive.
terms of
To do that, however, we must first examine IAE in
its characteristics as they relate to this issue.

.

.
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CHAPTER III
WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IAE THAT

ENABLE IT TO FACILITATE THE LEARNING OF CONCEPTS?
In beginning this discussion of whether or not the

Integrated Arts Experience (IAE) should be used to facilitate conceptual learning and development,

I

indicated that

we must first answer the question, Is it theoretically

possible for arts experiences to facilitate the learning of
concepts?

The first step in answering that question, was

to attempt to understand the processes by which any concept
is learned.

Hopefully, the previous chapter has given us

enough insight into those processes that we are able to
evaluate, within a reasonable context, the ability of given

approaches to facilitate the learning of concepts.

It is

now time to move from the general to the more particular,
and ask the question, What are the characteristics of the IAE
that might allow it to facilitate the learning of concepts?

Since we must recognize exactly what the IAE is before
we can identify the characteristics it possesses that might

allow it to facilitate the learning of concepts,

I

will have

the question.
to follow a four-step plan to adequately answer

more lengthy,
The first three steps will be brief, the fourth
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since it, itself, will, contain four sub-steps.

three sub-sections of the chapter,

I

In the first

will define, describe

and indicate the curricular function of, the IAE.

The fourth

sub-section will identify the actual characteristics of
the
IAE that might allow it to facilitate conceptual learning

and development.

The IAE Defined

The idea of the IAE is an outgrowth of the literature
and thought which deals with the impact of arts activities
on learning.

It

usually based either on the notion of the

is

similarity of the learning process to the artistic process,
or on the interrelatedness of the two processes.
One of the major proponents of the general view that
arts activities can facilitate learning in some manner- is

Herbert Read.

The title of his major thesis on education,

Education Through Art (1958), indicates that, to Read, art
is not necessarily something we educate about, but rather,
it is also something that can be used as a vehicle through

which to educate.

He states:

"Education may therefore be

defined as the cultivation of modes of expression -- it is

teaching children and adults how to make sounds, images, move
ments

,

tools and utensils..."

(p.

11).

He indicates, further

that all faculties of thought, logic, memory, sensibility
and intellect are involved in those processes that cultivate

modes of expression.

Therefore, all aspects of education
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are included in such processes.

Read views art as a form of

communication, and education as the process by which people
become skilled in the vehicles of, and use of, communication.

He states of the above mentioned processes:

"...

they

are all processes which involve art, for art is nothing but

the good making of sounds, images, etc.

The aim of educa-

tion is, therefore, the creation of artists -- of people

efficient in the various modes of expression"

(p.

11).

Another major author who viewed the processes of artistic production and learning as related was Viktor Lowenfeld.
In his work Creative and Mental Growth (1964), written in

association with

W.

Lambert Brittain, Lowenfeld speaks of

the "integrated experience," and the integration of arts and

society.

The term integrated has been used in this context

to denote many different things in the past, most commonly

the relating of the ideas and techniques found in one artistic

medium to those found in another.

But integrated denoted

something entirely different for Lowenfeld and Brittain.

By

the use of this term they implied a relation between the arts
and the learning process.

However, they were very specific

as to what type of relationship they were implying.

In a

section entitled "Integration and Learning," they state that

integration does not mean correlation with, nor the interpretation of, other subjects.

They go on to explain that the

integration they imply is the integration that occurs as

a

makes with
result of the self-identification that the learner
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the new material that has been learned.

Therefore, it is not

the phrase, "... outside of the realm of art" that
is most

crucial to their formulation, it is the kind of learning
that
occurs inside or outside of the realm of art.
It is the fact
the learner identifies personally with the new concepts

that are being taught that is the key to their formulation.
That they see arts activities as having the potential to

facilitate this kind of integrated learning is clear from
the following explanation:
Such integration cannot take place when the
teacher says, ’Children, let's draw the landing
of the settlers.'
It can only take place if the
child identifies with the experience.
'How would
you feel if you were in the group that landed; if
you were the child of a settler, who would lower
you from the big sailboat down into the rowboat,
in a set cold atmosphere of a dawning day.'
'How would you feel being rocked in your boat
up and down by the waves.'
The wave may become
the line, and the line, the wave; so intensely
integrated that one can no longer be separated
Such motivation of self-identifrom the other.
necessary
fication is
to create the urge for
expression, which ultimately may result in an
integrated art experience (p. 50).

More recently Elliot Eisner has taken up the issue of
arts activities and the learning process in his book

Educating Artistic Vision (1972).

In that work, Eisner

differentiates between two types of justifications for the
use of the arts in education:

the first type emphasizes the

instrumental consequences of art in work and bases its objectives upon the particular needs of the students or the society.
contextualist
He refers to this type of justification as a

:
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justification.

In the second type of justification,
the

kinds of contributions to human experience and
understanding
That only art can provide are emphasized.

It bases its

objectives on what is indigenous and unique to art.

Eisner

refers to this type of justification as an essentialist
justification.

Eisner favors an essentialist view as is indicated in
this statement:

"The prime value of the arts in education

lies, from my point of view, in the unique contributions it

makes to the individual’s experience with and understanding
of the world"

(p.

9).

He does, however, explain very care-

fully the contextualist position.

One of the justifications

used by contextualists that is identified by Eisner is very

germane to our own discussion.

"A fourth justification

argues that art activities develop the students’ understanding of the academic subject areas, especially the social

studies, and hence should be used as an important resource
in teaching those subject areas.

In such a view art is con-

sidered a hand-maiden to concept formation" (pp. 8-9).
The importance of the differing views of the role of

the arts in education cannot be underestimated.

These basic

views are the molds within which strategies and decisions

concerning arts in education are formulated.

Eisner under-

scores this when he states
The implications of different views about the goals
and content of art go even further if one stays with
the premise that schools should concern themselves
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with the development of intellect, and if one views
art as a product of the emotions, it will be difficult to make a strong case for the arts in education.
But if one embraces Langer’s view, that art
is a cognitive activity as well as one based on
feeling, then the problem turns on the task of expanding the usually held conception of cognition, a
conception that unduly restricts it to discursive
mediation (pp. 7-8).
.

Eisner’s notion of "expanding the usually held conception of cognition" is vital to my own views of the role the

arts can play in facilitating the learning of concepts.

One

of the basic characteristics of the IAE that might allow it
to facilitate conceptual learning and development is that
it allows an opportunity for other types of cognition to

occur.

Two of those other forms of cognition that are a

part of this position are perceptual cognition and metaphori-

cal modes of thinking.

Read believed there was a relationship between arts

experiences and learning, and that the relationship revolved
around the notion of education being a means of increasing
the efficiency with which people used systems of communica-

tion, one of those systems of communication, of course, being
the arts.
a

Lowenfela and Brittain held views that allowed for

relationship existing between arts activities and learning.

The particular view revolved around the ability of the arts
personto act as a vehicle through which students identified

ally with new material that was being learned.

Eisner

identified the possibility of arts activities facilitating
possible ability
concept formation, and also the fact that this
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is based on the existence of alternative
forms of cognition.

Perhaps the time has come now for me to
operationally
define the term, Integrated Arts Experience

(

IAE) as it is

used here, to explain the critical features of the
definition, and identify the degree to which those features
have

evolved from the thinking of Read, Eisner, Lowenfeld and
others.

I

have chosen to define the IAE as follows:

an

activity which induces in the learner an emotional and/or

kinesthetic state which is in some way analogous to the
concept being taught and which occurs through heightened

sensory awareness on the part of the learner

The term

.

integrated is used here to imply the integration of the
arts experience into the learning process.
As

I

have defined it here, an emotional and/or kines-

thetic state is analogous to a concept when it has salient

characteristics which are the same as, or parallel to, some
or all of the salient characteristics of the concept.

As an

example, the emotional state induced in a learner when he or
she is asked to continue drawing visual figures in a given

space after having already indicated that he or she has filled
that space to the extent that is comfortable for him or herself, is analogous to the concept to over-flow
are the feelings and the concept analogous?

.

In what way

They are ana-

logous because the salient characteristic of both the concept
and the emotional state is one of being filled to the point
at which something is forced to exceed its boundaries.
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A question that might arise concerning
this definition
has to do with the arts.
Nowhere in the definition
is it

stated that the activity must be arListic!

This is true.

However, what was important to me in formulating
the defi-

nition was not that the learner take part in an activity
that would normally be considered part of a traditional
art
form.

What was important was that the learner be made able

to avail him or herself of alternative forms of cognition

and experience.

These forms of cognition and experience

usually, but not always, occur as a result of activities we

would normally refer to as artistic.

The real determining

factor in whether these forms of cognition and experience

occur is the level of sensory awareness that the learner
exhibits during the activity.

Therefore, the clause "and

which occurs through heightened sensory awareness on the
part of the learner,' is more useful and accurate than any

phrase built on the narrower and more constrained notion of
an "artistic" activity.
Do all Integrated Arts Experiences have to do with

learning?

Since the term integrated is used here to imply

the integration of the arts experience into the learning

process, it is appropriate that this definition is stated in
terms of an educative function.

Whereas the analogous rela-

tionship of an emotional and/or kinesthetic state to

a

particular concept may be part of many, if not all, artistic
experiences, the experience does not necessarily become
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integrated in the sense that

I

am using it here until it

takes on an educative function.

Whenever someone proposes his or her own operational
definition of a term it is
unique formulation.

,

usually to a large degree

,

a

But whereas there is value in the

uniqueness of a formulation, our perception of the viability
of that formulation is often enhanced if we can trace its

component ideas back to other theories or formulations which
have proven useful in the past.

The question then arises,

"To what degree is it possible to trace back to the writings
of others, the component parts of my own operational defini-

tion of the term, Integrated Arts Experience.

It does not

appear useful for me to make an elaborate exposition of the

relationships that exist between previous writings and the
component parts of this definition; however, a very cursory

examination of those relations may, in fact, help to identify
the ideas that stand as the basis for this particular formulation.

Therefore,

I

will mention them briefly.

We can begin by breaking the definition down into its

component parts thusly:
(1)

the learner an

(2)

An activity which induces in

emotional and/or kinesthetic state

which is in some way (3) analogous to the

(4)

concept being

taught and which (5) occurs through heightened sensory awareness on the part of the learner

.

The first and fourth compo-

notion of
nents of the definition are related to the general
have impact on
arts activities being able, in some way, to

-

.
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the learning process.

We have seen that Read, Eisner,
and

Lowenfeld and Brittain, just to mention a few,
have all
supported this view. Eisner’s description of
the context
ualist justification for arts in education documents
the

degree to which this notion has been accepted.
The second component of the definition, an emotional

and/or kinesthetic state

,

is an outgrowth of the work done

by Lowenfeld and Brittain.

We have already examined their

views concerning the role of the learner’s personal identi-

fication, on an emotional as well as conceptual level, with

new material being learned.

A much more complete treatment

of the role of emotional material in conceptual learning is

available to us in Fantasy and Feeling in Education by
Richard Jones.
in this

study.

This view will be examined more closely later

Also, the relationship between kinesthetic

and emotional states is discussed clearly and thoroughly by

Alexander Lowen in The Betrayal of the Body (1967).
The third component of the definition, the analogousness
of emotional and kinesthetic states to concepts does not grow

out of the literature dealing with the arts and aesthetics.

Instead, it is explained for us in the writings of

Gordon (1961) and Robert Ornstein (1969).

W.

J.

J.

The ideas of these

men will be examined more closely later in this chapter.
And finally we come to the fifth component, occurs

through heightened sensory awareness on the part of the learner

I

have already explained how

I

chose the notion of
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sensory a wareness over the notion of artistic
because of its
relation to the idea of alternative forms of cognition.
These ideas derive from the work of many authors.
later section of this chapter

I

In a

will speak directly about

the work of Maddenfort and Arnheim, each of whom has contri-

buted greatly to the body of knowledge that now exists concerning these forms of cognition.
The IAE is defined in this study as an activity which

induces in the learner an emotional and/or kinesthetic state

which is in some way analogous to the concept being taught
and which occurs through heightened sensory awareness on the

part of the learner.

The component parts of the definition

are obviously an outgrowth of the ideas of Read, Eisner,
Lowenfeld,. Brittain, Maddenfort, Arnheim and others.

The

description of some activities that meet the definition of
an IAE will help us to better understand in practical terms,

exactly what an IAE is.
A Description of Sample Integrated Arts Activities

Description is different from definition, according to
Webster, whereas to define means "to determine or identify
the essential qualities or meaning of

.

.

.

,

"

to describe

means, "to represent or give an account of ..."
its function.

Each has

For example, whereas defining allows us to

know what critical features an activity or experience

must

possess if it is to be called an IAE, describing certain
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activities may actually help us to understand
more generally
what an IAE is like.
Since I have already defined
the IAE,

I

will now attempt to describe some integrated arts
activi-

ties so that, by the combination of the two processes,
defi-

ning and describing, the nature of the IAE may become clear.
Since an IAE may draw on one or more of a number of different

media and may also take place at many different points in
the learning process, three different IAEs

will be des-

cribed.
One example of an IAE is an exercise created for use

with high school social studies students (Note

1).

The acti-

vity draws upon the medium of creative dramatics and is used

prior to the teacher’s introducing the concept that is to be
learned.

.In

the activity the teacher begins by discussing

some of the daily routines followed by people.

As an example

he or she mentions the way in which people make their beds.

The teacher asks if there are any students who make their
beds in the same fashion every morning.

The teacher then

asks if one student would be willing to pantomine the process
in front of the rest of the group.

After the student has done

this once, he or she is asked to repeat the pantomine.

This

time, however, as each step in the process is identified

another student is asked to take the responsibility for doing
that particular step.

Eventually the entire process is broken

down into individual steps, each one done by a different student, and due to the nature of the task, each one done one
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after the other.

The class is then asked to imagine a row

of 100 beds in front of itself and is also asked
to extend

the procedures it has developed for making one bed so
that
iu can make all the beds as simultaneously as possible.

As

the students go through this final phase of the exercise

they are asked to identify their feelings.

They reply:

"I get bored doing step number five a hundred times in a

row," or "I don’t get any feeling of having made a bed at
all," or "I felt proud that we could work so efficiently

together."

At the conclusion of the exercise the teacher

begins a discussion of the industrial revolution and the

effects of mass production on individual workers.
As simple as the above exercise might seem, it meets

the defining criteria of an IAE.

During this creative drama-

tics activity the learners actually experience some of the

emotions that are felt by workers on an assembly line.

The

level at which those experiences are felt is probably much
lower, but they are some of the same emotions nonetheless.

The activity induces in the learner an emotional state which
is virtually synonomous with the emotional state that is

derived from the concept itself, and this is

a

result of

heightened sensory awareness on the part of the learner.

Ihe

emotions are felt, not deduced, by the learner.
A second example is taken from a workshop done with

in-service teachers who were trying to understand how concepts
could be taught through arts activities (Note 2).

They had
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completed three days of workshops on sensory
perception,
sound and music and movement, and had developed

a small but

vocabulary of movements and composition techniques.

The teachers were asked to travel through a large

space using any type of movement they liked.

They were

then asked to evolve into pairs of people moving in ways
that were similar, if not the same.

Next, they were asked

to "mirror” each other's movements, that is, to move to-

gether in a way that made it appear that one person was the

reflection of the other.

After repeating this first phase

of the exercise the teachers were asked to move through

space a third time.

This time, however, they were to walk

at a steady pace while they created a vocal sound of their

own choosing.

Once again they were asked to pair-off and

evolve into a mirror image.

That time, it was not movements

they were reflecting; it was sounds.
At this point the group was asked to identify, based
on the first half of the exercise, what it was that they did

when they "mirrored" or "reflected" someone's movements or
sounds.

Or,

in other words, what ideas are subsumed in the

notion of reflection

.

The group answered:

"The same as,

"Same but opposite," "Coming back to you," "No beginning, no
end," "Thinking back upon," "Infinity (reflection of reflec-

tion of reflection etc.)."

The teachers were then asked to divide themselves into
groups of fours.

Each group then had to choose one of the
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ment ioned above and find a way to reflect each

other

s

sounds and movements according to that notion.

teachers were asked to regroup four times.

The

Each time the new

group picked a notion or "type" of reflection and tried to

discover ways to reflect each other.

As this activity pro-

gressed, the group as a whole developed a repertoire of

different ways of reflecting each other’s sounds and movements

.

As a conclusion to the exercise, the teachers were

asked to spread out around the perimiter of the large space

within which they had been working.

Each one was asked to

conceive of himself as a movable object that was totally
"reflective" in nature.

movement / sound piece.

They were then asked to improvise a
The piece began when the facilitator

threw an object into the large space and all the "objects"
"reflected" the new object and each other.

The teachers were

asked to keep in mind the different notions subsumed under
the concept of reflection and to operate accordingly.

The

piece ended when all the sounds and movements had evolved to
a natural point of rest.

Although this exercise was both more lengthy and much
more ambiguous than the previous exercise, it was still very

powerful as an IAE.

The teachers involved in this exercise

reflect
all reported that their personal views of the concept

clarified
tion, a concept they already held, had grown and

tremendously.

It seems clear that this growth and
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c ar ^fi ca ’ti° n
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had taken place as a result of the partici-

pants "taking on" the quality of reflectiveness
after having

explored the possibilities inherent in that action.

I

be-

lieve that this "taking on" of the quality of reflective-

ness constituted assuming an emotional and kinesthetic state

analogous to the concept reflection

.

It is also clear that

this was accomplished through heightened sensory awareness
on the part of the teachers.

The final example
the IAE, one

I

I

would like to use in describing

have alluded to before, was developed by an

elementary school teacher during a six-day integrated arts

workshop (Note 3).

It is an excellent example,

not only

because it is an effective exercise which clearly meets the

criteria of an IAE, but also

because it is an example of

the kind of viable and exciting exercise that can be devel-

oped by a classroom teacher with no previous experience in
the arts.

The woman who developed the exercise was a fourth-

grade teacher.

The workshop was her first real experience

with the integrated arts.

When, on the fifth day of the work-

shop, she was asked to choose a concept she normally taught

and to attempt to develop an IAE through which she could

teach the concept, she chose the concept run-on sentence

.

The woman’s first attempt at formulating the exercise
was, in fact, rather shaky.

Since, as part of the previous

assignment, the participants in the workshop had taken a
of the
number of photographs, she decided to try using one
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photographs as the basis of the exercise.

She chose a slide

which included a diminishing line of perspective which
was
unbroken.

She explained that she would show the students

the photograph and talk with them about how the line went
on and on.

She would then relate this line' to the concept

of a run-on sentence

.

Although what the teacher had in mind is clear,

I

am

not so sure that her students would have been able to connect

that image to their existing cognitive structure in such a

way that an understanding of the concept run-on sentence

would have resulted.

In discussing the activity with others,

the teacher came to the realization that she would not be sure

that the activity would induce any sort of new emotional and/
or kinesthetic state for the students.

She realized that the

use of an artistic medium, the photograph, did not ensure an
IAE.

She decided to reformulate the activity.

The second formulation of the activity was a great

improvement upon the first and captured, in a very real sense,
the essence of the concept run-on sentence

formulation of the activity she began with

In this second

.

a

movement activity.

The essential part of the movement activity was not so much

what the students did, but rather, when the students had moved
to the point at which they felt the need to come to rest, she

forced them to go on, to exceed that natural limit.

When she

to
finally did allow them to stop, the children were asked

immediately begin a visual exercise.

The essential feature

.
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of this part of the activity was the same as in the
move-

exercise
limits,

.

When the children reached their natural

they were forced to go on, to be over-filled.

Through

this combination of activities the teacher hoped to induce in
the students both an emotional and kinesthetic state that was

analogous to the concept run-on sentence

.

In both their

experiences and the concept itself something was forced to
exceed its boundaries.

She would then conclude the activity

with a verbal discussion that moved on to a study of run-on

sentences
This activity is almost a prototypical example of an
IAE.

The analogous relationship between the concept and the

emotional/kinesthetic state is clear; the reliance on sensory
awareness obvious
.

.

Also, the activity is a good example of

the fact that the use of the IAE is not restricted to arts

specialists.

It is a technique that is potentially available

to all teachers.

The Curricular Function of the IAE

Explaining the curricular function of the IAE may help
to dispell some misconceptions about it.

Although this can

be done very quickly, the rewards are great, in that this is
and
an area concerning the IAE which causes great confusion,

ultimately lack of success, for many teachers who attempt to
use an IAE (Note 4).
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We begin to examine the curricular function
of the IAE
by reviewing the route a teacher follows in
planning any

lesson.

A common model for curricular planning includes
the
following:
(1) general objectives; (2) specific objectives;
(3)

learning opportunities, and (4) evaluation.

This model

is used in the classroom by most teachers whether
implicitly

or explicitly.

For example, a teacher never teaches the re-

lationship between numerators and denominators in a void.
He or she starts with the general objective of comprehending

fractions, moves to the more specific objective of under-

standing the relationship between numerators and denominators,
chooses

a

learning opportunity (a teaching vehicle such as a

workbook, lecture, film, etc.) which seems to suit the situation, and. decides upon an appropriate method of evaluation

.

When a teacher chooses an arts activity as the teaching
vehicle, it is essential that he or she understands how the

activity fits into the above model.

I

believe it is useful

to view the IAE as fitting into the model at the level of the

learning opportunity

.

in one of three ways:

Learning opportunities usually function
they (1) motivate the student;

(2) allow

for the initial apprehension of a concept; and (3) reinforce

previous learning.
ways

,

An IAE can function in any one of these

and therefore stands as a viable learning opportunity

when used in the proper setting.

If an IAE arouses the stu-

dent’s interest in a subject area, it is functioning as
motivator.

When an IAE provides an opportunity for the

a
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student to discover knowledge that is new to
him or her,
conc eptual apprehension is taking place.
When skills

are

pracTiced and/or conceptual knowledge is strengthened,
the
IAE is functioning as a reinforcer

.

Also, any given learn-

ing opportunity can be made to function in more than
one of

these ways, depending on the context in which it is used.
The example IAEs

I

have discussed exemplify the

different curricular modes of functioning of the IAE.

The

first activity, the lesson on the effects of mass production
on individual learners, could function as either a motivator

or reinforcer, depending upon whether the concepts involved
are "taught" before or after the use of the activity.

If

the activity is used prior to any discussion of the effects

of mass production on individual workers, it could be said to
be motivating the students to discuss and explore this area.
If the concepts involved have already been grasped by the

students, then the activity functions as a reinforcer, making

clearer the connections between the new material and the
concepts already held by the learners.
In the same vein of thought, the activity on reflect ion

could be considered both a reinforcer or an activity which

allowed for conceptual apprehension.

If we assume that all

the different notions subsumed by the concept reflect ion were

held by the adult participants before the activity, then it

clearly functioned as a reinforcer.

However, if we assume

reflect
that the realization of the idea that the concept

io_n

.

.
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does, in fact, subsume so many different notions
is new to
the learners, then we can say that conceptual
apprehension

occurea
The third activity

operated as a vehicle for concep-

apprehension or as a reinforcer.

The difference, again,

depends on whether the teacher dealt with the concept in

another fashion before or after the use of the activity itself.

One way or the other, the activity was powerful in

its ability to allow for new learning or strengthen previous

learning
In conclusion, the importance of understanding the

curricular function of the IAE derives from the fact that
arts experiences are often used improperly.

This happens

because the activities themselves are often attractive and

offer a change in fare for both the teacher and the students.
Unfortunately, if an arts activity is used without proper

attention to its curricular function, the result is usually
one of two things:

the activity may turn out flat or life-

less, going according to plan, but not generating excitement;
or,

it may be enjoyable and exciting but lack a sense of

purpose.

Either way, the activity fails to operate as an

effective teaching vehicle.
The Characteristics of the IAE That

Might Allow it to Facilitate The Learning of Concepts
mostly
The description of the nature of the IAE serves
its role in
as background information for understanding
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facilitating conceptual learning, but it is
important information nonetheless. To isolate salient
characteristics
of

any process or technique without first
understanding its
basic nature is to run the risk of knowing the
fact and

missing the point.

Working in a void always increases our

chances of misunderstanding.

Although any number of minor characteristics of the IAE
might be said to have a positive effect on conceptual learning,

I

believe that if we are to decide that the IAE can

facilitate this kind of learning that decision must be based
on the existence of major characteristics that are very

directly tied to conceptual learning.
three appear worthy of discussion.
tics of the IAE are:

ceptual cognition;

(2)

(1)

Within this context,

These three characteris-

it allows an opportunity for per-

it allows an opportunity for metaphori-

cal modes of thinking; and (3) it allows the learner to make
use of presentational forms of communication.

An examination

of each of these characteristics, and the processes they

include, is necessary in evaluating the IAE as a vehicle which

might facilitate conceptual learning.

First, however, since

each of these characteristics has to do with alternative
forms of cognition and knowing, we must take a look at the

case for the acceptance of other forms of cognition.

Alternative Forms of Cognition

According to Jerome Hausman of New York University,
art forms involve differing forms of sense modality and

.
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therefore, offer many possibilities for understanding
and
insight.
He believes that it is important to note
that

differing forms of expression and realization may be used
to inform each other.

He concludes,

"Seen as a means to

inform and train one’s perceptions as well as to develop

knowledge and insight, the arts should be viewed as an
integral part of general education” (pp. 49-50).

Hausman’s ideas outline the basic arguments involved
in accepting artistic experiences as vehicles for alternative

forms of cognition.

These arguments are supported by a

wealth of material found in the literature of aesthetic
theory.

In a chapter entitled "The Nature of Aesthetic

Education," for example, Gerard Knieter describes six characteristics, of the aesthetic experience, two of which are

germane to our discussion.

Knieter states that the aesthetic

experience involves focus, perception, affect, cognition and
the cultural matrix.

It is the second and fourth of

these

characteristics, perception and cognition, that are important to our discussiop.
In dissing perception and the aesthetic experience,

Knieter describes a percept thusly:
A percept is that which is known of an object, a
quality, or a relationship as a result of sensory
It is a state of awareness rathei "than
experience.
Percepts tend to be organan image or a memory.
ized around a series of related sensations that
are actuated from either internal or external
When a pattern of percepts becomes orstimuli.
ganized it may give rise to the development of a
concept (p 4 )
.

.
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He goes on to say of a concept that it is a
generalization

based upon a class of ideas, a stable percept, or
associated
data.

He states that it is usually organized as a result

of a group of related sensations, percepts and images.

We

know from our earlier discussions of concepts that this is
a narrow view of what a concept is.

It is significant, how-

ever, to note that Knieter clearly implies that concept

formation can be the result of purely perceptual functioning, and does not necessarily involve other forms of cogni-

tive operation.

In addition, he believes that this form of

conceptual behavior leads, in the end, to the types of

behavior we normally associate with "higher forms of thinking."

He states:

"This intellectual awareness is usually

manifested in one or more of the typical cognitive processes:
analysis, synthesis, abstraction, generalization, evaluation"
(p.

5).

I

will expand upon this view later.

It is true that other forms of cognition exist?

If so,

is not our world geared to function in accord with the more

commonly accepted form of cognition?

R.

Neal Appleby states:

But in this world where such emphasis is placed on
analytical and discursive thinking, how can there
Is
be an alternative to this approach in education?
people
prepare
to
schools
of
our
the
purpose
it not
Perhaps so, but the number
to live in this world?
dissatisfied with their
be
of people who claim to
and anomie are
alienation
lives and the fact that
that a
indicate
problems of contemporary society
for
sufficient
strictly empirical approach is not
the ’good life* (1974, p. 22).

Merle Flannery expands upon Appleby’s views:

"It is clear

answer all his
that man’s ability to conceptualize cannot
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needs.

Answers to these most plaguing questions do not
come

in words and numbers.

They come in concrete images.

our aesthetic consciousness thinks in images" (1974,

What about this aesthetic consciousness?

characteristics?

Only
p.

4 ).

What are its

One of its most important characteristics

is that it deals with the particular.

As Flannery says,

"In aesthetic consciousness, we do not attend to the quali-

ties of the object compared to those

of other objects, nor

do we attempt to identify or categorize the object by its
color, shape, function, chemical or physical properties ....
We consider only this apple, experienced by ourself at this

time of day in this place"

(p.

4).

One of the theorists who has been most thorough in

explaining this ability to deal with the particular

Wellington Madenfort.

is

Much of his work is a restatement,

clarification, and extension of the work of Maurice MerleauPonty.

In his article "Aesthetic Education:

An Education

for Immediacy of Sensuous Experience," Maddenfort indicates

that aesthetic experiences are those kinds of experiences
in which phenomena are apprehended in the immediacy of their

sensuousness, and, therefore, distinguished from those ex-

periences in which phenomena are apprehended conceptually.
living.
The latter is the normal state of affairs in everyday
of an
He concludes, therefore, that the primary purpose

to
aesthetic education is to promote the student’s ability

immediacy
experience the world as it is given in all the
without the mediation
its sensuousness, or in other words,
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of concepts.

Appleby (1974) speaks also of functioning
on the basis
of information derived purely from the
senses.
In describ-

ing synaesthesia

,

he says that children all have the ability

to perceive the world as a simultaneous,
multidimensional

experience, emotionally and physically as well as
cognitively.

He believes, however, that somewhere along the
road to

maturity, this ability is lost.

He says of the subject:

Another way of describing the child's view of
his environment is by the term synaesthesia, referring to the interassociation of the different
senses.
As the child perceives syncretist ically
his sensory impressions are also global, undifferentiated, and simultaneous.
Sight, hearing, taste,
smell and feeling are not seperate senses for the
young child, and in effect, the stimulation of one
sense will elicit responses from the other senses.
Synaesthesia means specifically this phenomenon of
cross-sensory perception (p. 24).
In describing synaesthesia, Appleby compares it with

what he calls "cognitive learning."

He believes that cogni-

tive learning which is based on analytic and deductive

principles of logic is concerned primarily with the accululation of pieces of substantive information and the inter-

connection with those pieces.

Due to this characteristic

of interrelating bits of information,

"cognitive learning,"

he feels is limited to a linear one-at-a-time approach.

Con-

versely, according to Appleby, sensory learning is not

limited in that way.

In sensory learning, experience is

assimilated through synaesthesia as a unified, multi-dimensional totality and its meaning is incorporated into all
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levels of the individual’s being and consciousness.

Appleby does not believe that we maintain our ability
to operate synaesthetically

.

He indicates that for the pre-

school child, experience and learning are based on a fusion
of sensations, and no single sense dominates during the pro-

cess.

However, the developing child is under a constant

subtle pressure to abandon his or her multi-sensory rela-

tionship with the environment.

This relationship is replaced

by a conceptual approach to employing fragmented and discon-

tinuous single-sensory perceptions.

He believes that this

process begins as soon as the child first learns to identify

him or herself as a separate entity from his or her surroundings.

Maddenfort describes this same phenomenon.

He uses,

however, a perspective of "conceptual” versus "immediately
sensous" experience.

He states:

The very idea of growing up, of maturation as
it functions in our society, principally means mastering our language, acquiring a control over various
modes of communication as techniques and increasing
Concepts,
the conceptual furniture in our minds.
thus naturally take over when we ’reflect' on our
experiences, and tend to block response to the immediately sensuous (p. 10).

Maddenfort goes on to further explain the role of
"concepts," as he uses the term.
the intermediaries of experience.

He says that concepts are
In other words, when we

world
see the world symbolically and conceptually we see a
of objects.

These objects have meaning for us through the

symbols and concepts we give them.

The meaning of symbols,

.
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turn

,

determines our behavior toward the objects.

As an

example, "The object chair is given an absolute reality

through the symbol ’chair,’ and it is as though the ’chair’
came with the 'creation of the world.'

The origin of 'chair'

as a cultural artifact is lost, and with it the reality of

the symbolic and conceptual processes"

(p.

10).

Given a shift in terminology, we find that Merle

Flannery supports Maddenfort’s position.

-

Flannery states:

In other words, the concept of a thing is
based on a sensory awareness of it.
It is extremely
difficult to understand what a horse is really like
if a child has never had sensory contact (however
remote) with a horse.
Conceptual subjects which
are taught in purely abstract form (in words and
numbers), which are not sandwiched with a sensory
base, are extremely difficult to get a hold of.
Children, especially, become confused when they are
confronted with the need to learn an idea that has
Tragic are the
been cut off from its sensory base.
adjustments they make to the absolute requirement
that they learn castrated concepts (p. 7).

If we accept the fact that objects and events can be

perceived in terms of either the general or the particular,
what are the advantages of perceiving the particular?

Haven't we already seen the advantages of classif icatory be-

havior?

The advantage is that the world is not made up of

generalities, it is made up of particular instances.

And if

characterwe look at a particular instance and see only the

istics which quality it as a member of a certain category,
unique ability
then we miss what is unique in it. We miss its
guide us in our
to solve problems, stimulate reactions,
real world.
We operate a step removed from the
efforts
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What are the educational implications
of all this?
Maddenfort believes that we rarely consider
educating the
human being to grasp the world in its
immediate sensuousness.
All too often, rather, the assumed goal is
the development of the student’s ability to deal with
the world through
abstract concepts. Appleby adds:
"If we are to overcome the

sterile methods of conceptual and empirical learning,
we must

nurture the dormant subconscious capacity to perceive simul-

taneously and syncret ist ically the total sensory impact of
experience and thereby through a more complete individual
involvement, be capable of dealing more effectively with the

complexities of our electric environment"

(p.

24

).

Based on those views, Appleby states that the synaesthetic approach to education tries to use personally meaningful

experiences to enhance substantive learning.

The approach

is developmental rather than instructional in nature, and

provides a more personal modality of experience by emphasizing the essential sensory involvement of the student.

Now that we have reviewed some views which seem to accept
the existence of alternative forms of cognition, we can exa-

mine those forms of cognition which might both facilitate

conceptual learning and are connected with the IAE.
Perceptual Cognition

I

have stated that one characteristic of the IAE that

might allow it to facilitate the learning of concepts is that
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it allows an opportunity for
perceptual cognition to occur.
It appears to me that in discussing

this characteristic the

problem that arises is not one of showing
that the IAE does
allow for perceptual cognition to occur, but

rather, one of

describing and supporting the existence of perceptual
cortion itself
If we accept that perceptual cognition

—

-

exists,

there does not seem to be much problem in going a step

further to accepting the fact that activities that induce

a

particular state as a result of heightened sensory awareness
on the part of the learner are likely to allow that percep-

tual cognition to occur.

I

turn now to the work of Rudolph

Arnheim, for it most clearly and thoroughly describes and
supports the existence of perceptual cognition.
In his major work on perceptual cognition Visua l Think-

ing Arnheim begins with
feminine in nature.

after it receives.

the notion of reasoning being

This is true because it can give only
The brain cannot function unless it is

constantly supplied with information concerning what

is going

He believes further, however, that

on in time and space.

sensory reflections of the world in their raw state would
not be very useful.

It

is not until we find generality in

the particular that anything we learn about an individual

thing can be of use to us.
it

Therefore, Arnheim suggests that

is only because perception gathers concepts,

or types of

things, that perceptual material can be used for thought.
He believes, also, that unless the senses present material
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to the mind, it has nothing to think with.

With that series of ideas as a starting point,
Arnheim
begins

a.

cognition

careful examination of the process of perceptual
.

First, he points out how we have come, histori-

cally, to mistrust our senses.

He indicates that even when

theorists have been forced to conclude that sensory perceptions play a part in thinking, they usually relegated that
role to the lowest status possible.

He points out that al-

though the sensualist philosophers remind us that nothing
is in the intellect without first being in the senses, they

still considered the gathering of perceptual data to be,

"unskilled labor, indispensible but inferior"

(p.

2).

In

contrast, he states:
My contention is that the cognitive operations called thinking are not the privilege of mental processes above and beyond perception but the
I am
essential ingredients of perception itself.
referring to such operations as active exploration,
selection, grasping of essentials, simplification,
abstraction, analysis and synthesis, completion,
correction, comparison, problem solving, as well
These
as combining, separating, putting in context.
mental
one
of
any
perogative
operations are not the
function; they are the manner in which the minds of
both man and animal treat cognitive material at any
There is no basic difference in this respect
level.
between what happens when a person looks at the
world directly and when he sits with his eyes closed
and ’thinks’ (p. 13).

How does Arnheim attempt to support the existence of

perceptual cognition?

First he speaks of perceptual cogni-

tion as exhibiting the characteristics of "active intelli-

gence."

see, we
He points out that in vision we do not just

.
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see selectively.

Of vision he states:

"Through that world

roams the glace, directed by attention, focusing
the narrow
range of the sharpest vision now on this, now on that
spot

This eminantely active performance is what is truly meant
by visual perception"

(p.

14).

He concludes, therefore, that

sensory responsiveness can be said to be intelligent.

Arnheim then discusses the different media of sensory
perception and their relative abilities to facilitate intelligent behavior.

He believes that this ability is dependent

on the degree of articulateness that data in that medium

achieve.

In smell and taste we get a lot of subtle informa-

tion, but that information is only of a "primitive order."
In vision and hearing, we find that shapes, colors, movements

and sounds are susceptible to definite and highly complex

organization in space and time.

Therefore, these two senses

are the most highly acceptable media for the exercise of

intelligence
While Arnheim indicates that both vision and hearing
have great potential for the exercise of intelligence, he
does differentiate between the two.

He points out that in

music, each tone can be given a definite place and function,
and that this is applicable within several dimensions in the

total system.

He believes, therefore, that music is one of

the most potent outlets of human intelligence.

He points

place in
out, however, that while the thinking that takes
and
music is of the highest level, it is thinking about

.

95

within the musical universe.

In contrast, he points out that

the great virtue of vision as a medium is that it is not only

highly articulate, it also offers inexhaustibly rich information about the objects and events that exist in the outer
world.

He therefore concludes that the primary medium of

thought is vision.

After having theoretically established vision as the

primary medium of thought, Arnheim returns to the process of
visual selectivity

.

Demanded by the physiological fact that

acute vision is limited to a narrow area, points out that

visual selectivity allows for the intelligent practice of

concentrating on one point of interest and neglecting all
that is beside the point of attention.

He points out also,

that through the accommodation of the eye lenses, visual

selectivity also functions through the process of depth perception.

This process contributes to cognition by making the

size of objects variable and therefore adaptable to the needs
of the observer.

The size of the object in the visual field

determines how much of the contextual environment
hended along with the object itself.

is appre-

The importance of this

process is indicated by the following statement
How much detail is relevant? What distance is
needed to bring out the larger structural features,
of
otherwise hidden by too much detail? How much
or
understanding
the
the context is pertinent to
correct
the matter under scrutiny? Here again the
is an
level
perceptual
selection at the elementary
cog
broader
a
important part, and reflection of,
nitive stragegy (pp. 25-26).
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Hext, Arnheim moves on to a discussion of
visual concepts.
He clearly believes that the beginnings of
concept

formation lie in the perception of shape.

Why is this true?

Arnheim reminds us that whereas the optical image projected
upon the retina is an exact and complete recording of the
object or event it represents, the corresponding visual percept is not.

In other words, the perception of shape indi-

cates the grasping of the structural features that are found
in, or imposed upon, any stimulus material.

It

is seldom

that the material conforms exactly to the shape it acquires
in perception.

Arnheim considers this "grasping of structural features," indicative of conceptual behavior.

He describes

perception as consisting of fitting stimulus material with
templates of relatively simple shape.

He refers to these

templates as visual concepts or categories.

He believes

that an object is only perceived to the degree that it is

matched with one of these organized shapes.

For Arnheim, the

shape of patterns perceived in this fashion have two proper-

ties which enable them to serve the function of visual concepts; they have generality and they are easily identified.
He states,

"Strictly speaking, no percept ever refers to a

unique, individual shape but rather to the kind of pattern
of which the percept consists

.

.

.

There is, therefore, no

difference in principle between percept and concept...
28

)

.

(d.

97

Another point that Arnheim makes is that visual imagery
and visual concepts are both tied to memory.

He states:

A perceptual act is never isolated, it is only the
most recent phase of a stream of innumerable similar acts, performed in the past and surviving in
memory.
Similarly, the experiences of the present,
stored and amalgamated with the yield of the past,
precondition the percepts of the future. Therefore, perception in the broader sense must include
mental imagery and its relation to direct sensory

observation

(p.

80).

Arnheim identifies two forces that operate in visual
imagery and memory.
structure.

Once force is a tendency toward simplest

This leads to tension reduction.

The other force

is a counter-tendency to move toward sharpened and more dis-

tinctive features of a given pattern.

Of these two processes

Arnheim says, "Antagonistic though the tendencies of leveling
and sharpening are, they work together.

intensify the visual concept.
ize the memory image"

(p.

One of the issues

I

They clarify and

They streamline and character-

83).

mentioned in our discussion of alter-

native forms of cognition in general was the issue of knowing
Arnheim

the particular instance versus knowing the generality.

addresses himself to this issue quite clearly.

He begins:

A concept from which everything is subtracted but
its invariants leaves us with the untouched figment
Such a concept is most useful
of high generality.
because it facilitates definition, classification,
The object looks
learning, and the use of learning.
however,
Ironically,
the same, every time it is met.
person
the
this eminently practical attitude leaves
experience
without the support of any one tangible
since the ’true' size, shape, color he perceives are
never strictly supported by what his eyes show him.
the
Also the ridgidity of such constancy may make
.

.
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observer blind to revelations offered by a
lar context and prevent him from reacting particuin a
ner appropriate to the particular occasion. A manmost
common form of unintelligent behavior consists precisely in the misuse of constancy, that is, in the
assumption that what was true before must be true
this time (p 45
)

.

But there is another approach to knowing a concept.

According to Arnheim, this approach appreciates the infinite
and often puzzling change the object undergoes as it moves

from one situation to another.

According to Arnheim this

approach is well suited to productive thinking.

Such a con-

cept does not suppress the differences among the various in-

stances over which it presides, but rather, it keeps them

present in total comprehension.

Not only does it supply an

enjoyable richness to life, it also assures artists as well
as scientists continuing contact with "the concrete manifes-

tations of the phenomena in which they are interested"

Arnheim concludes that

a

45).

(p.

thinker or perceiver who is limited

to concepts of the kind forseen by traditional logic is likely

to end up performing in a world of paralyzed and empty con-

structs

.

There are two more major points about perceptual cog-

nition that Arnheim makes and that
our discussion.

I

believe are germane to

The first of these is the ability we have to

"draw" concepts.

In speaking of some experiments in which

subjects were asked to make visual representation of concepts
like past

,

present

,

future, or good marriage

Arnheim states that although

,

bad marriage

,

these experiments were informal,

.

:
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they show that young educated adults are
relatively able to
represent abstract concepts through non-mimetic
drawings.

He states of these drawings

The principal reason why these disembodied shapes
can be so helpful is that thinking is not concerned with the sheer matter or substratum of things
kut only with their structure.
The elementary qualities of a particular red color or a particular
sound are supplied by the senses but are neither
represented in thinking nor conveyable by it ...
The perceptual feature accessible to thought are
purely structural, e.g., the' expansiveness of that
sound, or the centric and compact nature of something round.
Thinking treats space and time,
which are containers for being, as the structural
categories of coexistence and sequence.
Both of
these categories can be represented in the spatial
medium of visual patterns (p . 129).
But concepts are not only represented in visual images,

they are apprehended through work with visual images.
comments:

Arnheim

"What we need to acknowledge is that perceptual and

pictorial shapes are not only translations of thought- products
but the very flesh and blood of thinking itself and that an

unbroken range of visual interpretation leads from the humble
gestures of daily communication to the statements of great
art" (p.

134

)

The final major point made by Arnheim, and in my opinion

germane to our discussion, deals with the process of abstrac-

Arnheim begins his discussion of abstraction thusly:

tion.

have tried to show that perception consists in the
grasping of relevant generic features of the object.
Inversely, thinking, in order to have something to.
think about, must be based on images of the world in
which we live. The thought elements in perception
and the perceptual elements in thought are complemenThey make human cognition a unitary process,
tary.
I
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which leads without break from the elementary
acquisition of sensory information to the most generic
theoretical ideas. The essential trait of this unitary cognitive process is that at every level it
involves abstraction (p. 179).
To help us better understand the process of abstraction
as it relates to perceptual cognition, Arnheim breaks
concepts

down into two types, static and dynamic

.

He points out that

there is a conflict in the human mind between the need to

comprehend the total range of a phenomenon and the need to
simplify it to a static concept, in which one characteristic
state of an object or movement is chosen and stands for the
whole.

He also indicates that this' type of concept may be

sufficient for the purpose of definition or classification.
In this case the concept is reduced to the minimum of traits

needed to determine what genus it belongs to and by what’ property or properties it is distinguished from other members of
the group.

However, in productive thinking as much informa-

tion as possible must be conveyed.

It

is to dynamic concepts

that Arnheim attributes this latter type of thinking.
In further explaining the process of abstraction,

Arnheim points out that there are two antogonistic ways of
describing the process.

The first, and more commonly accep-

ted view, describes abstraction as a withdrawal from direct

experience.

He comments:

"This view assumes a dichotomy

between perceiving and thinking.

One perceives only particu-

to think
lars, but one thinks in generalities, and therefore,

188).
one must sweep the mind clear of perceptual material (p.
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According to this view, abstraction
performs this clearing
function.
The second view, Arnheim's,
holds that abstraction
IS an indispensible link between,
and common
trait of, both

thinking and perceiving.

He points out that the danger
of

accepting the first view is that it
suggests that a person
is capable of truly abstract thinking
only if

he or she can

ignore, defy, or even contradict the life
situation in which
h.e or she must function.

Arnheim gives us many examples of the danger of
viewing
abstraction as a withdrawal from experience. One of the
most

cogent is taken from the process

by-

which young children are

taught to match cardinal sets in mathematics.

The children

are hold that a "set" is a well-defined collection of objects

which are not necessarily alike.
three objects.

In each example there are

Since the objects can be matched one— to— one

from one set to another, the sets are said to have the same

cardinal set.

Unfortunately the objects chosen do not represent pure
qualities.

Instead, the children are faced with objects,

e.g., a square, a triangle, a circle, in which practical

daily-life relations are not absent but, "absurdly offended."

Arnheim points out:
Here again we run into the tendency to define abstraction as the ability to violate the natural order of
Are the consequences harmless educationally?
things.
The child is told, on the authority of the teacher,
that the natural bonds and meanings of life are not
Systematic training in alienation
to be respected.
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during "the first school years may prepare some of
the children for the spirit of higher mathematics,
to be met, perhaps, in the distant future; it
will
not necessarily help them to reconcile school with
life outside (p. 210).
.

In summary, while there is much to be gained by the
use of

static, defining concepts, to view abstraction as a withdraw3.1

from experience is to value through! processes stripped of

their sensorial base, and therefore lacking in authenticity.
Before concluding this section

I

would like to mention

very briefly two aspects of perceptual cognition which

I

have not discussed but which reflect directly on our discussion.

The first of these is experiencing the whole

.

Throughout the literature on aesthetic theory, there
are many references to the notion of experiencing the whole.

John Dewey (1958

)

describes it as an experience in which',

"The whole is then experienced as an expansion of ourselves"
(p.

195).

Bennett Reimer (1971) adds:

"That such experience

is so richly available in the arts is what makes the arts so

important to life" (p. 86).

I

believe that it is through the

process of perceptual cognition that experiencing the whole
is made possible.

Finally

I

would like to re-emphasize the importance of

the need for flexible perception.

examples of this process.

Arnheim mentions numerous

He points out that Copernicus

succeeded in seeing the intricate gyrations of the planets
an
as simple orbital movements overlaid by the effects of

equally simple movement performed by the observer’s base.

.
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The erratic back-and-f orth motion of
an observed planet
could only be seen as circular and steady
if the observer
couia visualize himself on a base that was
also rotating.
In order to restructure the problem situation
in this way,

Copernicus had to have a remarkable visual imagination.

His

perception, although actually in line with reality, seemed
so only if tremendous flexibility of perception
prevailed.
It is this flexible perception that is so important in
fos-

tering productive thinking.
In summary, Arnheim proposes that thinking takes place

during perception.

To support this- notion he points out the

active intelligence of visual selectivity, both in terms of

attention and contextual inclusion.

He also believes that

while many senses supply us with data of varying degrees' of

articulateness, visual imagery is the prime medium

of-

thought

because of the "inexhaustibly rich information" it supplies
for us.

Arnheim proposes the existence of visual concepts,

and describes their inclination towards both simplicity and

completeness.

And finally, he suggests that whereas some

theorists represent abstraction as a withdrawal from direct
experience, he finds this position untenable.

In his view,

abstraction is the indispensible link between thinking and
perceiving
In Chapter IV

I

will attempt to connect perceptual cog-

nition to the criteria for facilitating conceptual learning
that

I

identified in Chapter II.

First, however,

I

will
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examine the processes, involved in the other
two characteristics of the IAE that I hope to link with
conceptual learning.

Metaphorical Modes of Thinking
The second characteristic of the IAE that might allow
it to facilitate the learning of concepts is that it allows

an opportunity for metaphorical modes of thinking to occur.
As in our examination of perceptual cognition, the major

problem in understanding the role of this characteristic

is

understanding the processes involved, i.e., metaphorical
modes of thinking.

Therefore

I

will begin this part of our

discussion with an examination of those ideas that support
the existence of metaphorical modes of thought, and then’

move to a description of the modes themselves.
however,

I

This time,

will conclude by spending some time indicating

exactly how it is that the IAE does, in fact, allow an opportunity for these modes of thinking to occur.

Metaphorical or intuitive forms of knowing have been
practiced by people for thousands of years.

The "intuitive

leap" the scientist makes toward solving a problem, a

"woman's intuition," and "knowing one thing in your mind and

another in your heart" are all common examples of this phenomenon.

It was not until recently, however, that neuropsycho-

logists came up with fairly well-tested physiological explanation.

In The Psychology of Consciousness,

Robert Ornstein
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has pulled together the work of many theorists and
psycho-

surgeons and articulated for us a theory which proposes
the

existence of two minds in our brain.

One of these minds is

ional — 1 inear and logical in function, and the other is

metaphoric-intuitive and analogic in function.

The two

"minds” are actually conceived of as the differentiated

functioning of the two cerebral hemispheres of the brain.

Ornstein indicates 'that the right cerebral hemisphere is the

metaphoric-intuitive hemisphere and that it performs analogic
functions.
eously.

It examines tremendous amounts of data simultan-

On the other hand, the left cerebral hemisphere is

far more constrained.

It

sifts through inputs and transforms

functions to a logical-rational form, thereby acting more
like a digital computer."
.

The effects of the two cerebral hemispheres are said to

manifest themselves on different sides of the body.

The

effects of the right hemisphere are tied to one side of the
body, the effects of the left to the other.

Moreover, since

the cerebral hemispheres are ’wired’ to opposite sides of the
body, the right hemisphere is linked with the left hand and

the left hemisphere is linked with the right.

There has been subjective support for this linking of
many
the sides of the body to different types of behavior for

years.

In

"

On Knowing:

Essays for the Left Hand ," Jerome

the
Bruner summarized the feelings held by many concerning

two modes of operation.
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Since childhood, I have been enchanted by
the
fact and the symbolism of the right hand
and the
leff--the one the doer, and the other the dreamer.
Ihe right is order and lawfulness, le droit.
Its
beauties are those of geometry and taut implication.
Reaching for knowledge with the right hand
is science.
Yet to say only that much of science
is to overlook one of its excitements, for the
great hypotheses of science are gifts carried in
the left.
.

Of the left hand we say that it is awkward
and, while it has been proposed that art students
can seduce their proper hand to more expressiveness
by drawing first with the left, we nonetheless suspect this function.
The French speak of the illegitimate descent as being a main gauche and, though
the heart is virtually at the center of the thoracic
cavity, we listen for it on the left.
Sentiment,
intuition, bastardy. And should we say that reaching for knowledge with the left hand is art? Again
it is not enough, for as surely as the recital of a
daydream differs from the well-wrought tale, there
is a barrier between undisciplined fantasy and art.
To climb the barrier requires a right hand adept
at technique and artifice... (pp. 2-3).
,

But these views are not held by scientists alone.

Ornstein

points out that in simple experiments many laymen indicated
that they associated the concept of left as "bad," "dark,"

"profane," and "female," while the concept right was asso-

ciated with the opposite.
Is there any empirical evidence which supports this

theory?

According to Ornstein, yes.

He reports on a number'

of psychosurgical experiments which appear to clearly indi-

cate that there is, in fact, this "cross-wiring" between the

cerebral hemispheres and the sides of the body.

These ex-

periments also indicate that certain mental functions are
linked with one or the other of the two hemispheres.
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In one experiment, Roger Sperry,
of the California

Institute of Technology, along with his
associates, experimentally severed the corpus callosum, the
link through which
the two cerebral hemispheres communicate.
Although
this had

been done previously on laboratory animals,
Sperry undertook
the procedure on human subjects.
These subjects had severe

epilepsy and Sperry hoped that when the patients had

a

siezure in one hemisphere, the other would still be availto take control of the body

.

In many cases the proce-

dure was extremely successful.

Although in daily living these "split-brain" patients
appeared normal, Sperry and his associates developed many
subtle tests which uncovered evidence that the operation had

clearly separated the specialized functions of the two cerebral hemispheres.
In one test, for example,

if the patient felt a pencil

(hidden from sight) in his right hand, he could verbally des-

cribe it.

But if the pencil was in his left hand, he could

not describe it at all.

This was due to the fact that the

left hand informs the right hemisphere which does not possess

any capability for speech.

With the corpus collosum cut, the

left hemisphere, the one with verbal capability, is no longer

connected to the right hemisphere which communicates with the
left hand.

Therefore, the verbal apparatus literally does

not know what is in the left hand.

It was found, however,

that if the patient was offered a selection of objects--a
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key, a book, a pencil--and asked to choose
the previously

given object with his left hand he could choose
correctly,

although he still could not state verbally just what
he was
doing (pp. 55-57).
Based on this and many other experiments, what have
we come to know about the two hemispheres and their func-

tions?

First, in a pragmatic sense, we see that the left

cerebral hemisphere acts as a filter to sensory input.

It

limits data and selects those things that are important.

works like a computer and

It

strings relevant ideas into logical

messages that are linear in nature.’

It is enhanced by the

skills of reading, writing and arithmetic because they, too,
are linear in nature.

On the other hand, the right cerebral

hemisphere specializes in processing sensory information'
simultaneously.

It tends to elaborate and increase the

variables that result from each stimuli.

It works in diverse

and sometimes confusing ways, and has been described by some

researchers as being "intuitive.”

We are just beginning to

understand these forms of "intuition" as expressions of a
different function of the mind rather than a higher or lower
form of logical integration.
We have seen now chat there exists some empirical evi-

dence which would support the notion of a "two-sided" brain,
and that one side of this brain is purported to allow for

metaphorical ways of knowing and learning.

But what exactly

are these metaphorical forms of cognition like?

How do they

.

:
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operate?

According to Samples, there are four
modes of
metaphorical thinking, and these modes
parallel four levels
of analogy identified by W. J. -J. Gordon
in his work on

synectics

(

1961 )

The first of these modes is the invent ive mode.

It

parallels the level of analogy known as fantasy analogy.
Robert Samples (1975b) describes this mode in the following
way
... the mind creates objects, entities and
processes that have never existed.
Imagery and
metaphoric relationships blend in a totally invented
mindscape of thoughts.
Contexts and contents overlap, merge and diverge.
The processes are generally
'all new' for each individual, and the results of
such mind work create products that likewise are
new in the experience of the person... (p. 23).

In other words, the metaphors created in the mind are far

ranging.

Any bit of piece of information from one source may

be expanded until an entirely new entity is formed.

The second mode of metaphoric thinking is the integra-

tive mode and is parallel to the personal analogy.

In this

form the person creating the metaphor or analogy "becomes"
something else.

The child "becomes" a ball.

He or she takes

on the characteristics of a ball and experiences the world as
a ball would.

It is a process which is based on total in-

volvement, and one through which our repertorie of experience
can be vastly expanded.
Samples describes the third mode, the comparative mode,
as a mode in which,

"... certain processes or entities are

compared with other processes or entities that ordinarily
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seem distant, remote or alien
(p.

22).

to the initial comparison...

This mode, which is parallel to the direct analogy,

is very common.

It is one in which salient characteristics

are selected from one object or event and shown to be
the
same as, or parallel to, the salient characteristics of

another object or event.

A good example of this mode is

constituted when a heart and a city are said to be analogous.
Here the salient characteristic

of'

having tiny particles or

objects flow inward and outward along winding routes is iden-

tified in both entities.

In the heart, blood corpuscels are

drawn into the heart and then sent flowing outward along

winding arteries.
it

The city appears to draw automobiles into

in the morning, and then force them out along winding

roads at night.

The city, then, is seen as a heart that'

beats once a day.
The final mode, the symbolic mode, is parallel to the

symbolic level of analogy.
of language is implied.

In both the use of symbolic forms

The metaphors and analogies are them-

selves displaced by metaphorical and analogical connections
of thoughts to words.

This of course, is the most common form

of analogy and metaphor known to us today.

Given that metaphorical modes of thinking exist, and
that they consist of four types, the question still arises,
"Does the IAE allow these modes of learning to occur?"

Cer-

tainly art forms in general depend on metaphorical techniques.
and
Arnheim points out that metaphors are used in literature

Ill

and that, "There, the pairing of two images
throws into relief a common quality and thereby accomplishes
a perceptual

abstraction without relinquishing the contexts from
which
the singled out quality draws its life" (p. 62).
Eisner
adds:

"Through the ages art has served as a means of making

the spiritual, especially in religion, visual through the
image.

When the artist takes an idea such as the divine and

transforms it into a visual metaphor, he creates not only

a

specific object worthy of attention in its own right, he also

creates a form within which man's most cherished values can
be embodied"

(pp.

10-11).

If art as "art" depends on metaphoric modes, is this

also true of the IAE?
ical modes of thinking?

Does a typical IAE facilitate metaphorIn order to answer this question,

I

would like to describe some educational activities that were

designed specifically to enhance the use of the right cerebral

hemisphere (RCH), the hemisphere connected, as you recall,
with metaphorical modes of thinking.

The salient character-

istics of these activities, as described by Samples, are

significantly similar to the salient characteristics of an
IAE.

Samples states:
The instructional materials were specifically
designed to legitimize student access to their own
The assignments were highly ambiguRCH functions.
ous in order to heighten the student's role in
Students were
deciding what the assignment meant.
asked to make decisions; they were asked to set up
strategies and plans based on the nature of the
They were invited to invent
initial problem.

.
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solutions for problems posed by the materials,
plans that they could take action on in their
own
environments (1975b, p. 21).

Samples believes that these instructional materials
and

learning materials not only created a legitamacy for
the RCH,
but that they also created access routes to the use
of that

hemisphere.
What were the salient characteristics of the activi-

ties?

They were:

(1)

the assignments were highly ambiguous

and heightened the student’s role in deciding what the

assignment meant; (2) the students made decisions and made
up strategies;

blems

(3)

the students invented solutions to pro-

posed by the materials; and (4) the students were able

to act on their plans.

I

believe that it is essential that

we recognize that these characteristics are all inherent in

almost all IAEs
To explain further, almost all IAEs

are ambiguous in

nature, in that every student determines for him or herself
what the final outcome of the IAE will be.

Experiencing how

you would feel while mass producing a product is not experi-

encing what the teacher would experience.

As a result one

student experiences boredom, another lack of accomplishment,
but a third, pride.

The teacher and the IAE allow only for

the opportunity to experience.

come

They do not control the out-

.

Another characteristic of the IAE that is basic to its
existence is the use of materials that bring with them their
own character.

The materials themselves present problems:
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thick paint refuses to be translucent; musical tones last
for
only a given duration.

The students make decisions, plan

strategies and solve problems based on the assignment itself
and on the materials involved.

In solving these problems and

making these decisions the students often come to understand
the metaphorical relationships between the problems posed by
the materials and the problems they face in real life.

Finally, it is important to note that there is great
value in the fact that the IAE allows students to actually

manipulate materials and take action on their plans and
strategies.

I

believe this allows for the concret izat ion of

many ideas, and for the juxtaposition of those ideas in a way
that makes clear the different relations between them.

One final point that

I

would like to make in discussing

metaphorical modes of thinking concerns the educational implications of using those modes.

First of all, Samples points

out that in tests done on the effects of enhancing the use of

the RCH the results were:

(1) the students'

self-esteem in-

creased; (2) performance skills typically assigned to the LCH

increased at the same time; and (3) students chose to explore

greater number

s

of content areas and to a greater depth in

the arts, sciences and humanities (1975b, p. 21).

I

believe

many
that since these activities and materials shared so
positive
characteristics with the IAE, we can assume the same
IAE.
results would be obtained with the use of the

.
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And finally. Samples indicates
that not only are these
modes of value to students, but students
clearly seemed to
prefer them when confronted with a problem.
He explains,
"The first action the children consistently
took was to latch
onto the problem, the equipment, the setting
and all the
various and sundry components with all, the
senses they could
bring to bear" (p. 18). And how did the
children discuss the
problems.

Samples indicates that most of their expressions

were highly metaphoric in nature.

They often formed analogies

between the experience they were having and situations they
had experienced in the past.
Thst

,

Clearly, the implications are

since metaphorical modes of thinking appear to be

natural to children and advantageous for them, we should do

everything we can to balance our instructional programs so
that they develop both analytic and metaphorical modes of

thinking
In summary, we have seen that there are two separate

modes of functioning, one analytic and the other metaphorical, and that these two modes of functioning are said to be

based in the two different cerebral hemispheres.

We have also

seen, from the work done by Sperry and his associates, that

there is some strong empirical evidence which supports the

existence of these two modes and the connection between them
and the cerebral hemispheres.

Samples has identified that

metaphorical thinking is divided into four modes
tegrat i ve

,

comparative and symbolic

,

,

inventive

,

in-

and that these rour modes
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were parallel to four modes of analogy,
fantasy
d irect

and symbolic

.

,

personal

,

Finally, we have seen that since there

were strong similarities between activities
designed to
celebrate the right cerebral hemisphere and IAEs

and since

those activities did, in fact, allow for metaphoric
modes of
thinking to occur, we might assume that the IAE might also

facilitate the use of metaphoric modes of thinking.

It

is

now time to discuss the final characteristic of the IAE which
I

believe facilitates the learning of concepts.

Presentational Forms of Communication
The final characteristic of the IAE that

I

believe

allows it to facilitate the learning of concepts is that it

allows the student to use presentational forms of communication.

After describing the major alternative mode of commu-

nication that

I

believe can be associated with the IAE, we

will take a look at the role of communication in art in general and then briefly examine one particular type of communi-

cation that can result directly from an IAE.
In order to understand presentational forms of communi-

cation, the concept of symbolization must be examined.

her book Philosophy in a New Key

,

In

Susanne Langer undertakes

an examination of symbolism and its role in communication and
the arts.

She feels that,

"...there is a primary need in

man, which other creatures probably do not have, and which

actuates all his apparently unzoological aims .... This basic
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need, which certainly is obvious only in
man, is the need to
s ymbolize "

m

(pp.

40-41).

This need to symbolize is apparent

many ways and she feels many of our actions
are the result

of it.

She states:

"As all registered experience tends to

terminate in action it is only natural that

a

typically human

function should require a typically human form of overt
y

,

and that is just what we find in the sheer expres—

sion of ideas " (p. 43).
It is important to note that Langer is not discussing

only the spoken or written word, but rather all forms of symbolic communication.

According to her view, symbolic commu-

nication can be broken down into two categories.

In the

first category we find spoken and written language.

points out:

She

"...however, all language has a form which re-

quries us to strin g out our ideas even though their objects
rest one within the other... This property of verbal symbol-

ism is known as discursiveness; by reason of it, only thought

which can be arranged in this peculiar order can be spoken at
all" (p.

81).

As mentioned earlier, there is another form

of symbolic communication, one which many people rarely consider.

Langer believes that visual

proportions, etc.

— are

f orms--lines

,

colors,

just as capable of articulation.

How-

ever, she also beleives that the laws that goven this sort of

articulation are altogether different from the laws of syntax
that govern language.

The biggest difference is that these

visual forms are not discursive.

These forms are not
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perceived by viewing each of their constituents
successively
as in discursive forms, but rather,
simultaneously.
These forms, known as presentational forms,
are not to
be considered less effective nor less natural
to human
sym-

bolic functioning.

"The abstractions made by the ear and

eye--the forms of direct percept ion--are our most primitive
instruments of intelligence.

They are genuine symbolic

material, media of understanding, by whose office we appre-

hend a world of things
of things" (p.

92).

,

and of events that are the history

It is clear,. also,

from the preceding

statement, that Langer is not considering only visual forms
as presentational.

She also believes that music is capable

of articulating forms which language cannot.

Forms that are

perceived visually but are not fixed can also be presenta-

tionaltional forms of symbolic communication.
"...

Langer states:

as soon as an expressive act is performed without inner

momentary compulsion it is no longer self-expressive;

it

is

expressive in the logical sense... instead of completing the
-

natural history of a feeling, it denotes the feeling, and may

merely bring it to mind..."

(p.

152).

It is these presentational forms of communication that

play an important role in the IAE.
the IAE does communication play?

How important a role in
To the degree that the IAE

deals with forms that are artistic, the role is essential.

Many theorists believe that the attempt to communicate is

defining characteristic of art.

Howard Gardner explains.

a
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Every art form involves
communication on the part of one
person (or subject) to another by
means of a symbolic object
that the first subject has created,
and that the second is
able in some way to relate to"
(1972, p. 30).
He also points
out:
"Indeed Tolstoy defined art as a ’human
activity
con-

sisting in this, that one may consciously
by means of external signs, hand on to others' feelings he
has lived through
and that others are infected by these feelings
and also
experience them" ( p p. 34-35).
There arises a point of confusion, however, if art
is

viewed only within the context of communication from one
person to another.

As Lowenfeld and Brittain have pointed

out "Art on all levels is an expression of the human spirit..
It expresses the relationship of the artist to himself and

to his environment"

(1974, p.

40).

Although "expression"

could be viewed as an attempt at communication, the role of
the second person is not explicitly clear in the statement.
Also, Schactel states of creative behavior:

"The main moti-

vation at the root of creative experience is man's need to
relate to the world around him..." (Getzels and Jackson, 1962,
p.

114).

Again communication between two people is not

clearly a part of the statement.
How can we resolve the discrepancy?
to us from the field of gestalt therapy.

The answer comes

Erving Polster and

Miriam Polster, in explaining the use of the term "contact"
to describe the process of becoming aware of parts of one's
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own self, state:

"This kind of internal contact can
occur,

however, because of the human ability to
split oneself into
the observer and the observed" (1974,
p. 106).
Drawing on
this notion, then, we can consider arts experiences
as com-

municative in nature, although internally communicative
as
well as/or opposed to externally communicative.
I

stated before that after describing presentational

forms of communication and discussing the role of communica—
tn art in general, we would examine briefly one parti-

cular type of communication that can result directly from an
IAE.

All we need to do to accomplish this, is to combine the

two topics we have just discussed with our general descrip-

tion of the IAE.

How does a child learn some-

We may ask:

thing about him or herself through an alternative form of

communication and as the result of an IAE?
many, possible answers might be:

(1)

Just one, of

given the assignment:

using clay as a medium, create a sculpture which expresses
the concept, capital punishment

;

(2)

the child discovers his

or her own feelings about the concept capital punishment
(3)

;

through both the discursive thoughts he or she thinks

while deciding on the form the sculpture will take and through
the presentational forms that take shape as the child manipu-

lates the clay.
It appears that we have come full circle in answering

the question, What are the characteristics of the IAE that

might allow it to facilitate the learning of concepts?

Vie

.
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have seen that the definition of the IAE
used in this study
revolved around three component parts:
(1) a kinesthetic
and/or emotional state; (2) that is in some way
analogous
to the concept being learned; and (3) that occurs
through

heightened sensory awareness on the part of the learner.

We

have seen that the component parts of this definition
grow
out of the writings of many authors:

speak of the

Lowenfeld and Brittain

integrated" experience; Eisner’s description

of the contextualist justification points out the possible

connection between the arts experience and concept formation; authors such as Jones and Lowen discuss the relation-

ship between emotional and kinesthetic states and learning;

and Ornstein and Gordon describe metaphoric and analogous
forms of learning.

Finally, after examining some sample

integrated arts activities we have isolated three characteristics which might allow the IAE to facilitate conceptual
learning.

These characteristics are that it:

opportunity for perceptual cognition to occur;

(1)

allows an

(2)

allows an

opportunity for metaphorical modes of thinking to occur; and
(3)

allows the learner to make use of alternative forms of

communication.
Where do we go next?

Our next step is to bring together

all the bits and pieces of information that we have examined.

Our hope will be to connect them in such a way that they can

help us reasonably answer the question,
tate the learning of concepts?

Can the IAE facili-
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CHAPTER III
Reference Notes
1 Exercise

developed by consultant team working through

an in-service project under the auspices of
Massachusetts

Council on The Arts.
2

Exercise developed by the author for use in an in-

service training project for the Bethlehem Public Schools,
Delmar, New York.
q

Exercise developed by a participant in an in-service,

Integrated-Arts workshop given in Utica, New York, under the

auspices of Project Search, New York State Department of

Education
4

..

Ideas derived from an unpublished article entitled,

"A Conceptual Framework For the Use of the Arts as a Teach-

ing Vehicle," by Phyllis Krakauer and Frank Messina.
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CHAPTER

IV

A MODEL OF HOW THE IAE FACILITATES THE

LEARNING OF CONCEPTS
We have come, at last, to a point at which we must

touch ground.

We have taken flight and have travelled over

much terrain.

Part of our flight has been smooth, allowing

us to race quickly over large areas while still being able

to see clearly the formations below us.

flight have not been so smooth.

Other parts of our

Clouds of confusion have

sometimes made it difficult for us to see the places at which
some of the different formations we were studying were con-

nected, and how they interacted.

In our travels we have

collected, and come to understand, many different ideas and
theories.

But as

I

have said, it is now time for us to come

to ground; to see if those ideas and theories we have col-

lected will. allow us to fulfill our goal.

And what is that goal?

I

stated in the introduction to

this study that a problem existed.

Many people have sup-

ported, based on intuitive feelings, the notion of using arts

activities to enhance conceptual learning and development.
Unfortunately, however, the use of arts activities in this
way has not been examined within the context of a systematic

understanding of the processes involved in conceptual

.
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learning and development, nor has it been critiqued
based on
criteria from outside the realm of arts education.
I,

cherefore, proposed that the purpose of this study

would be to ask the question, Should the IAE be used to
facilitate conceptual learning and development?

I

also indi-

cated that the first part of the study would address itself
to the issue of whether it is theoretically possible for

arts activities to facilitate conceptual learning and devel-

opment

The goal of our travels so far was to be able to

.

answer the question, Can the IAE facilitate the learning of
concepts?

I

believe we can, within a theoretical context,

now answer the question.
In Chapter II, we saw, after examining the nature of

concepts .and concept formation, that there was one theory

which gave us a context within which to evaluate the relative merits of any approach to facilitating the learning of
concepts.

That construct was David Ausubel's theory of mean-

ingful learning.

This theory allowed us to evaluate the

merits of different approaches by identifying the goal we
attempt to reach,

i .e

,

meaningful learning, and the cri-

teria we must fulfill in order to attain that goal.

Accord-

ing to Ausubel's theory, if meaningful learning is to occur,

we must facilitate learning that is nonarbitrary and substan-

tive.

Nonarbitrariness implies that the new material that

is

learned has some reasonable connection to material already in
the existing cognitive structure of the learner.

Substantive
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implies that the learning is not merely
the memorizing of a
verbal proposition. We also saw that
Ausubel proposed two
kinds of advance organizers, expository
and comparative,
which facilitated meaningful learning by
increasing the

readiness of the student to learn.
In short, we now have a goal, meaningful
learning, and

two criteria for achieving that goal, learning that
is non-

arbitrary and learning that is substantive.

We also have two

which function to facilitate our goal, expository
and comparative advance organizers.

Therefore, we can evalu-

ate any approach to facilitating the learning of concepts on
the basis of the degree to which it fulfills either criteria,

nonarbitrariness or substantiveness, or functions in the role
of either form of advance organizer.

How effective is the use of the IAE in facilitating the

learning of concepts?

To fit the approach more easily and

clearly to the model, we have isolated the three main charac-

teristics of the IAE that appear to allow
the learning of concepts.
(1)

it allows an

occur;

(2)

it

it to

facilitate

These three characteristics are:

opportunity for perceptual cognition to

allows an opportunity for metaphorical modes

of thinking to occur; and (3) it allows the learner to make
use of alternative forms of communication.

The task becomes one of matching characteristics to

criteria.

To the degree that allowing perceptual cognition

to occur facilitates nonarbitrary and substantive learning,
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the use of the IAE facilitates the learning
of concepts.
To
the degree that allowing metaphorical modes of
thinking to

occur facilitates nonarbitrary and substantive
learning, the
use of the IAE facilitates meaningful learning.
And,
of

course, to the degree that allowing learners to use
presen-

tational forms of communication facilitates nonarbitrary
and

substantive learning, the use of the IAE again facilitates
the learning of concepts.

In addition, to the extent that

perceptual cognition, the metaphorical modes of thinking and

presentational forms of communication can function in the
role of advance organizers, they, and therefore the IAE,
can be said to facilitate the learning of concepts.
The structure of this chapter will be based on the

attempt to connect each of the three characteristics to both
of the criteria.

Therefore, there will be four sub-sections

In each of the first three,

I

will discuss one of the three

characteristics in terms of the degree to which it facilitates
I

each of the two criteria.

In the fourth sub-section,

will present a model that will visually summarize the re-

lations between the three characteristics and the two cri-

teria

.

Perceptual Cognition and Meaningful Learning
The first characteristic we will evaluate is based upon

the process of perceptual cognition.

Rudolph Arnheim (1969

)

It was from the work of

that much of our discussion of percep-

tual cognition was drawn.

The major thrust of Arnheim

s

.
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discussion was that in perception we gather not only
reflections of things, but actual generalizations about those
things.

In other words, we are able to form concepts
during

the perceptual phase of cognition.

Kneiter also supported

that view, describing percepts and their ability to develop
into concepts.

It

is,

I

believe, through this process that

perceptual cognition might be able to facilitate nonarbitrariness

.

Arnheim describes two types of concepts, static and
dynamic.

Static concepts allow one given moment in the life

of a concept to stand for the concept in its entirety.

In

contrast, dynamic concepts identify the generality by which
a concept was held together but not at the expense of the

attributes of each individual exemplar of the concept.

Arnheim points out that dynamic concepts are strictly attached
to perceptual cognition since verbal expressions had to, by

nature, be static in quality.

Verbalized concepts must

isolate a given instance that is representative of the concept as a whole.
I

believe that perceptual cognition contributes to non-

arbitrariness through the vehicle of the dynamic concept
Since nonarbitrariness is constituted through making reason-

able connections between new and existing material, imagine
the increased number of connections that can be made if the

combined attributes of all the instances included in the
opposed to
dynamic concept are available for connection, as

"
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only the limited number available in the static
concept.

It

is true that not all of the attributes that
define some of

the instances included in the dynamic concept
faithfully re-

present the nature of the concept itself.

It

is also true,

however, that these non-representative characteristics may

trigger the making of connections that are potentially available but are not normally noticed if only the static concept
is used.

The higher the number of connections available,

the higher the quality of those connections is likely to
be.

In short, the dynamic concept, which is the domain of

perceptual cognition, might easily contribute to nonarbi-

trariness by bringing to bear more attributes that are

potentially connectable to the existing cognitive structure
than does the static concept.
To expand a little further on this topic, there is

another value of dynamic concepts.

Arnheim points out that

the approach to knowing that is a result of the use of dynamic

concepts also keeps in front of us, at all times, "... concrete manifestations of the phenomena in which [we] are in-

terested."

What better way to see the connections inherent

between a concept and one's own existing cognitive structure
than to be able to examine, with our own senses,

exemplar of that concept.

a concrete

As Flannery points out, concepts

removed from their sensory base are extremely difficult to
understand, and, "Tragic are the adjustments [learners] make
to the absolute requirement that they learn castrated

concepts

.
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Maddenfort's discussion of experiencing on
an immediately sensuous basis is also germane to a
discussion of
perceptual cognition and its relation to
nonarbitrariness.
In the example he gave which dealt with seeing
a chair "con-

ceptually,

n

rather than in its immediate sensuousness,

Maddenfort pointed up clearly how much of what we could know
about that chair was interferred with by our using a static

concept as a mediator of our experience with the chair.
Again, the more we can know about a particular chair the

more we can see the superordinate/ subordinate relations within which it exists to other material in our cognitive struc-

ture

.

Another way in which perceptual cognition might facilitate nonarbitrariness is through visual selectivity.

Arnheim

points out how visual selectivity indicated the active intel-

ligence of perception.

He also points out that as visual

selectivity obtains during the process of depth perception,

contextual inclusion is controlled.
_

The differing amounts of

the contextual environment that are apprehended along with the

subject or concept itself must influence the relatability of
the concept to the learner’s existing cognitive structure.

Therefore,

I

believe, visual selectivity acts as a vehicle

through which perceptual cognition might facilitate the learning of concepts.

A final point concerning perceptual cognition and non-

arbitrariness involves the need for flexible perception.

.
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Arnheim has pointed out through his example of Copernicus
visualizing the movements of planets around
the need for flexible perception.

a

rotating base,

This need is obviously

based in the fact that the more flexible the perception of a
concept, the more flexible the connection of that concept to

existing cognitive structures is likely to be, and therefore,
the more likely it is that the learning of that concept will
be nonarbitrary.

There appears to be little problem with connecting per-

ceptual cognition to substantive learning.

It is the very

essence of perceptual cognition that it occurs during sensory

perception and before the concept enters verbal relations.
Since the essence of substantive learning is that it is learning that

-is

nonverbatim, or not merely the committing to

memory of verbal propositions, there can be no doubt that

perceptual cognition facilitates the substantive nature of
learning
In summary,

I

believe that it is reasonable to state

that perceptual cognition might facilitate the meeting of

both of the criteria for meaningful learning.

I

believe it

may facilitate, nonarbitrary learning through the vehicle of

dynamic concepts which allow for knowing particulars as well
selectivas generalities, and through the vehicle of visual
ity especially as it obtains during depth perception.

I

facilitate subalso believe that perceptual cognition might

necessarily
stantive learning due to the fact that it is
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non-verbal in nature.

I

should now examine the relationship

between metaphorical modes of thinking and these two
criteria

.

Metaphorical Modes of

Thinking and Meaningful Learning
In answering the question,

Is it possible that meta-

phorical modes of thinking facilitate nonarbitrary learning?,
it must be remembered that a metaphor itself is the sub-

stituting of one object or thought for another to imply the
likeness of the two.

If a metaphor is used experimentally,

i.e., to find out about potential metaphorical relations, we

not only imply possible likeness, but we discover other qual-

ities of -relation as well.

It

would seem then, that implicit

in the notion of metaphorical learning is the process of com-

paring new material, or material that is new in the sense
that it is being reexamined, with material that is already
known, or that we can say already exists within the cognitive

structure of the learner.

Thus, metaphorical modes of think-

ing imply nonarbitrariness.

Perhaps this relation can be made even clearer if we
take a look at the two modes of metaphorical thinking that
are most commonly a part of an IAE.

In the comparative mode,

the salient characteristics of one object or event are shown
to be the same as, or parallel to, the salient characteristics

.
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of another object or event.

We have already seen an example

in which a city is found to be analogous
to a heart that

beats once a day.

Already implied in the example is the

fact that one half of the analogy is new, or "newly
realized,"

while the other half is considered to be already known.

Let

us extend the example, however, from one of "pure
metaphori-

cal relation,

to one in which the type of metaphor that occurs

in the arts evolves.

Arnheim has pointed out that in litera-

ture, metaphors, "... throw into relief a common quality and

thereby accomplish a perceptual abstraction without relin-

quishing the contexts from which the singled out quality draws
its life."

We have seen in the previous sub-section that the

appropriate degree of contextual inclusion can have
effect on facilitating nonarbitrariness.

a

positive

In the "artistic"

metaphor, then, we not only have a vehicle for learning which
implies nonarbitrary learning by its very nature, we also have
a vehicle in which the ability to facilitate nonarbitrariness
is enhanced. by the fact that both entities in the metaphor

come to the learner in contextually inclusive form, thereby

facilitating as many connections to existing material as
possible.

To state that the learning that would take place

in this instance might be nonarbitrary would appear to be an

understatement
The other mode of metaphorical thinking that is commonly part of an IAE is the integrative mode.

In this mode the
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learner "becomes" something else, and
experiences the world
as that object would.
Does this type of metaphorical learning
have a special connection to nonarbitrariness?
I believe so.
The special connection comes from the obvious
fact
that the

learner does not really "become" anything else at
all except
more open to perceiving the world in new ways.
In this

pro-

cess the learner brings to bear a new frame of reference.
But,

of.

course, this frame of reference is made up of cogni-

tive materials and dispositions he or she already possesses.
The learner allows cognitive material that he or she possesses but would not normally allow to come in contact with this

new material to do just that.

For example, the experience

of rolling is usually only allowed to come into contact with

the cognitive material which the learner possesses that de-

fines the physical characteristics of his or her own body.

When the learner "becomes" a ball a new set of cognitive

material is allowed to join the process.

Although it is not

based in reality, the cognitive material that defines the

learner's body as round is allowed to join the material that

normally defines the physical characteristics of the learner's
body in coming. into contact with the experience of rolling.
In short, more cognitive material takes part in the inter-

action and therefore the potential connections between new
and existing cognitive material increase dramatically.

Once

again, given the nonarbitrariness that is implied in the

nature of metaphorical learning, and given that that quality
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is enhanced by the special
characteristics of this mode of

metaphorical thought, it seems clear that
nonarbitrary learning might easily occur in this situation.
We have seen that metaphorical modes of
thinking are

tied to nonarbitrary learning by their nature.

This is due

to the fact that in any metaphor there is one entity
that is
"new" or "newly realized," and another that is known
or

exists already in the cognitive structure of the learner.

We

have also examined two of the four modes of metaphorical thinking, the two that are most commonly a part of an IAE.

In

examples of both the comparative and integrative modes we saw
that these particular modes had special characteristics which

enhanced their already formidible ability to facilitate non-

arbitrary learning.

Once again,

I

find myself concluding that

the characteristic in question, the fact that the IAE allows
for metaphorical modes of thinking to occur, does, in fact,

facilitate the meeting of the criteria in question, the non-

arbitrariness of learning.
The relation of this characteristic to substantive

learning is not nearly as clear in this instance as it was in
the case of perceptual cognition.

Whereas perceptual cogni-

tion is nonverbatim or substantive by nature, the same is
not true of metaphorical modes of thinking.

In fact, the

metaphor is most often thought of as a verbal comparison.
There are two points

I

would make in relating metapho-

rical modes of thinking to substantive learning.

The first
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is that although the metaphor is usually
thought of as a

verbal proposition, it need not necessarily be one.

In an

activity that is an IAE, other media of expression are
used
to express metaphorical relations as well.

Visual shapes

and images can easily come to represent different ideas.
The images are then put into differing relationships with

each other.

The learner perceives the metaphorical rela-

tions that evolve as visual concepts first and only translate

them into verbal propositions as a later step.

The same can

be true of aural images, and kinesthetic sensations, etc.

In

other words, metaphorical modes of thinking need not be verbal modes of thinking.

The second point

I

would make is that if, in a given

instance,- the metaphorical mode of thinking involved is ver-

bal,

it

is not necessarily also nonsubstantive.

The term

verbat im implies that a verbal proposition is that and

nothing more.

It

implies that the learner could not express

the same relevant ideas by the use of an equivalent symbol
or group of symbols.

Therefore, if metaphorical modes of

thinking develop an idea for the learner which he or she can
then express in any number of different combinations of verbal symbols the learning would be verbal but also substan-

tive

.

We see that metaphorical modes of thinking do not, by

nature, facilitate substantive learning.

However, based on

and
the fact that all metaphorical learning is not verbal,
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the fact that all metaphorical learning that is
verbal is
not always nonsubstantive, it at least appears that
meta-

phorical modes of thinking do not prohibit and may possibly
facilitate substantive learning.
In the end, what can we say of the relation between

metaphorical modes of thinking and the two criteria for meaningful learning?

In my opinion, the characteristic in ques-

tion, that the IAE allows for metaphorical modes of thinking

to occur, might easily allow for the nonarbitrariness of

learning.

As for the second criteria, however,

I

can only

see that the characteristic does not theoretically prohibit,

and may possibly facilitate, the substantiveness of learning.

Presentational Forms of

Communication and Meaningful Learning
The final characteristic of the IAE that we will relate
to substantive and nonarbitrary learning is that it allows

the learner to make use of presentational forms of communication.

I

believe that whereas perceptual cognition can be

clearly tied to both nonarbitrary and substantive learning,
and metaphorical modes of thinking can be tied to nonarbi-

trary but not necessarily to substantive learning, alternative forms of communication can be tied to substantive learning,

but

I

am not certain of the degree to which they

facilitate nonarbitrary learning.
by
Presentational forms of communication are described

that they grasp
Langer as non-discursive in nature, meaning
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concepts and thoughts simultaneously and all-at-once,
rather
than in the one-at-a-time fashion that verbal forms
of com-

munication rely on.

What does this imply about the relation

between presentational forms of communication and nonarbitrary learning?
The major point

I

would make is that since presenta-

tional forms allow for the communication of information that
is not conveyable by discursive forms of communication, the

opportunity for nonarbitrary learning is enhanced.

This is

due to the fact that there are more types of information

available to serve as either new or existing cognitive material.

This is exemplified in learning that occurs as the

result of experiences with music.

Music has been identified

by Langer as the form of symbolization that is most highly

presentational in nature (Langer, 1942,

p.

9).

Therefore,

only information carried to the learner directly through the

music itself is information that would not normally be available to the learner if he or she depended solely on discursive forms of information.

As in any case in which more

information is available to the learner, we could make a case
that nonarbitrariness is facilitated since more connections

between new and existing material would be potentially available.

I

would warn, however, that although, in the most

theoretical sense the argument may be considered valid, we are
of
not certain of anything that indicates to us that the type

connect
information transmitted to us is likely to be able to

to existing cognitive material.

Therefore, it is possible
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that while the characteristic does
not prohibit nonarbitrary
learning, it may not facilitate it either.
We are not certain
of the degree to which presentational
forms of communication
facilitate nonarbitrary learning.
If that is so, on what grounds do we
say that presen-

tational forms of communication might allow the IAE
to
facilitate conceptual learning? I believe that we

can say

this on the grounds that information that is important
to

the learner in forming concepts may well be conveyed through

presentational forms of communication.

Learning that results

from this is, and must always be, substantive in nature.

In

other words, important learning that occurs through IAEs

may

be based on information that is carried through presentation-

al forms of communication, and one of the most important

characteristics of that learning is that it is always substantive in nature.
A Model of How the IAE

Facilitates the Learning of Concepts
In the final subsection of this chapter

I

will propose

a model of how. the IAE facilitates the learning of concepts.
It

is, however,

only a tentative model, one built on what

have discovered about this process.

future

I

I

am sure that in the

may alter many features of the model, or even its

basic structure.

The purpose of the model is only to sum-

marize, in visual form, the ideas which

I

have already

I

.
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discussed throughout this study.

This seems, to me, an

appropriate form of summary, given the
content of the study.
The model is comprised of five levels
(see
Figure 1).

The upper and lowermost levels represent
the components of
the basic question to which the model, and
indeed the whole
first part of this study, address themselves,
Can the IAE

facilitate conceptual learning?'

represents the IAE itself

,

The top level of the model

and the lowest level represents

the learning of concepts.
The second level up from the bottom of the model repre-

sents the operationalized version of the learning of concepts,
namely, meaningful learning

.

This form is employed because

it supplies us with criteria which we may use in evaluating

approaches which attempt to facilitate conceptual learning.
Which brings us to the third and fourth, or innermost, levels
of the model.

The third level represents the criteria which

we must fulfill if we are to achieve our goal of meaningful

learning, i.e., the learning of concepts

.

It

is comprised

of two criteria, nonarbitrariness and substantiveness.

The

fourth level represents those characteristics of the IAE

which might allow us to fulfill those criteria and therefore

attain the goal of meaningful learning.

The three charac-

teristics that comprise this level are represented by the
processes which they involve, perceptual cognition, meta-

phorical modes of thinking and presentational forms of

communication
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The relationships that exist
between the members of the
third and fourth levels are
represented by the lines drawn
from each characteristic to each
criteria.
Perceptual cognition, it is indicated, has a positive
relation to both nonarbitrariness and substantiveness.
It relates positively to
nonarbitrariness through the vehicle of dynamic
concepts and
visual selectivity.
It relates positively to substantiveness
by virtue of its nature, which is essentially
non-verbal.

Metaphorical modes of thinking, on the other hand,
are
shown to relate positively to only one of the
critera.

They

relate positively to nonarbitrariness because their essential
nature is reflective of a relation between new material and

already existing material.

The comparative and integrative

modes are also shown to be especially well-suited to facili-

tating nonarbitrary learning.

However, the relation between

metaphorical modes of thinking and substantiveness is not

necessarily so positive.

Metaphorical modes of thinking do

not prohibit, but may not necessarily facilitate substantive

learning

Alternative forms of communication also relate differently to the two criteria.

They relate positively to sub-

stantiveness, based, as in perceptual cognition, on their

nature which is essentially non-verbal.

their relation to nonarbitrariness.

This is not true of

It is unclear from the

material discussed in this study, to what degree alternative
forms of communication relate positively to nonarbitrariness.
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It is clear that they increase the
potential numbers of con-

nections that might be made between new and existing
cognitive
material.
However, the nature of the information carried
by

presentational forms of communication may, or may not,
deter
that information from connecting with already existing

cogni-

tive material.

Consequently, my answer to the question, Is it theore-

tically possible for the Integrated Arts Experience to
facilitate conceptual learning and development? is, yes.

PART II
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CHAPTER

V

THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF

EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF THE IAE:
EDUCATION AND ECSTACY
In 1968, George Leonard published a work
entitled,

Education and Ecstacy
received.

.

The book was widely-read and well-

It stands as one of the earlier works that com-

prise the educational reform movement of the late 1960’s and
early ’70s.

The book is particularly interesting because

it views education both from a sociological and anthro-

pological perspective.

It discusses the role that education

plays in the development of any species.

Obviously, if Leonard successfully discusses problems
of such wide and differing scope, he must define education
in equally broad terms.

He does just that when he states:

"To learn is to change.

Education is a process that changes

learners"

(p.

18).

In other words, any process that changes

the learner, either in the short or long run, can be consi-

dered "educative."

We wil]

better understand the applica-

tions and implications of this definition as we look more

closely at some of Leonard's major points.

However, we get

a hint of the attitude toward education that Leonard brings

to his discussion by noting what he says concerning the

.
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rapidly changing conditions we fac e
hl

sl tuation, despite attempts
at drawing
Parallels cannot be viewed simply as'
more o f the same.
It is something entirely new,
calling for entirely new responses. What
important, it seems to demand a new kind is more
of human
being— one who is not driven by narrow competition
eager acquisition and aggression, but who
ms -Life in the joyful pursuit of learning.spends
Such
a human being, I. feel, will result not
so much
through changed ideologies or economic systems
as
through changes in the process I have called 'education.’
The idea of education as the most effective human change agent is by no means new.
But I
tried to broaden and simplify education’s
definition, to expand its domain, to link it with
the new technology and to alter the relationship
between the educator and the learner. As a chief
ingredient in all this, as well as an alternative
to the old reinforcers, I have named ’ecstacy'-joy, ananda, the ultimate delight (p. 230).
T

f

,

.

Keeping in mind Leonard’s view of education,

I

will

examine the degree to which the use of the IAE might enhance
our prospects of reaching some of the goals that Leonard
sets for education.

To facilitate that examination,

identified four major goals for education that

accurately reflect Leonard’s views.

I

I

have

believe

The goals are stated

in a form which will allow us to use them as standards by

which to evaluate the use of the IAE.

Given the accepta-

bility and validity of the goals themselves, which, of
course, it is the perogative of each reader to judge, the use
of the IAE can be considered positive to the degree to which
it facilitates the attaining of each of those goals.

four goals are:

(1)

The

Education will encourage learners to be

responsive to their environments;

(2)

Education will
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encourage learners to realize as
much of their potential
as
possible; (3) Education will
discourage detachment on the
part of the learners; and (4)
Education will
be ecstatic.

The chapter will be divided into
four sub-sections, each
dealing with one of the four goals I
have identified, and
each sub-section we will look first
at Leonard's views
concerning the goals, and then at the role
the use of the
IAE might play in attaining the goal.

m

Goal No.

Education Will Hake

1:

Learners More Responsive to Their Environments
Leonard has stated:

"Learning involves interaction be-

tween the learner and his environment, and its effectiveness

relates to the frequency, variety and intensity of the in-

teraction" (p. 19).

He also indicates that most students

realize that the symbolic tricks they are expected to learn
have little to do with their own deeper feelings or anything
in the here and now.

I

believe, from these and many other

comments, that Leonard would hope that education would en-

courage learners to be responsive to their environments

.

Leonard believes that much of education is geared

toward making students avoid contact with their environment.
Almost everyone who has been educated in America would probably agree with the fact that we are told we must go to
school now so that we can reap the benefits later.

Leonard puts it:

As

"The activity that masquerades under the
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ancient and noble name of 'education

1

actually seems to serve

as a sort of ransom to the future, a
down payment toward

getting ahead' --or at least toward not falling
behind"

(p.

10).

Of course, the attitude in and of itself is
enough to take

learners out of the here and now.

They come to view each

activity, each exercise, not for what is to be felt,
or seen
or tasted or experienced; they come to view it in
terms of

what is to be learned, and learning is something that is

used in the future, not in the present.

The goal of the

activity lies, then, not in the present, but in the future.
No wonder the small child, not yet fully enculturated and

without an inclination for delayed reward, has trouble staying with the problems of memorizing times tables.

Another way in which education usually manages to
remove the learner from the here and now is through the sub-

stitution of the word for the experience.

Historian Arnold

Toynbee, in discussing the decline of Chinese and Roman
Empires, explains that one factor in the decline of those

empires was the extension of formal education from the pri-

vileged few to a wider circle.

In the process, according to

Toynbee, education degenerated into formal education in book

learning and became divorced from
ship for life.

a

spontaneous apprentice-

In fact, the art of playing with words became

a substitute for the art of living.

still true today.

This, of course, is

Students still endure lectures and audio-

visual displays, while they seldom have a chance to experience much that is new.

Perhaps the real here and now for the
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student is that he or she will be
consistently denied a
chance for sensorial experience with
the objects and concepts that are to be learned.
There have, of course, been attempts
to alter this
relation.
John Dewey, perhaps the most well-known
reformer
in this area,

sought to unify education and life.

Dewey

recognized that education is a process, a part
of life, not
a preparation for future living.
Unfortunately,
Dewey’s

attempts were aborted when the ideas and programs he
envisioned were taken to extremes by disciples who did not
really

understand his intensions.

However, that does not make the

valuing of present experiences for themselves invalid, and
Dewey’s ideas retain their importance for us.
It

is Leonard's hope that learners will come to expe-

rience in the here and now not only those learnings that are
part of an activity structured by a "teacher," but all learnings, no matter who, or what, the "teacher" is.

He states:

"Ho environment can strongly affect a person unless it is

strongly interactive.

To be interactive, the environment

must be responsive, that is, must provide relevant feedback
to the learner" (p.

39).

But the learner can receive that

feedback at many different times and in many different ways
if only he or she is open to experiencing the environment in

the proper manner.

Leonard points out to us that there are many natural
teachers.

For example, the human organism is educated by the

inexorable day-night cycle of a rotating
planet.

He states:

Current research on what happens to
those who
jet east or west across several time
zones only confirms what many travelers have suspected
since the
jetliners began to fly:
interaction with the terrestrial twenty-four-hour cycle shapes many
aspects
ot our being into resonant cycles.
Functions that
range from digestion to dreaming, from sex to
sweating need recycling after a quick hop from New
York
to Teheran.
We have yet to know precisely the
diurnal or nocturnal patterns of hormonal and other
systems.
Perhaps breaking prior conditions and
longitudinal place will help us better understand
the human mechanism (p. 56 ).
.

.

.

.

Words also have their effects on us.

Aldous Huxley

once estimated that seventy percent of human existence is

dominated by verbal relations.

We have already seen how

authors like Maddenfort, Arnheim and Larger describe the

difference between sensuous perception and experiencing that
is mediated by verbal concepts.

Leonard points out that

it

is possible, if only momentarily, to. escape from language

itself.

He refers us to Huxley’s experiments in "nonverbal

humanities" and indicates that they revealed the rich world
that waits for us behind the screen of words.

According to Leonard, the effects of these natural
teachers are grossly underestimated.

By affecting our learn-

ing, they affect the shape of our existence, even of our-

selves.

A child learns to operate in an environment.

what if that environment changes?

Leonard states:

But

"Such

’natural developments' require interaction between the or-

ganism (baby) and the environment.

If the properties of the

environment were different, if gravity, light, inertia, air.

sound, and the like were not as they are,
then learning would
be different, and the resulting organism,
though clothed in
a.
human body, would be different indeed"
44-46)
(pp.

This brings us back to Leonard’s original statement:

"Learning involves interaction between the learner and
his
environment, and its effectiveness relates to the frequency,

variety and intensity of the interaction"
come to the question:

(p.

19).

We also

To what degree does the use of the

IAE facilitate learners being responsive to their environ-

ment?

We are interested in the relation between the IAE and

the responsiveness to the environment, and interaction plays
a

significant part.

To answer the question, however, we

need to remember that the IAE is defined as an activity which

induces in the learner an emotional and/or kinesthetic state

which is in some way analogous to the concept being taught
and which occurs through heightened sensory awareness on the
part of the learner.

I

believe that there are two ways in

which the IAE might facilitate learners being responsive to
their environment, both of which we have discussed in previous chapters.
What have these things to do with responsiveness to the

environment?

The objects and events that the learner per-

ceives sensorially during the IAE are, first and foremost,
part of the learner’s environment.

It

is because these ob-

jects and events are part of the learner’s environment that
he or she is being asked to learn about them at all.

already
fore, as the learner takes part in an IAE he or she is
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responding to at least part of the
environment.
But, of course, what Leonard implies
goes much further
than that. He is asking that the learner be

constantly

aware of the environment and of the interactions
he or she
has with that environment.
Although I speak without the

weight of empirical evidence behind me,

regular use of the IAE
^

f ee l

I

believe that the

encourages that behavior in learn-

that every time a learner perceives and operates

cognitively on a perceptual plane, it increases the chances
that he or she will operate in that way at another time.
The more the learner can come to feel comfortable with per-

ceptual cognition, the more likely it is that he or she will
come to use it.

I

believe also that concomitant with the use

of perceptual cognition is a disposition to perceive larger
and.

larger amounts of the environmental context as potentially

involved in any problem.

As this happens the learner becomes

more and more responsive to the environment in general.
The second process by which the IAE might facilitate

learners being responsive to their environment is mentioned
It has to do with the process of inter-

by Leonard himself.

action.

We have seen in Chapter II how Piaget described

learning in terms of interactions between the learner and the
learned.

He uses the terms, assimilat ion and accommodation

to describe, first how a learner takes in new knowledge, and

secondly, how the learner is changed by that knowledge.

also saw in Chapter

2

We

that these processes were subsumed in
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Ausubel's theoretical, construct of meaningful learning

Since

.

we have seen that it was reasonable to believe
that the IAE

might facilitate meaningful learning, it is also reasonable
that we assume that the IAE might encourage interaction be-

tween the learner and the learned.

Though

I

speak again

without the support of empirical evidence,

I

feel that this

process of interaction can be expanded to involve the environment as a whole as the result

o'f

regular IAEs.

Again my

belief is based on the idea that as perceptual cognition becomes more and more a part of the cognitive arsenal the

learner uses in attempting to understand the world, his or
her limits of environmental context expand.

Therefore more

and more things in the environment are seen as applicable
to the solving of a given problem and as a result the learner interacts with more and more of the environment.
In short, through increased sensory awareness and

through the process of interaction that is subsumed in the
notion of meaningful learning, the IAE does have the potential to significantly increase the probability that education
will encourage learners to be responsive to their environments.

Goal No.

2:

Education Will Encourage Learners

To Realize As Much of Their Potential As Possible

I

have stated before that Education and Ecstacy is

from
particularly interesting because it looks at education
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both a sociological and anthropological
perspective.
Leonard
discusses education as it relates to the
development of a
species and to the needs of society. The
major thrust of
this discussion is that Leonard believes
we can, and must,
realize more of our potential if we are to
survive as a species.

Therefore,

I

believe that it is accurate to say that

Leonard hopes that education will encourage learners
to

realize as much of their potential as possible

.

To understand his position, we must follow Leonard's

argument in this field very carefully.

Based on his view

that to learn is to change, Leonard begins:

"All behavior,

including that commonly called 'instinctive' or 'specialspecific' is learned.

In the lower organisms it is learned

not so much during the life of any individual of the species
as during the life-span of the species itself"

(p.

65 ).

How does learning span the lifetime of numerous gener-

ations of one species?

To answer this question we must

first refamiliarize ourselves with two substances, DNA and
RNA.

DNA (dexoyribonucleic acid) is contained in every

living cell, including brain cells.

It contains the complex

genetic molecules that pass along the blueprints of any
RNA (ribonucleic acid) contains somewhat similar

species.

molecules.

These molecules serve as messengers for the DNA

informing the proteins of the body what and how to build.
But RNA,

it

seems, also serves another function.

molecule is a storehouse of information.

The RNA

It functions as

if
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it were a microscopic library.

Leonard summarizes

Learning involves memory, that is,
the storln carnation.
Man’s large, complex, yet
^
?
unified centra] nervous system can store
great
amounts of new information during the
individual's
me dnd Can revam P information already
stored.
All the ubrain cells, as well as the
material between the cells, have their own ways of
responding
as we have seen, may be traced back to
thin, chainike molecules of RNA or DMA, which serve as
tiny
rererence libraries, holding incredibly great
amounts of coded information.
The DNA passed
down from our ancestors contains information
about the brain cell’s basic structure and composition.... The RNA serves as a messenger from the
DNA and a template upon which the protein of the
cell may build.
During learning, the RNA also
helps modify the brain cell's composition so as
to change its way of behaving.
It may be said that
a record of our lifetime’s learning is kept in
those tiny chainlike molecules (p. 66).

An^

,

,

He continues:
We call species-long learning ’adaptation' or,
when the species shifts in physical form so that we
recognize it as something separate, ’evolution.' ~~K
record of these changes, this education, is kept in
the DNA, the microscopic libraries of learning that
are passed down from generation to generation.
Whether in earth worm, robin or man, the chemical
scheme, the language in the molecules, is the same
(p.

67).

We see, then, that Leonard views evolution as the edu-

cation of a species.

Thusly, a species is educated when

predator kills off members of the species with
characteristic.

Over time,

th<rt

a

a

certain

characteristic disappears

from the species altogether, and the species can be said to
have been educated.
What does this have to do with the learning that suppo

sedly goes on in schools?

According to Leonard, species edu

cation can be said to follow. the same laws of functioning

,

.
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that we follow in programmed learning.

He indicates that

some species succeed in learning from
their environments

while others fail for the same reason that
some students
succeed in school while others fail.
If the learning steps
are too great, if the environment changes too
fast,
then

the student cannot learn (adapt or evolve) and the
species

may perish, the child fail.

In an extremely stable envi-

ronment, on the other hand, the species may survive but it
may hardly change.

The -same is true of course, for the

student
One example of this is the navigational feat accom-

plished by the green turtle of certain South Atlantic colonies.

Each year, the green turtle navigates 1,400 miles

without a landmark, from Brazil to Ascension Island, a tiny
dot on the open ocean.

How can they do this?

At least one

theory holds that Ascension is the last out-cropping of what
once was a vaster land mass.

Perhaps when the green turtle

first evolved, the Great Atlantic Ridge, now sunken, humped
a thousand-mile-long spine out of the sea, making a target

nearly impossible to miss.

As the land mass gradually sank

beneath the water, generation after generation of green
turtle learned finer and finer positional discrimination.
They learned in order to insure survival of the species.
They could learn because the process was gradual
(p.

enough

69-70).

Have humans learned in this way?

Host certainly.

as a species, have our automatic behaviors.

VJe

But compared to

.
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other animal families they are certainly
unimpressive.
it is
another realm that we, as a species,

m

excell.

No,

have come to

It is in the realm of intragenerat
ional learning.

Leonard states:
The ancient learning of the species
called
man is ^passed down in the cleverly comprehensive
code or the.DNA molecules. A key message in
the
code for this species may be summarized as
follows:
Construct now an organism that will do most of
its learning during its individual lifetime.'
From this, the organism derives its very essence.
All the. other particularities that have been cited
to distinguish man from animal upright stance,
opposable thumb, massive brain--may be viewed as a
means to this end (p. 71 ).
.

.

—

Given the relatively low degree of learning carried in
DMA by humans, how is it that we come to learn such similar

things?

Does not learning within the lifetime imply a tre-

mendous variance in the behavior of each species member?
Leonard indicates that our present automatic responses are

passed down, not so much by DNA as by an agency that in some
ways seems equally rigid and repetitive.

That agency is

society

Society has many subtle ways of controlling our learning.

In preliterate times much of its effect was carried

through the vehicles of epics, rituals and mores.

But

whether social learning is stored in song of a people or on
shelves of a library, each human individual draws upon a

learning program that goes back many centuries.
states:
man.

Leonard

"In these programs may be found the 'nature' of

All those

writers who have delineated 'human nature’
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(and note that the term itself has
a pessimistic limiting
ting to it) have actually been writing
about the nature of
human societies” (p. 72).
But, as the above implies, society
is more than a

carrier of information.

It actually sets the limits on the

kinds and quality of learning that individuals
will make.
To better understand this phenomenon we must
look at the
most recent epoch in the development of the human
species,
the epoch referred to by Leonard as Civilization

.

The agri-

cultural revolution is seen as the beginning of the epoch.
Prior to the agricultural revolution, according to Leonard,

humans were ultimate learners.

The human

as hunter was

totally involved with his or her environment.

Humans

learned constantly, and this was facilitated by the immediate feedback they received concerning their actions.

new weapon worked or didn't work.
in feast or hunger.

A

A hunting strategy ended

Each person grew wiser as the hunters

never stopped learning

(p.

73-74).

But all this changed with the agricultural revolution.

That revolution was based on the principle of delayed reward.

How difficult it must have been for the hunter to work and
plow and plant, only to wait months before reaping the benefits.

How was this incredible change from hunter to farmer

and later merchant, cobbler, statesman, accomplished?

Accord-

ing to Leonard, it came with the first large assemblages of

people, cities.

But the principle that made workers plant
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and wait was not delayed reward, but
immediate punishment.
Leonard states of the educational
attributes of the whip:
"And its teaching may be summed up in
the demand, often enforced on penalty of death, that each human
individual
develop only a fragment of his potential abilities.
That

humans could respond even to this negative
education con-

stitutes high tribute to their adaptability as learners"
(p.

76).
It was the whip, then,

Great Wall of China.

that built the pyramids and the

But the whip is very expensive in terms

of the man-power needed to make its presence felt.

If so-

ciety was to accomplish its goals, often at the expense of
the individual, a more efficient system would have to be de-

veloped.

reason

.

And so, according to Leonard, society "invented"
Leonard states:

The invention of ’reason,’ for example, was
an ingenious way of internalizing the whip, for
the concept itself comes into being only as separate from and opposed to feelings, emotions,
impulse.
Too often, indeed, such terms as 'conscience,' 'dignity,' 'stoicism,' 'heroism,' 'honor,'
or even 'glory' have constituted ultimately indefinable variations on a single theme:
man's
endeavor to act and speak in a manner aversive to
him without the prod of external punishment. During
the entire period of Civilization, a large measure,
perhaps a majority, of an individual's education
was devoted to teaching him how to be less than he
could be and to perform this feat with the aid of
no external taskmaster whatever (p. 76).

Why did society need to gain control over people.
that people would function as cogs in the social machine.

Certainly much has been gained in terms of technology,

So

.
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control of environment, etc., through
this means.
But the
price has been paid by the individual.
Leonard believes that
during the period of Civilization it was
societies that
learned.

The conditions under which they learned
imposed,

in effect, a moratorium on the full development
of individual

learning

(p.

78).

Which brings us back to the goal which is the focal
point of this sub-section:

education will encourage learn-

ers to realize as much of their potential as possible.

To

what degree does the use of the IAE facilitate the attaining
on this goal?

To answer this question

I

mine one more point that Leonard makes.
it

is precisely those people who,

would like to exaHe indicates that

for whatever reason, have

operated outside Civilization’s structures who have kept
learning alive across the centuries.

Leonard describes these

people as rogues and identifies four types of rogues:
(1) the

ordinary rogue or rascal, the adventurer, the picaro

(2) the radical technologist;

(3) the mystic; and

(4)

the

artist
It

is,

of course, the artist who concerns us here.

Leonard believes that the more highly specialized and re-

pressed a society becomes, the more it needs art as
ate category.

a separ-

It serves as a place that is safe for whole-

ness, for feelings and for learning.

He continues:

In the meantime, the rogue-artist provides us one
of the best learning programs to be found in the
whole crumbling schoolhouse of Civilization. He

;
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demonstrates the inter-play between
discipline and
freedom, contending with the limitations
materials yet never failing to find (if of his
he is a
true art is that the materials are
less limiting
than was previously thought. He reveals
for us
inhis way of working, what the Indian mystic
Sri Aurobmdo called the soul’s distrust
of all
absolutes.
He is compelled toward the particular, the place, the moment.
'Art does not generalize and classify,’ writes Suzanne Langer; 'art
sets forth the individuality of forms which discourse, being essentially general, has to suppress.
This sense of life is always new, infinitely complex, therefore infinitely variable in its possible
expressions' (p. 98).
<

)

We see, then, that Leonard recognizes the value of sen-

sory perception and experience as we have discussed it

throughout this study.

He states of the artist:

The artist revives in us the senses and feelings
and aspects of being that Western Civilization, in
its pell-mell pursuit of the purely verbal-symbolicconceptual, has caused many of us .quite to neglect
in the educational endeavor.
He shows us how to
explore the sensory universe.
He maps for us the
many roads to delight (p. 98).

To what degree does the use of the IAE encourage

learners to realize as much of their potential as possible.
I

believe we can say, initially, that to the degree that the

IAE facilitates artistic experiences, the IAE allows the

learner to experience all the ways of knowing that Leonard

attributes to the art ist-as-rogue
artistic experiences?

.

Does the IAE facilitate

Although the question is the topic

of an entire study in and of itself,

I

believe that we can

assume of an activity which is based on sensory awareness,

which allows for manipulation of materials, and which often
calls for internal and/or external communication of
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subjective material, there is a strong probability that
that
ivitiy will
I

often facilitate artistic experiences.

believe further, that whether an IAE is "artistic"

or not, students who are learning through perceptual cognition, metaphorical modes of thinking and presentational

modes of communication, are exercising more of their potential than are students who have not gained access to these

modes of cognitive functioning.
The aspect in which

I

believe the IAE plays no signi-

ficant role in encouraging learners to realize as much of

their potential as possible is volitional and societal in
nature.

The IAE is an approach which gives the learner

greater access to his or her potential.

However, it is the

will of society, transmitted to the student through the

teacher, that will determine whether or not the student sees
fit to realize that potential.

If learners are instructed,

through any one of many subtle mechanisms, that their function is to fill a role in society and to develop only enough
of their potential to fill that role successfully, they will

not realize their full potential no matter how available it
is made to them through the IAE and other approaches.

If,

again
on the other hand, learners are encouraged by society,

through the teacher, to be the most fully involved learners
technique
(changers) they can be, the IAE stands ready as a

that might help them in their efforts.
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Goal No.

3:

Education Will

Discourage Detachment on the Part of Learners
I

have spoken at length of the positive attributes of

responsiveness to the environment and full realization of
potential.

It seems clear that this is what Leonard hopes

students would achieve.

But if that is the hoped-for goal,

what is the present condition?

What do students do now?

It

is possible to describe this present condition merely in

terms of the lack of the positive attributes Leonard hopes
for:

students are non -responsive to their environment;

students do not realize their full potential.
ever, goes a step further.

Leonard, how-

He describes the present condi-

tion as one in which students become detached; from their

environments and, more importantly, from themselves.
fore,

I

There-

believe it is accurate to say that Leonard would

hope that education would discourage detachment on the part
of learners

.

In discussing this problem,

Leonard begins by pointing

out that we should be glad that schools generally fail in

their present task.

The task is to teach a few tricks and

otherwise limit the student’s possibilities, narrow his or
her perceptions and bring the individual's career as
er (changer) to an end.

He continues:

a

learn-

Such a task may have

of the
seemed necessary in the precarious fragmented society

past.

to
During that period individuals as components had
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prop up the social machine.

Leonard concludes by indicating

that he believes this type of educating will
no longer suffice, even at the lowest level of survival.
If
we do not

change our educative process, he believes, the very
existence
of our species will be in jeopardy.

He summarizes:

"It is

the basic premise of this book, however, that the highly
^-^^-^nact ive

,

regenerative, technological society now emerg-

ing will work best, indeed will require something akin to

mass genius, mass creativity, and lifelong learning"

(p.

115)

And what stands in the way of that mass creativity,
etc., detachment.

Detachment is the process whereby the indi

vidual losses contact with his or her own feelings, needs,
or wants.

Our society has often called for this detachment

from the self in order to allow the learner to fulfill his
or her function in the social machine.

One way we do that

is to substitute proficiency or skill for active experience.

Leonard states:

Concentrat ion on technical proficiency has become
one of the very best ways to avoid awareness of
The swordsman in a duel or the jet pilot
self.
in a dogfight generally is more concerned with
his technique than with the survival of his own
Detachment from self reaches
physical person.
Facing imminent
an extreme in the test pilot.
de^.th, his interest remains focused on his flight
Millions have heard the voices of
instruments.
astronauts (test pilots all), calm and mechanical
Courage? Yes, but
in the face of epic dangers.
self (p. 123).
the
from
divorce
also detachment,

Another way society has managed to encourage this detachment of the self is through external reward.
puts it

,

As Leonard

piling up honors, whether tangible or intangible,
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has often had the effect of
divorcing the student from his
or her own feelings.
In this case a person's worth
is
measured by things outside him or herself.
We saw in Chapter III, that many
people consider the
mental process of abstraction as a withdrawal
from direct
experience.
Arnheim pointed out to us the danger inherent
in this view.

In addition, he points out that detachment
is

also a result of this withdrawal from direct experience.

He

states:

The indirectness of relation leads easily
enough to a partial or complete detachment from the
objects of these activities.
The salesgirl, with
the merchandise right in her hands, may "think of
it only as a means of making sales, a lawyer may
be absorbed by a purely formal play of fitting a
given case to its legal precedents; the teacher
is tempted to lose, in the transmission of textbook
data, the sense of what these data are about.
This
harmful alienation occurs in people largely concerned with things that stand for other things.
It
is a pathological detachment (Arnheim, 1969, p. 203—
204

)

.

Whereas Arnheim discusses detachment from objects and
events and Leonard discusses detachment from the self,
lieve the two are both results of the same process.

process is the withdrawal from direct experience.

I

be-

That
We do not

directly experience either the object we look at or the feelings we have.

Both become mediated by verbal concepts.

And so, as we ask the question,

To what degree does

the use of the IAE discourage detachment on the part of the
learner?,

I

believe the answer is obvious.

In both Chap-

ters III and IV, we spoke of dynamic concepts, the concepts
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that Arnheim proposed as a
means of cognition that
did not
withdraw from direct experience.
We saw how static
concepts,
the counterpart of dynamic
concepts, gave us learning
that
was stripped of its sensorial
base, and Flannery pointed
out to us the disadvantage of
such "castrated" concepts.
We
also saw how dynamic concepts played
a role in facilitating
meaningful learning, by allowing the
learner to experience
more of the particularity involved in a
concept, thereby
increasing the potential connections of the new
material to
existing material in the learner’s cognitive
structure.
All of this can be considered a result of direct
ex-

perience.

Direct experience discourages detachment, on
the

part of the learner, from the external world of objects
and

the internal v/orld of feelings.

We will see more clearly,

in Chapter VI, how the IAE can help the learner be more
aware

of his or her own feelings, needs or wants.

But

I

believe

it is reasonable to say, based on the process of perceptual

cognition in general and on dynamic concepts in particular,
that the IAE might easily discourage detachment on the part
of the learner.

Goal No.

I

4:

Education Will Be Ecstatic

indicated in a quotation at the beginning of this

chapter that Leonard has stated:

"As a chief ingredient in

all this [a new view of education], as well as an alternative
to the old reinforcers,

I

have named ecstacy..."
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(parenthetical statement added)

(p.

230).

It seems clear

from this, and from Leonard's
work in its entirety, that
he
would hope that education would
be ecstatic
Early in the work he states:
.

"What then is the purpose,

the goal of education?

A large part of the answer
may well

be what men of this civilization
have longest feared and most
desired:
the achievement of moments of ecstacy"
(p. 17 ).

Leonard believes that the "new” educators
will become explicit
the pursuit of the ecstatic moment as they
lose their fear
of delight.
He also believes that .at its best,

m

its most effec-

tiveness, the moment of learning is a moment of
delight.
this true?

Is

Does Leonard know of any information on which
to

base this belief?

He states:

Do discipline and mastery of technique stand in
opposition to freedom self-expression and the ecstatic
moment? Most Western educators have acted as if they
did.
Strange, when there exist so many models of
the marriage between the two.
Take the artistic endeavor:
the composer discovers that the soul of
creation transcends the body of form only when form
is his completely.
The violinist arrives at the sublime only through utter mastery of technique.
The
instruments of living that are now coming into our
hands--rich, responsive and diverse--require mastery.
The process of mastery itself can be ecstatic, leading to delight that transcends mastery (p. 17-18).

Unfortunately we have not, as a society, come to see
that marriage of mastery and ecstacy.

We often believe that

ecstacy is an inward-directed experience.

Leonard points out:

The notion that ecstacy is mainly an inward-directed
experience testifies to our distrust of our own
society, of the outer environment we have created
for ourselves.
Actually, the varieties of ecstacy
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are limitless ... The new educators
will seek out
PO Slb
ty of dell g ht in every form of learnS
Ina
^H realize that solving an elegant
ing
He will
mathematical problem and making love are
different
classes
the same order of things, sharing common ec stacy (p. 40-41).
.

m

If this does not happen,

the result?

if learning is not ecstatic, what is

When joy is not present, the effectiveness of
the

learning process falls until the human being is operating

hesitatingly, grudgingly, fearfully at only a tiny fraction
of his or her potential.
But what do we know of ecstacy as Leonard defines it?

Leonard himself would have us start with three negative statements.
(p.

First,

231).

"

Ecstacy is not necessarily opposed to reason "

But, on the other hand, it may help us to better

understand reason by connecting it to its missing element-emotion.

Secondly,

order " (p. 231).

"

Ecrstacy is not necessarily opposed to

It may,

however, help us to achieve a more

natural order than one imposed upon us by fear and aggression.
If people are allowed to be what they can be and what they

want to be, there may evolve an order that is balanced and

natural.

"Ecstacy is implicated in changing not the quantity,

but the quality of order"

(p.

231).

neither immoral nor moral in itself "
condition.

And finally,
(p.

231).

"

Ecstacy is

Ecstacy is a

If it is fostered by people of ill-will,

function immorally.

If,

it can

on the other hand, it is used for

human purposes, it obtains a moral quality.
And finally, we move again to the question of relation.
To what degree does the use of the IAE facilitate education

,
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that is ecstatic?

believe the answer to the question lies

I

in identifying the underlying process in
ecstatic learning.

Leonard is not exceedingly clear in defining
"ecstacy" and,
therefore, my view is colored by my own preconceptions.

How-

ever,
ing,

believe that what Leonard describes as ecstatic learn-

I

is similar to what

I

have described as intuitive knowing.

Leonard himself speaks of the moment when things become suddenl Y clear to us.

"intuitive leap."

I

believe what he is describing is the

If that is so, then yes, the IAE does, at

least partially, facilitate ecstatic learning.

It does

so

through the vehicle of metaphorical modes of thinking.
Ornstein described this experience for us when he talked about
the type of thinking that occurs in the right cerebral hemisphere.

There is, however, another connection

make between ecstatic learning and the IAE.

obliged

,

because to make the connection

idea which

I

I

I

use the term

must refer to an

feel ill-qualified to speak of.

the aesthetic experience

feel obliged to

I

That idea is

.

The aesthetic experience has been the topic of much

discourse.

Theoreticians have attempted to describe it,

analyze it, and identify it.
ject.

It has proved a difficult sub-

Having not studied the aesthetic experience per se,

would feel some discomfort in stating that the aesthetic

experience

as it has been described by some authors, is

similar or parallel to the ecstatic moment

.

There are,

I

.
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however, some similar characteristics
between the two, as far
as I can tell, and I feel I would be
remiss in not mentioning
them.
First, as

tive leap.

I

have already mentioned, there is the intui-

The "aha!" that

I

believe is a part of the ecsta-

tic moment certainly has its counter-part in the aesthetic

experience.

Many authors describe the moment at which the

interplay between the materials the artist is using, and the

conscious and unconscious thought of the artist, produces

a

sudden shift to a new level of understanding.
Secondly, there is the

period of preparation that

essential to both experiences.

is

No sudden shift in knowledge

and understanding can occur without a period in which the

mind and the senses, either consciously or unconsciously,

manipulate the cognitive material prior to understanding it.
And finally, there are the integrative effects that
the experience has on the participant.

these effects throughout his work.

Leonard alludes to

He implies that as a

result of ecstatic moments people will function more fully,
feel better about themselves and face the difficulties of life

more effectively.

Janie Rhyne, just to mention one author,

describes these same effects as the result of aesthetic experiences in her work, The Gesralt Art Experience (1973).
I

find it possible to connect the IAE to education that

is ecstatic.

The connections

I

see, however, are not solidly

based on empirical, or even theoretical evidence, but are

intuitive
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In evaluating the degree to which
the IAE might play a
part in facilitating some of the outcomes
from education that

Leonard appears to value,

I

formulated four goals which

I

believe accurately reflect Leonard’s views, and
then discussed the role of the IAE in attaining each of those

goals.

I

believe we are justified in believing that the IAE
could

play a significant role in achieving the quality and type
of

education that Leonard advocates.

.
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CHAPTER

VI

THE ROLE OF EMOTIONAL MATERIAL IN

CONCEPTUAL LEARNING AND THE PART THE
IAE CAN PLAY:

FANTASY AND FEELING IN EDUCATION

In recent yeers the terms effective end cognitive heve

come to teke on speciel importence for educetors.

They heve

come to describe the two "domeins" of leerning thet teechers
ere continuelly involved with.

The domeins they describe

heve come to be thought of es seperete.

These domeins heve

even been described seperetely in two texonomies of objectives, the now-femous Texonomy of Educetionel Objectives II:

Affective

0.9

64

) ,

by Krethwohl, Bloom end Mesie, end its less-

femous predecessor, Texonomy of Educetionel Objectives

I:

Cognitive (1956).

Certeinly much hes been geined by the identif icetion
end seperete study of the cognitive end effective domeins.

Much confusion hes been dispelled, end the unique end individuel cherecteristics of eech domein heve been grented, et

leest elternetely, the undivided ettention of investigetors

There ere, however, liebilities involved in this seperetion.

The two domeins exist concurrently within the humen

mind, end it is only through ertificiel methods thet we sepe-

rete them.

It is certeinly conceiveble thet in sepereting the

two domeins we come to investigete two helves neither of which
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contain, in their separated form, the
essence of the whole.
This view, of course, is supported by
the work of organismic

psychologists whose "wholistic" views hold that
the laws
which govern the organism are inherent in the
organism as a
whole, but are not necessarily manifest in its
individual
component parts.
<3-Fe

the effects of separating the cognitive and

affective domains?

As

I

pointed out before, certain advan-

tages, mostly concerned with methodological considerations in

studying the two domains, accrue with their separation.

How-

ever, certain authors agree with Charles Silberman who feels

that the artificial separation of these aspects or modes of

knowing only creates a false dichotomy between the cognitive
and affective domains and that this can only cripple the de-

velopment of thought and feeling.

They believe that feelings

play an important part in conceptual behavior.
It is to this issue that we will direct our attention in

this chapter.

Two questions will form the basis for the sub-

sections of the chapter.
To

First we will deal with the question,

what degree do emotions and feelings play a significant

role in conceptual learning?

question,

Following that we will ask the

To the degree that emotions can play a part in con-

ceptual learning, how can the use of the IAE facilitate their
doing so?

The major work we will use at the basis for the

discussion will be Fantasy and Feeling in Education (1968), by
Richard Jones, an eminent educational psychologist.
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To What Degree Do Emotions and Feelings

Play A Significant Role in Conceptual
Learning?

Richard Jones begins his discussion of this
question
by describing, briefly, the Endicott Conference.
This

auspi-

cious conference, held in the Endicott House at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1962, scholars and
educators from many fields came together to discuss how the

leading producers of knowledge, the scholars, might take

a

more active role in facilitating the work of the communicators of that knowledge, the teachers.

The conference en-

couraged the beginnings of many of the sophisticated "new
curricula" that were produced in the late 1960's and early
’70’s.

It

stands as a turning point in the progression and

production of curricula that are intellectually honest and
stimulating.
But the effects of the Endicott conference, and others

like it, have not been entirely satisfactory.

The scholars

and educators involved have had great influence in the field
of education, but Jones states of that influence:

"The empha

sis of this influence is on instructional materials:

syllabi

texts, films, documents, exercises, etc. --as it should be.

Corresponding experimentation with new instructional methods,
which the new materials often vaguely demand but cannot themselves supply, has not been proceeding apace"

(p.

5).

One of the most influential writers during this period
has been Jerome Bruner.

Jones takes issue with Bruner

s
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writings, believing them to be
representative of the thought
and ideas of many of the educators and
scholars who were in-

m

volved

formulating the new curricula.

Jones believes that

it is unfortunate that Bruner has sought
to found the new

educational psychology on an exclusively cognitive
base.
states:

"In what follows

I

He

shall try to indicate how Bruner's

advances toward a theory of instruction, made as they have
been by half-steps, have revealed possibilities for the taking of full steps; that is for the coordination of cognitive

moves with emotional and imaginal ones"
Jones goes

-on to

(p.

5).

describe the value he sees in the work

done by Bruner, especially how important it is that attempts
are made to make the new curricula intellectually honest and

challenging.

He indicates, therefore, that he does not oppose

what Bruner has brought to pedagogy, but rather, he hopes to

bring to Bruner's ideas their due complements.

And what is it that Bruner has brought to pedagogy?
The effects can be most clearly seen in the new social studies

curriculum Bruner took part in designing and testing,
entitled:

Man:

A Course of Study.

a

course

Bruner himself describes

the course thusly:
his nature
The content of the course is man:
as a species, the forces that shaped and continue to
Three questions recur throughshape his humanity.
out
What is human about human beings?
How did they get that way?
How can they be made more so?
We seek exercises and materials through which our
pupils can learn wherein man is distinctive in his
:
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adaptation to the world, and wherein there
is discernible continuity between him and his
forebearers
In ^pursuit of our questions we proceed
to
explore five subjects, each closely associated
with
the evolution of man as a species, each defining
at
once the dist inct iyeness of man and his potentiality
for further evolution.
The five great humanizing
forces are tool making, language, social organization, the management of man's prolonged childhood,
and man's urge to explain the world (1966,
PP' 77.

85)

And Jones states:

"In order to bring these five dimensions

into the kinds of inwardly induced articulation which are

known to support some of the most lasting and buoyant of the

learning processes, materials have 'been designed which show
evidence of these humanizing forces at various points of contrast to modern man along the evolutionary continuum..."
(p.

13).

Does Jones find fault with this new curriculum?

tainly not.

In fact he is most enthusiastic about it.

CerWhat

he does say is that the standards of intellectual honesty that

will be brought to schoolrooms by a curriculum of this nature

would be unprecedented, and that if we succeeded in committing

teachers to these standards, we would be obliged to succeed
in committing them to similarly unprecedented standards of

emotional honesty as well.

He points out that the new chal-

lenges would reside not only in presenting such materials to

children in ways that would not be obnoxious to them, but
also in presenting them in ways that would enlist the child-

ren's rich emotional and imaginal responses.

:
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It would seem, then, the next
logical step is to answer

the question, How can emotional
involvement aid in conceptual
learning? Before dealing directly with
the question, however,
Jones Attempts to broaden his readers’
understanding of the
role emotions might play in learning. He
begins by drawing
an example from a special summer school
session in Newton,

Massachusetts.
^ or

-?

an

The session was designed to test materials

A Course of Study

In the example Jones describes

.

to us a film which the children view, one in which Netsilik

Eskimo hunters kill a seal in its breathing hole.

The film

attempts to portray, as accurately as possible, the actual
hunt.

It also portrays the scene that occurs in the family

igloo while the mother and children wait for the father to

bring home- the much needed food.

In its striving for accuracy,

the movie contains many scenes for which the children are

totally unprepared.

There is some nudity in the igloo, and

the breathing hole scene is especially bloody.

Jones .also shares with his readers some of the comments
that were part of the evaluation of the showing of the film

and the lesson that ensued.

He quotes:

'The gory parts didn’t get in the
Master teacher
...
I wanted them to think--not feel.’
:

way.

’No doubt they learned
Subject Matter Specialist
a lot about tool use and that’s what we set out to
teach them, but I find myself thinking about all that
wasn t there an awful lot being
emotional hubub
...
bypassed?
:

.

.

.

’

’

Tomorrow, or next week, or next
Psychologist
month we’re going to want these children to exercise
:

.
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another kind of cognitive skill, to think not only
analytically and objectively, with an eye to solving the problems we pose for them, but to think
intuitively and subjectively with an eye to posing
problems for themselves. And for that we are going
to want them to indulge their imaginations, their
offbeat thoughts, a different order of cognitive
skill presuming different orders of emotional skill:
expression, sharing, use. We’ve prepared them for
that by teaching them control.
So far so good.
People can't express, share, or use emotions that
they can’t control.
But we’re only half-way there,
and if we forget where we helped them to leave
their emotions we shouldn't be surprised if later
they can't find the images that went with those
emotions (pp. 17 - 18).
Jones is advocating here that children be allowed to
use their imaginations while learning.

If it seems unclear

how this might occur, perhaps it will help if we examine what
he says of a later lessen in Han:

A Course of Study

.

He states:

It is intended that by comparing the Netsilik's
ways of regulating human conflict with our own
ways the children may begin to deepen their comprehension of their species, of what makes all
When such objectives have proved
humans human....
elusive in the past the instructional process which
sought to achieve them can usually be shown to have
significant and believlacked a crucial element:
unfamiliar world,
between
able points of comparison
materiinstructional
as brought to the child by the
to
child
als, and familiar world, as brought by the
the instructional materials (p. 19).

In other words, he believes that the points of comparison

which are potentially most significant are sometimes not im-

mediately believable, and must first be made believable

.

to test
Sometimes children need to imagine reality in order
it

more "believable,
If imagination is used to make reality

more "testable," what of emotions?

Jones warns us that there
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are two half-truths which have gained
ascendancy in education,
and which tend to impede our understanding of
the role emo-

tions play in learning.

According to Jones, these half-truths

have become so ingrained in the thinking of curriculum
designers that if we do not actively seek to correct them, or
rather

make them full-truths, they, "... must reduce the effectiveness of the new social studies curricula by exactly the other
half, thus subverting the new possibilities into the same old

practicalities..."
follows:

(p.

25).

These two half-truths are as

"(1) Emotions and fantasies can obstruct learning;

and (2) Expression of emotions and fantasies can have cathartic benefits" (p.

25).

Of the first half-truth Jones states:

Now it is true that emotions and fantasies
can obstruct learning when they are uncontrolled.
Uncontrolled emotions and fantasies obstruct alThe other half of
most all aspects of learning.
this truth is that the control of emotion and fantasy is substantive in one kind of learning (the
attainment or discovery of knowledge) and preparatory to another kind of learning (the formation or
In respect to the latter,
invention of knowledge).
however, control of emotion and imagery, while
necessary is not sufficient (pp. 25 - 26).
Or, in other words,

if people are to be able to invent know-

ledge, they must be able to do more with their emotions than

control them.

As we have seen in one of Jones’ earlier state-

ments, they must be able to expres s them and use them.

Which brings us to the second half-truth.

Again, Jones

does not disagree with the idea that expression of emotions

and fantasies can have cathartic benefits.

He does wish to
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remind us, however, that there is a
second half to this half
truth, a pedagogical one.
He states:
construction of knowledge, as distinct
attainment of it, presumes freedom and skillfrom
in the sharing and use of controlled
emotion and
imagery.... A child cannot, of course, learn
to
share and use what he has not learned to
control.
Beyond the matter of control, however, the
teacher
has the option of instructing the child or
leaving
him or his own devices (p. 20).

i;*
the

And how is it that we can go about instructing the
child
in the use of his or her emotions as a tool for
conceptual

learning.

Obviously, for Jones, the issue revolves around

imagination as well as emotion.

Perhaps we need to take a

closer look at imagination in order to better understand how
both imagination and emotion can facilitate conceptual learning.

As is often the case, Jones begins his discussion with

Bruner’s work.

He states of Toward a Theory of Instruction

that it omits much.

In particular,

,

he believes it says very

little about imagination, that aspect of the human learning

process which is so uniquely human and which very often goes

uninstructed in our schools.

And what of imagination itself?

He states that our understanding of imagination should include
(1)

an appreciation of its ubiquity and (2) knowledge of the

conditions that vary its availability.
As concerns the first point, Jones makes clear that

imagination is not a special gift given to some.

He believes

that it is obvious that we all have imagination, but vary in

,
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our ability to call it forth.

The ability not only varies

from person to person, but also, from
situation to situation
for the same person.
Jones states:
The ubiquity of imagination resides in the
fact that human beings perceive the world
symbolically.
Our everyday, conscious, adult experiences
tend to obscure this fundamental feature of human
existence.
The common sense of our imaginations
is rather that they come into play after perceptual
events, i.e.
that we perceive the world as it
unalterably is, and then, in occasional moments of
idleness or sport, alter it, as we say, in the
mind’s eye.
It was Freud's most significant contribution to our understanding of ourselves that
common sense misleads us in this matter, that in
fact we alter the world, change it, play with it,
make it up and over constantly... (p. 58).

Therefore, use of the imagination in learning is not only
advisable, it is essential.

The reality we grasp is always

controlled by the symbolic images we create.
Jones states further, that we send our children to

school in order that they may develop their capability to con

dition their stimuli, a distinctly human capacity.

What does

he mean when he refers to the capacity to condition their sti

muli?

He states:

"We refer to the fact that it is in [our]

first nature to perceive symbolically, to respond to [our]

responses as well as to stimuli"

(p.

63).

Again the impor-

tance of the imaginal process in symbolic representation is
clear.

We have already seen, in Chapter III, that Arnheim’s

work with perceptual cognition adds credence to Jones' views.

And what of the conditions that vary the availability
of imagination?

A.ccording to Jones, the one condition that

is most closely tied to this problem is anxiety.

Jones
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describes anxiety in terms of three factors:

isolation and helplessness.
these simultaneously

He states:

— imagining

imagination,

"When we are all of

and alone and helpless--we

are in a state of anxiety" (p. 70).

He indicates further

that there are three general ways, this side of
insanity, to
avoid anxiety.
They are to:
(1) be less alone; (2) be

less

helpless; (3) be less imaginative.

Although most educators would emphatically state their
objective to eschew the last of these alternatives, Jones
feels that this is usually the method used.

He finds that:

"All too often, however, we find the teacher falling into

such a course by default, for lack of methods and materials

which can help the children avoid anxiety by way of being
less alone- and/or helpless with their imaginations" (p. 73).

Does this goal of reducing anxiety not hint of therapy?
Is Jones not trying to sneak therapeutic methods into the

schools?

According to him, emphatically not!

In response to

these questions, he asks, "What sets instruction apart from

psychotherapy, penology, pastoral guidance and other forms
of ministration to human development?"

He answers:

"Whether

by chance, or by design,... all forms of instruction begin by

appealing to the students' imagination.

And it is notable

that they do so according to the converse of the psychothera-

peutic model..."

(p.

81).

He continues:

"Where the therapist

comes to call forth... expectations of sharing one's images
and sometimes using them, the teacher calls forth...

.

:
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expectations of using one’s images and sometimes sharing
them.

.
.

"

(p

.

82

)

.

Jones explains further diagrammat ically
psychotherapy
(imagination

+

aloneness + helplessness)

instruct ion-K imagination + community

+

mastery)

^

=

anxiety

=

creative
learning

.

Cp.

77)

Here, whereas imagination plus aloneness plus helplessness

leads to anxiety and this calls for psychotherapy, instruction, if proper, calls for an apprppriate combination of

imagination, community and mastery which leads to creative

learning
We see, then, that Jones is quite clear on the matter

of therapy and instruction.

But if, as he states, teachers

should be interested in reducing anxiety so as to facilitate

creative learning, how can they accomplish this.

Jones des-

cribes one instructional method of contrasting it with a
therapeutic. method.

He states that therapists often reduce

anxiety by aiding patients in their attempts at gaining insight

.

Insight consists of knowing one’s own images and

"... what has brought forth this or that image in the past;

what situations bring it forth now; how it has been over-

generalized, misapplied, rashly acted upon; how it can be
more aptly viewed in the future, etc."
tors have another option.

(p.

79).

But instruc-

Insight is only one way that images

which no longer trouble a person can be put to use

The other

.
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way that Jones discusses is by way of
out sight, the grasping,
enlivening, enhancing, discovering, making
one's own this-orthat datum in the real world
by virtue of enhancing it with
private images.
In other words, people come to be less
alone
and/or helpless with their imaginations if they can
imbue the

—

world as it is grasped with personally relevant images.

For

the child from Newton, Massachusetts, the realities of
a world
in which. an Eskimo hunter kills young seals, cuts them
and

eats them raw can become less anxiety producing if he or she

can attach to those realities personal images that give them

relevance to the past experiences of the child.
We have now seen how Jones views emotions and imagina-

tion as they are related to learning.

But the crucial ques-

tion remains unanswered, and Jones is the first to admit it.
He reminds us that invoking the imagination is only the first

step in the direction of creative learning.

There remains the

question, of how to cultivate and use aroused imaginations,
and their attendant emotions, in the interest of increased

mastery of subject matter.

He states:

"The power of emotion

to generate interest and involvement in subject matters which

would otherwise find children uninterested and uninvolved
lies in its potential for aiding the assimilation of new ideas
or remote experiences in ways that are illuminating for the

individual
As we look back, we see that Jones has taken it upon

himself to attempt to broaden the base of the "new educational

.
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psychology."

He has found the work of
Bruner and others ex-

citing and intellectually honest,
but based only on cognitive
material
He would hope we would come to
see that emotional
and imaginal material plays an important
part in conceptual
learning.
He believes that by being able to not
only control
emotional material but also to express it,
learners can come
to use it to facilitate learning by imbuing
new conceptual
material with the personal relevance and points of
contact
.

that are essential in any learning.
day

,

He would hope that some-

in the near future, conditions are created in school-

rooms which invite expression of controlled emotions for the
purpose of imbuing curricular issues with personal signifi-

cance

.

How Can the Use of the IAE Facilitate the
Role Emotional Material Plays in Conceptual Learning?
We now come to the second question that we must deal

with in this chapter, To the degree that emotional material
plays a role in conceptual learning, how can the use of the
IAE facilitate its doing so?

Hopefully, we have, based on

the preceding sub-section, a pretty good idea of the role
that emotional material can play in conceptual learning.

It

is to the second half of the question that we now turn our

attent ion
Before attempting to answer the question directly, however,

I

would like to bring it into clearer perspective by
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pointing out some facts about our
earlier discussion in general.
At the very beginning of this
chapter I pointed
out

educators have recently come to separate
learning and
thinking into two modes, cognitive and
affective.
tnai:

I

mentioned,

also, that there were both advantages and
disadvantages inherent in the separation.
If we look back, I believe
it is

obvious that this study has been basically
predicated on just
such a separation.
We have asked questions concerning
the

IAE and conceptual learning.

In attempting to answer these

questions we have looked at learning per

cognitive

sense.

se in a

strictly

We have discussed classif icatory and cate-

gorization behavior, criterial and defining attributes,

stimulus-response learning, etc., all "cognitive" notions.
Even in examining the IAE we drew from it three characteristics that dealt with cognitive material.
I

believe another point is important also.

In looking

at the definition of the IAE we see that it is generally

divideable into three sections.

The definition states that

an IAE is an activity which induces in the learner an emotional and/or kinesthetic state which is in some way analogous to

the concept being taught, and which occurs through heightened

sensory awareness on the part of the learner.

The three

characteristics that are most important in the definition
are:

(1)

an emotional and/or kinesthetic state;

(2)

which is

analogous, in some way, to a given concept; and (3) which

is

the result of heightened sensory awareness on the part of the

,
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learner.

In forming theoretical connections
between the use

of the IAE and conceptual learning, and
in connecting it with
the goals of education advocated by Leonard,
we have consis-

tently used two of the three aspects of the
definition.

We

have tied heightened sensory awareness to perceptual
cogni-

tion and presentational forms of communication, through

dynamic concepts and visual selectivity to nonarbitrariness
and substantiveness.

We have also tied heightened sensory

awareness to learners who are responsive to their environments
and who are not detached from their learning.

We have con-

nected the analogousness identified in the definition to

metaphorical modes of thinking, and through those modes of
nonarbitrary learning and, to some degree, to substantive
learning.

As consistently as we have dealt with the second

two aspects of the definition of the IAE, we have, just as

consistently, avoided the first aspect, the emotional and/or

kinesthetic state induced through the experience.
I

mentioned at the beginning of the chapter that advan-

tages accrued from separating learning into cognitive and

affective domains, and that they accrued mostly in the area
of methodological considerations in studying learning.

lieve those advantages have been obtained in this study.
fact,

I

I

beIn

believe that dealing with the role the IAE could play

in "cognitive" learning has allowed us to avoid obscuring the

potential of the IAE in this domain by continually implying
the great strength it has in the affective domain.

However

.
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with many of the authors

I

have previously mentioned who see

the separation of learning into two domains
as artificial.
It is because of this believe that

I

have not identified con-

ceptual learning as "cognitive" learning through
this study.
More importantly, the nature of the IAE, as I have
formulated
it, does not allow for such a separation.

That emotional

material plays an important role in conceptual learning is
a given, as soon as one accepts the' definition of the IAE

that

I

have postulated.

Therefore, it is in this chapter

that we finally come first, to the importance of the emotional and/or kinesthetic state that is such a vital part of the

IAE, and second, to the reintegration of "cognitive" and

"affective" learning.
We can now return to Jones and our question concerning

the use of the IAE and the role of emotional material in

learning.

If we condense Jones’

ideas to a brief statement

we see that emotional material plays a part in conceptual

learning when it is:
(3)

used.

(1)

controlled; (2) expressed; and

Fortunately, or unfortunately, as the case might

be, controlling emotional material is not the problem faced

by most students.

They have come, through socialization and

acculturation, to be all too facile at controlling their emotions

.

It is in the realm of expressing those controlled emo-

tions that we first break relatively new ground for most students

It is also in this realm that the IAE becomes extremely
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userul as a pedagogical method.

You will recall, from the

examples Jones gave us, that all material
that is intellectually honest has emotional concommitants
As I have just
pointed out, the problem lies in allowing the
child to be
.

able to express those emotional concommitants.

I

believe

that the IAE exists as a vehicle which can facilitate
that

expression.

To support this belief we need only to look at

the traditional uses of art in our society.

I

mentioned in

Chapter III a number of authors whose views held that art was
the expression of ideas and feelings.

And we noted also that

to the degree that the IAE facilitated "artistic" experiences, which, we saw, was to a relatively high degree, it also

facilitated the expression of ideas and feelings.

Therefore,

we can safely assume that the use of the IAE will generally

facilitate the expression of emotions by students.
It is in the third realm that we must look very care-

fully at the nature of the IAE if we are going to accept that
it plays an important part in facilitating the role of emo-

tional material in learning.

The question is.

emotional material, come to take on usable form?

How does
I

believe

that this does not happen merely as a direct result of the

sheer expression of emotional material.

For emotional mater-

ial to take on usable form it must not only be expressed, it

must be expressed in a form that is recognizable by the
learner.

If it is not expressed in that form the learner will

not be able to use it to imbue conceptual material with

.

188

personal relevance.
What part does the IAE play in this
process?

As in the

case of the expression of emotional material,
it is when the
IAE functions as an artistic activity that
it obtains the

power to have an effect on this process.

It does so through

the combination of three processes, production,
interpreta-

tion and contact.
The first process is inherent in the IAE when the IAE

takes on an "artistic" nature.

An emotional state is induced

in learners as they create an artistic product.

The medium

might be dance or drama or music, but as the learners struggle

with a problem, manipulate materials, and try to formulate

a

solution to that problem, they come to experience an emotional
state
The next step is that they must interpret that emotional
state.

It

importance.

is here that the artistic product takes on added

The product may be looked upon by the students

as a message sent by themselves to themselves.

But it is

important to remember that it is the interpretation of the
product, not the product itself, that is important.

Janie

Rhyne calls this process the Gestalt Art Experience and

states:

"... we create things made from materials; in themselves they

have no particular meaning; the way we perceive them makes

them meaningful" (1973, pp.

87

-

88).

Which brings us to the third process, contact.

The

term contact is drawn from the field of Gestalt Therapy.

There, as Erving and Miriam
Polster state:
"... contact is
the awareness of, and behavior
toward, the assimilable novelties; and the rejection of the
unassimilable novelty" (1973,
ff

P.

101).

In other words, contact is the
process by which we

interact with and are changed by those
elements in the environment that are new to us, but are in
some form with which
we can deal.
There is a part of our psychological
selves
that is known as the contact boundary
state:

.

Polster and Polster

"The contact boundary is the point at which
one ex-

periences the 'me' in relation to that which is not

’

me

'

and

through this contact, both are more clearly experienced"
(pp.

102

-

103).

The question arises, "If we are trying to gain access
to our own- emotions, are we not dealing with things that are

already ’me,' and therefore not applicable to the process of
contact?"

The answer comes, again from Polster and Polster.

They point out, as

I

have mentioned in Chapter

I'll,

that:

thi

kind of internal contact can occur, however, because of the

human ability to split oneself into the observer and the observed.

In other words, many things exist in our psychologi-

cal make-up that we are not aware of.

These things are things

that are "me" but are not experienced as "me."

Through cer-

tain experiences we can have contact with these things and
come to experience them as "me."

Emotions, of course, fit

very neatly into this category.
In summary, then, we have learners who are producing
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artistic products.

They then interpret those
products as
messages from themselves to themselves.
In doing so, they
are attempting to gain co ntact with
those emotions,

to come

to understand and recognize them.

If they can achieve this

contact, that emotional material will
take on a form that is
useable for the learner.
It will take on a form in which
it can attach personal relevance to
conceptual data, thus

allowing that data to become learnable.
I

Based on the above,

believe we can state that the IAE stands as a
vehicle

through which emotional material can be expressed and
used,
and therefore can play an important role in conceptual
learning.

We have asked two questions in this chapter.

was,

The first

To what degree to emotions and feelings play a signi-

ficant role in conceptual learning?

To answer the question

we looked closely at the ideas of Richard Jones as he

explained them in Fantasy and Feeling in Education

.

In brief,

he states that emotional material plays,- or should play, an

important part in conceptual learning but can only do so when

emotions are controlled, expressed, and used.
the question,

We then asked

To the degree that emotions can play a part in

conceptual learning, how can the use of the IAE facilitate
their doing so?

We found that the IAE has great potential

for helping students express and use emotional material, and

therefore can be considered to be potentially able to play

significant role in that process.

a

.
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We saw earlier that Jones hoped
to find someday that
conditions are created in schoolrooms which
invite expression
of controlled emotions for the purpose
of imbuing curricular
issues with personal significance.
I believe that it is

clear that the IAE has the potential to play

a

significant

role in achieving the kind of educational situation
Jones

advocates
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CHAPTER VII
THE EFFECTS OF THE EDUCATIONAL

SYSTEM ON THE LEARNER AND THE
ROLE OF THE IAE

:

CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM

In attempting to discern the relative value of
the use

of the IAE, we have discussed it in relation to two
major

aspects.

First, we related the use of the IAE to the socio-

logical implications of education, as they have been des-

cribed by George Leonard in Education and Ecstacy

.

Secondly,

we discussed the use of the IAE in allowing students to deal

with emotional issues as a part of conceptual learning.

Our

investigation of this area was based on the ideas of Richard
Jones as he presented them in Fantasy and Feeling in Education

.

As a final step in this critique of the relative value

of the use of the IAE, we will look at the relation of the
IAE to a specific methodology; that methodology being, infor-

mal education

.

In 1970, Charles E.

Crisis in the Classroom

.

Silberman published a work entitled,
The work had special significance,

because it was actually the chairman’s report of the Carnegie
Report on the Education of Educators

.

Since the work is the

product of a large, funded, research project, Silberman and
his associates were able to amass a tremendous amount of in-

formation concerning not only pre-service and in-service

s
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teacher training, but education in general.
It

is significant that the study did
include a larger

perspective of education in general.

According to Silberman,

the reason the study was expanded to include this
larger

perspective is because he and his associates came to feel
that teacher training programs reflected our general view of

education.

Therefore, to examine only teacher training

programs and ignore the broader perspective would be analogous to examining the symtoms of an illness without attempting to understand the disease which caused the symptoms in

the first place.

For our purposes it is useful to divide Silberman'

study into three major areas, each of which will serve as

a

basis upon which we can further examine the relative value
of the use of the IAE.

First, in his discussion of education

in general, Silberman deals specifically, and at great length,

with the purposes of education.

Secondly, in an attempt to

identify for his readers an approach which is in accord with
the purposes of education that he advocates, Silberman dis-

cusses infor mal education

.

Finally, Silberman discusses the

effects of the educational system on learners.

Therefore,

this chapter will be divided into three sub-sections, each

dealing with one of the aspects of the study
tified.

In each sub-section,

Silberman'

s

I

have just iden-

ideas concerning

the area will be presented, and then we will discuss the

possible ways in which the use of the IAE might be related

.
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to these ideas.

The f.irst of the sub-sections deals
with the

purposes of education.
The IAE and the Purposes of Education

Silberman begins his discussion of education by pointing out that, whatever value or lack of value there is in
our

system of education, it is mostly the product of "mindlessness."

He feels that the system

to a large degree,

is',

ineffective and that it achieves ends that are most often the

opposite of what our ostensible goals for education are.

He

believes, however, that this is not the result of ill-intention, or even of lack of ability.

It is almost always,

in

his opinion, a result of the fact that it never occurs to

most educators to ask why they are doing what they are

do-ing,

or to think seriously about the purposes of consequences of

education
Silberman defines education as, "... the deliberate or

purposeful creation, evocation, or transmission of knowledge,
abilities, skills and values"

(p.

6).

The definition is

clearly one of direct intent and might appear to be in the
behaviorist tradition.

Silberman himself points out, however

that he intends a broader meaning.

In discussing behavioral

objectives, Silberman reminds us of a statement made by Lee
Cronbach, of Stanford University.

Cronbach points out that

the insistence on the behavioral definition of objectives is
a

prescription for training, not for education.

Silberman

J

s
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indicates that education can, and
almost certainly does include training.
In almost every field, there
are skills that
have to be mastered, concepts that have
to be learned.

But

he also points out that the converse
is not necessarily true.

Education cannot be subsumed under training.
points out:

As Cronbach

"The person who wants to 'specify the acts
the

learner is to perform as a result of instruction'
is deluding

himself when he talks of history, science, or other nonskill
subjects"

C

Silberman

,

1970

,

p.

202

).

Silberman is also concerned that whereas his definition
seems purposeful in nature, it not be confused with the popular move toward teaching the basic skills.

He states:

"More-

over, students need to learn far more than the basic skills.

For children who may still be in the labor force in the year
2030, nothing could be more wildly impractical than an. educa-

tion designed to prepare them for specific vocations or professions, or to facilitate their adjustment to the world as
it is"

views.

(pp.

113

-

114).

Many educators share Silberman'

Francis Chase, the former dean of the Graduate School

of Education, University of Chicago, states:

"The qualities

essential to employability and productivity, are coming closer
and closer to the characteristics that have long been attributed to the educated person" (Silberman, 1970, p. 114).
But what does it mean to be an "educated" person?
is it that one who is "educated"

fies four aspects for us.

is like?

What

Silberman identi-

First, he indicates that a person
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must have the ability to educate him
or herself.
.

He states:

0f w hat does the capacity to eduoat
e oneself

and that he uses that capacity to think about
his
own education, which means to think about his
own
nature and his place in the universe--about the
meaning of life and of knowledge and of the relations about them (p. 114).
Secondly, Silberman feels that to be educated is to,
M

...

know something of the experience of beauty--if not in

the sense of creating

it

or discoursing about it, then at the

very least in the sense of being able to respond to it, to

respond both to the beauty of nature and to the art made by
our fellow man” (p. 115).

This view has been supported by a

report by the Ontario, Canada Provincial Committee on Aims

and Objectives of Education, among many others.

They write:

To find and appreciate beauty in the ordinary
and the extraordinary is the right of every child,
for the aesthetic experience is a basic need of all
men in their universal struggle to add meaning to life.
We owe to the children the freedom to explore the
full range of their senses; to appreciate subtle
differences; to be aware of beauty wherever it is
found; to see, to touch, to smell, to hear, to taste,
so that each in his own way will strive to find and
express the meaning of man and human destiny (p. 115).

Silberman believes that a third aspect of being educated has to do with effectiveness.

As he defines it, to be

educated means to understand something of how to make our
intentions effective in the real world, or in other words,

understanding how to apply knowledge to the life one lives and
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the society in which one lives.

He states:

"The aim of

education, as Alfred North Whitehead has
written,

'is the

acquisition of the art of the utilization of
knowledge.'
deed,

'a

In-

merely well-informed man is the most useless
bore

on God's earth'" (p. 115).

And finally, Silberman notes the importance of
the educational experience itself.
Since children spend so

much time

in school, Silberman believes that the quality of
that exper-

ience must be regarded as important in and of itself.

He

points to the Plowden Committee and its insistence that a good
school is a community in which children live as children and
not as future adults.

However, as Carleton Washburn, a giant

of the progressive movement, warned in 1925, letting children
live free, natural childlike lives may be to fail to give

them the training they will need in order to meet the problems
of later life.

This appears to bring us to the question, What should
the educative process include?

But before going on to deal

with that question, perhaps it would be useful to examine the

relationship between the four aspects of being educated, as
Silberman identifies them, and the use of the IAE.
The first aspect identified by Silberman is that the

person will have both the desire and the capacity to educate

him or herself, and also to judge what is worth learning.
Throughout this study, while relating the IAE to some aspect
of a given set of criteria, principles or characteristics,
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etc.,

have consistently tried to tie
the IAE to that criterion via one of the characteristics
of the IAE that I
discussed in Chapter III. Therefore,
what I would hope to
do at this point, is to connect
the quality of having the
desire and capacity to educate oneself to
one of the characteristics of the IAE, such as perceptual
cognition, metaphorical modes of thinking, or presentational
forms of communication.
Unfortunately, as far as I cdn tell, the direct
and
significant connection that we seek is not there.
This is,
I

in my opinion, because the characteristics of the
IAE that

I

have identified have dealt with ways- of knowing and learning
that were facilitated by the IAE, and not with attitudes

toward knowing.
In Chapter

V

we discussed an instance that was parallel

to this situation, whether or not a learner would want- to de-

velop as much of his or her potential as possible.
instance

I

stated that

I

believe

In that

that whereas the IAE offers

a vehicle which can facilitate full realization of potential,
it is up to other forces,

e.g., society, the teacher, etc.,

to foster the desire to do so.

I

believe the connection be-

tween the criterion and the IAE is similar in this instance.
Because of the personalized nature of perceptual cognition,

metaphorical modes of thinking and presentational forms of
communication, the learning that occurs through these forms
could conceivably be called, "the educating of oneself."

How-

ever, whether learner chooses to avail him or herself of these
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forms of cognition and learning is
not, as I see it, tied to
the IAE itself.
It is much more a result of
the attitude
toward learning that is manifested in
the environment which
surrounds the learner, an environment
that contains parents,
teachers, peers and the rest of
society-at-large.
The situation is noticeably different,
however, as concerns the second criteria identified by
Silberman.
That

second criteria is that the student will, "...
kn ow something
of the experience of beauty." When we speak of
the IAE,
we

speak, by definition, of heightened sensory awareness.

We

also speak of the forms of cognition, i.e., perceptual
cognition, metaphorical modes of thinking, and presentational forms
of communication, that are most often used by people to under-

stand works of art.

Implied in the notion of the IAE, as

I

have described it, is practice in the use and understanding
of different modes of artistic expression.
Is

The question is,

there any connection between the IAE and the learner’s

knowing something of the experience of beauty?

For me, the

answer is, If there is no connection, then it is not because
of the nature of the IAE, but rather, in the way that the IAE

has been used.
The third criterion mentioned by Silberman is that the

student will "...understand something of how to make [his or
her]

intentions effective in the real world."

Again

I

believe

that there is no direct and significant theoretical connection

between the criterion and the characteristics of the IAE.
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There is, however, one less direct
connection which I
believe bears mentioning.
In discussing metaphorical
modes
of thinking, I mentioned an educational
program that was

specifically designed to "celebrate" the
functions of the
right cerebral hemisphere.
One of the characteristics of
that program was that the learners got
practice in directly
implementing the solutions they had formulated to
the prob-

lem they encountered.

also discussed how the same charac-

I

teristic was true of the IAE; the IAE allows an opportunity
to directly try out solutions to problems posed by the
mater-

ials involved.

connection,

I

Although there is no direct theoretical
believe it is reasonable to assume that this

type of experience facilitates, to at least some degree, a

person’s ".knowing something of how to make their intentions
effective in the real world."
The fourth aspect of being educated that is identified
by Silberman concerns the effects of the educational experi-

ence itself.

Since, as

I

have mentioned previously, this

issue is one of the three main areas of Silberman’

s

discus-

sion, we will leave the question of the relationship between

the IAE and the effects of the educational experience and
deal with it in the third subsection of this chapter.
Now, we can return to our discussion of Silberman

views concerning the purposes of education.

's

We left off with

the question, What should the educative process include?

response to this question, Silberman states: "Education is

In
a
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process that cannot be separated from
what it is that one
learns" (p. 325).
He continues:
"The raeson d’etre of the
school— society’s ultimate justification for
creating a
separate, formal, educational institution,
and for making prolonged exposure to it compulsory— is the
conviction (the
faith, if you will) that as Bruner also puts
it, 'The conduct
of life is not independent of what it is
that one

knows,' nor

of how it is that one has learned what one knows’"

What do others have to say on the subject?
sing the purposes of education, Piaget states:

(p.

235).

In discus-

"The principal

goal of education is to create men who are capable of doing

new things, not simply repeating what other generations have
done

men who are creative, inventive, and discoverers, who

have minds which can be critical, can verify, and not accept

everything they are offered"

(p.

219).

It is not to be forgotten that time in school is limi-

ted.

In answering the question, How can limited exposure to

new material have the most impact?, Bruner states:
The dominant view among men who have engaged
in preparing and teaching new curricula is that
the answer to this question lies in giving students
an understanding of the fundamental structure of
whatever subjects we choose to teach. This is a
minimum requirement for using knowledge.... If
earlier learning is to render later learning easier,
it must do so by providing a general picture in
terms of which the relations between things encountered earlier and later are made as clear as
possible (1963, p. 18).

Whitehead expands on that notion in The Aims of Educa tion.

He states:

"What education has to impart, is an
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intimate sense for the power of ideas,
for the beauty of
ideas, and for the structure of ideas,
together with a particular body of knowledge which has peculiar
reference to
the life of the being processing it"
(1929,
p.

36).

A final perspective concerning what the
educative process should include comes from Margaret Mead.
She
states:

"We are no longer dealing primarily with the
vertical trans-

mission of the tried and true by the old, mature and
experienced teachers to the young, immature, and inexperienced
pupil.

This was the system of education developed in a stable,

slowly changing culture" (Silberman, 1970,

30).

p.

But in a

rapidly changing world, vertical transmission of knowledge
not sufficient.

Mead continues:

is

"What is needed, and what

we are already moving toward is the inclusion of another whole

dimension of learning; the lateral transmission, of every sentient member of society, of what has just been discovered,
invented, created, manufactured or marketed"

(p.

What, then, is the purpose of education?

30).

According to

Silberman and others, it would appear, the purpose of education lies in the power, the use, the production, and the

transmission of ideas.

Education should instill in the

learner a realization of the power and structure of ideas.
It

should instill in the learner a realization of how ideas

are used and how old ideas can be structured to make the

learning of new ideas easier.

It should instill in the

learner the desire to question old ideas and create new ideas
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when the old ones are found inadequate.

And further to

actively engage in transmitting those ideas
while they are
still being formulated, so that they are developed

to their

fullest potential by the combined genius of society.

And what is the relation of the use of the IAE to
the
t<3-^- ri

i-n§

of those goals?

believe the key to the answer

I

lies in a statement made by William James.

He states:

You make a great a very great mistake if you
think that psychology, being the science of the
mind’s laws, is something from which you can deduce
definite programs and schemes and methods of instruction for immediate classroom use.
Psychology
is a science and teaching is an art; and sciences
never generate arts directly out of themselves.
An intermediary inventive mind must make the
application, by using its originality. Yet science
must be understood; it plays a major role, for it
lays down the lines within which the rules of art
must fall, laws which the follower of the art must
not transgress...
Everywhere the teacher must
agree with the psychology, but need not necessarily be the only kind of teaching that would so
agree (Silberman, 1970, p. 217).
,

Psychology is a science, and so is "education" as it is

portrayed in the statements of Silberman and the others.

But

the "science of education" is transposed to the everyday

classroom, as James points out, by the artfulness of the
teacher.

And it is within the realm of the art of teaching

that the IAE falls.

It is,

perhaps, one of the modes of

teaching that demands the most artful manipulation by the
teacher.

The individuality and subjectiveness of most of the

experiences involved in the IAE demand an artful teacher.

And how are the goals of the "science of education" achieved
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through the IAE?
to be found.

The direct theoretical connection
is not
However, the IAE stands ready as a
vehicle

through which the teacher can artfully bring
learners to the
levels at which they realize the power, the
use,
and the

nature of ideas, or at least ideas that are new to
the learner, can be produced and transmitted to other
learners.
The

connection may not be direct.

That does not insure that it

is not powerful.

The IAE and Informal Education

Crisis in the Classroom appeared during the educational

reform movement of the late 1960

s

and early ’70s.

It is not

surprising, therefore, that a good deal of the material in
the book deals with that reform movement.

It is as a response

to that movement, as an attempt to offer a positive direction

for that movement, that Silberman discusses informal education

.

Before examining the relation of the use of the IAE to

the pedagogy of informal education we need to understand

informal education itself.
may be useful to spend

Before attempting to do that, it

just a moment understanding the reform

movement that Silberman describes and is a part of, thereby
better understanding why he proposes informal education as
positive alternative to existing educational methodologies.
One of the earliest and most influential reports that

constituted the reform movement of the ’60s and the ’70s is
the Coleman Report.

The Coleman Report was the result of a

a

205

lit tie -not iced section of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
directed the U. S. Commissioner of
Education to "conduct a

survey

concerning the lack of availability
of equal educational opportunity for individuals by
reason of
.

.

.

race, color,

religion, or national origins" (Silberman,
1970,
Coleman and his associates had expected to find
P ar ^' ^ es
l:

^-

n

t ^ie

’

p.

71 ).

large dis-

quality of education and educational facili-

ties that were available to majority and minority
students.
More importantly, Coleman and his colleagues found
that dif-

ferences in school quality were not very closely related to

differences in student achievement at allj they simply did
not find the cause and effect relationship between low student

achievement and inadequate educational inputs that they expected to find.

Family background of the student and his or

her fellow students seemed to have had a much more important
effect than did differences in school background in effecting
student achievement.

These findings have been supported by at least some

other studies.

In a chapter entitled,

School’s Achievement,”

J.

M.

”The Constancy of the

Stephens summarizes research

studies which indicate that academic achievement is usually

unaffected by factors such as class size, size of the school,

administrative organization of the school, amount of time
given to instruction, teacher’s ability and personality,

teaching method, homogenous or grouping and so on

(p.

71).

’

:

And what of reform?

school reform movement?

results were not.

Hadn't the 1950s seen a large
The movement had been there,
but the

Silberman relates the findings of
a major

investigation
Jo] n G °°dlad,
}

dean of the UCLA Graduate
of Education along with several
visited some 260 kindergarten-through-f colleagues
irst-grade
classrooms in 100 schools in thirteen states
to
determine the extent to which the reform movement
had changed the schools.
He found ... that things
are much the same as they had been 20 years
ago,
and in some respects not as good as they were
forty
years ago, when the last great school reform movement was at its peak.
'We were unable to discern
much attention to pupil needs, attainments, or
problems as a basis for individual opportunities
to learn,
he reports.
’Teaching was predominantly
telling and questioning by the teacher, with children
responding one by one or occasionally in chorus.
In
all of this, the textbook was the most highly visible
instrument of learning and teaching....
Rarely did
we find small groups intensely in pursuit of knowledge:
rarely did we find individual pupils at work
in self-sustaining inquiry..." (p. 159).
v
c
bchool

.

Nevertheless, there was a reform movement of the late
1960s and early '70s.

Goodlad himself referred to that period

as the "education decade."

As James E. Allen, former U.

S.

Commissioner of Education stated at the time:
Never before in history have our schools engaged in such widespread experimentation to meet the
new educational requirements...
Never before have so many hopeful new approaches developed in such a relatively short period.
An intense self-examination is now under way on a
national scale...
In the process, we are learning that many of
the old ways of operating our schools are not necesNew methods of organization,
sarily the best ways.
the use of new technological devices and new concepts
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of the role of the teacher provide
answers that
numbers alone cannot provide (Silberman 1970
*
pp. 159 - 160).
’

But something must be learned from the study
done by

Goodlad and his associates.

If we are to transform the schools

during the 1970s we must understand why the reform movement
of
the 1950s and 60s affected such little change.

Perhaps the

key issue as Silberman sees it, is again the problem of '’mind-

lessness.”

Of all the major innovations of the early reforms,

only one, the ungraded primary, seems to be the result of

serious thought about the nature of childhood and learning.
As Silberman points out, most of the other innovations, such
as team teaching,

instructional television, and teacher aids,

were techniques which were aimed at increasing efficiency and

which left both the content of the curriculum and the process
of instruction untouched or at least unexamined.

The experience of the National Defense Education Act

Institutes is a perfect example.

The institutes grew out of

the belief that the major problem was to get teachers to know-to really know--the subject.

Unfortunately, time proved that

knowing the subject better had little or no real effect on
being able to teach it (p. 182).

Which brings us to informal education

.

In Section III

of the study entitled, "How the Schools Should Be Changed,"

Silberman points his readers’ attention to the English Informal
Schools.

The basis of the approach, as Silberman sees it, is

are
that children are allowed to learn for themselves, and

—

:
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allowed to follow their own interests.

But the freedom that

accrues to the learners in this
situation is not the same
freedom that became the hallmark of
American progressive
schools.
American progressive schools came to
be places in
which students followed their interests
without close observation and well-timed intervention on the
part of teachers,
and

this resulted in a "softness" as concerned
academic rigor.
Not so in the case of the English informal
schools.

Silberman

states

With rare exceptions, the teachers and administrators
with whom I talked and whose informal classrooms I
observed were more than simply here
they were very
much in charge.
'It's easy to be a sweet nothing and
just say, "Oh, that’s nice,"
one London headmistress remarked, ’but we are here to teach, not just
to let children discover.'
The teacher ’must know
clearly what she's trying to do and how and why,'
Nora Goddard, Chief Inspector of Infant Schools in
London, insists.
It is not enough to create a rich
environment, as teachers of the progressive era Were
content to do.
The teacher must know when, and how,
to intervene if she is to achieve the main objective
as Miss Goddard defines it, ’helping children learn
how to think, to form judgements, to discriminate'
'

;

'

'

'

(p.

It

260

).

is when we understand the informal approach as one

of "structured environments" and "maximized opportunities"

that we are able to relate the informal approach to the IAE.
The following statement by Silberman indicates the type of

learning situation that is common in the informal approacn
and the control the teacher has over it.
The teacher does not just maximize the
occasion; he makes the occasion possible in the
first place by the kind of environment he creates
'In a sense there is no
and maintains.
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0
dnei y a all,f says Mary Brown,
headmistress
^
of S£
Sherar ^ Infa
t Sch ° o1 in Leicestershire
County
^nH
2
a ?K
^° r ° f ThS Inte gr*ted Day in the Primary
V
Sohnn?"
School,
since we select the materials that
are
available.
We are structuring all the time;
that
is what teaching is.’
Indeed, the informal classroom can be termed a formal situation, in
the sense
°f having form and structure...
The 'formality'
of the informal classroom grows out of
the fact
that the teacher creates a highly structured
environment, organized around a space rather than a
time
framework, and then manages it so that it changes in
response to children's interest, activities, and
needs (p. 238).
-r

.

I

believe that the same is often true of the IAE.
In the IAE we also have an environment that is struc-

tured by the teacher.

The teacher has already chosen the

conceptual material that is to be the basis of the lesson.
This choice, hopefully, is made on the basis of the individual needs of the learner or learners involved in the experience.

The teacher structures the experience by selecting or

limiting the choice of materials involved.

As we said in our

discussion of metaphorical modes of thinking, materials play
an important part in controlling the problems that learners

struggle with in order to understand larger concepts.
The teacher structures the environment, facilitates

certain learnings, keeps track of and is responsible for meeting academic standards.

But it is the child who actually

determines the learning that is the result of each experience.
And it is because of this that both informal education and the
IAE have such advantages as pedagogical techniques.
The advantage obtains,

I

believe, because of the fact

that the learner is always the final determiner of what is or

is
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not learned.

Unfortunately, in formal approaches the
learner
is only offered one possibility,
one choice.
The alternatrves are then only to learn or not to learn.
It
is no sur-

prise, therefore, that much of what is "taught"
by teachers,
is not "learned" by students.

However, in both the informal approach and the IAE,
the learner is given other choices, other alternatives.

with-

in the constraints set by the teacher as he or she structures

the environment, the learner is allowed to gravitate towards,

and work to attain, those learnings that are most appropriate
to him or her at that time.

This can reflect itself in terms

of the particular aspects of a concept the student chooses,

consciously or unconsciously, to learn, or in the level to
which a particular concept or subconcept is learned.

We have

seen in Chapter II, that the concepts learned by students in

school are usually hierarchial in nature and are often defined
by a number of criterial attributes.

There are many things

to be learned in learning a concept, and these approaches allow

an opportunity for the learner’s individual learning pattern
to operate unmolested.
We have also seen in Chapter VI that there is often

both a cognitive and an emotional aspect of a given concept.
Some learners are most ready to deal, at a given time, with

the cognitive content of the concept.

Other learners need

to, or are more able to, deal with the emotional impact of

the concept.

Again, both the informal approach in general
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methodology, and the third with the
effects of the educational
system on the learner.
It is the last of these three
components to which we now turn our attention.

Silberman begins his discussion of the effects
of the
educational system on the learner with the
following statement:
Like Procrustes stretching his guests or
cutting off their

limbs to make them fit the standard-sized bed his
inn provided, educators and scholars, frequently with the
best of

intentions, have operated on the assumption that children need
to be cut or stretched or otherwise ’adjusted* to fit the
schools
(p.

rather than adjusting the schools to fit the children"

81).

In a later comment on the subject, Silberman adds:

"Our most pressing educational problem, in short, is not how
to increase the efficiency of schools, it is how to create and

maintain a humane society.

A society whose schools are inhu-

mane is not likely to be humane itself"

And what is school like?
in Life in Classrooms

where it happens.

(1963):

(p.

203).

As Phillip Jackson points out

that school is school no matter

Jackson bases this thought on four condi-

tions that are almost always true of schooling.
is the element of compulsion.

First, there

Children are usually in school

because they have to be, most often because of state law.
Even if there is no compulsion by law, they are seldom there
of their own volition.

Secondly, children not only have to

be in school, they have to be there a long time.

School

usually lasts six hours a day, five days a week, thirty or

.
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forty weeks a year for twelve or more
years.

Between the ages

of five and eighteen, the child spends
more time engaged in

schooling than in almost any other activity.
is a collective experience.

crowd.

Thirdly, school

Being in school means being in a

It is seldom that most students receive
the undivided

attention of their teacher.
always evaluative.

And finally, school is almost

The students know that their words and

deeds are being constantly evaluated, and this causes a clear

demarcation between teacher and student, teacher and learner.
The teacher and the child may be "partners in learning," but

the partnership dissolves when it comes time for the former
to evaluate, rate, and categorize the latter.
But Silberman identifies still yet another commonality

among schools.

As he puts it:

"The most important character-

istic schools share in common is the preoccupation with order

and control" (p. 122).

He relates further:

As Herbert Kohn points out, 'the tightness
with time that exists in the elementary school has
nothing to do with the quantity that must be learned
It represents the teacher's
or the children's needs.
fear of loss of control and is nothing but a weapon
used to weaken the solidarity and opposition of the
children that too many teachers unconsciously
dread (p 124
'

.

)

And, from "An Ounce of Prevention," in Discipline in the

Classroom published by the NEA comes the following statement:
"Avoid emotion-charged topics.

Discussing them may lead to

an argument so explosive that fighting can result.

Until

group has achieved enough maturity to keep itself under

a

:
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control, it is better to risk boredom than
pandemonium"
(

Silberman

,

1970

,

p.

134).

Besides the obviously compulsive

demand for control indicated in ’the statement,
it is frightening to think of its implications in terms of
what we

learned from our discussion of emotional material

in

Chapter VI.

Of course there have been attempts to rethink the
problem.

Many schools, realizing the effects of living within

the system are so damaging to a child that they might undo any

good that may have been accomplished by that system, have

looked for better alternatives.

The John

F.

Kennedy High

School in Silver Spring, Maryland states of its program's
goals:

"The purpose of the program... is to provide an envi-

ronment which will focus on the individual--a climate where
student responsibility is emphasized, where conformity

is"

not

imposed, where learners solve problems important to them,

where interest is high, and where there is an active commitment to discovery and learning" (p.

341).

Similarly, the

Parkway Program, in Philadelphia is designed to, "... help
students to 'live learningly within his present life space'
and to help him expand that space"

(p.

350).

And in marked

contrast to the NEA publication cited earlier, comes the

following from the Murray Road Annex Program in Newton,

Massachusetts
The students learned to handle feelings, too,
'Feeland to view feelings as an aspect of thought.
student
one
Road,
Murray
ings are important at
remarked, in explaining how the school differed from
'Even in a subject like
the regular high school.
'
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math it becomes. harder and harder
P
feelings from thinking' (p. 359). to separate
The question that arises for us, of
course, is to what
degree can the use of the IAE be an
important factor in making
the effects of the educational system
positive rather than

negative?

I

believe we can answer the question by examining

the three descriptions of the above-mentioned
programs.

If

we use these programs as examples of a more humane
educational system, then to the degree that the use of the IAE
facili-

tates some of the goals they profess, the use of the IAE

facilitates a more humane educational system.
The Kennedy Program in Maryland shows dramatically,

I

believe, the connection between the use of the IAE and a more

humane educational environment.

The program professes as one

of its goals that it will focus on the individual.

Certainly

we have seen that if nothing else the IAE is geared toward

personalized learning and personalized experiences.

This is

one of the most important characteristics of the approach.

Secondly, the Kennedy Program attempts to not impose conformity.

Again, the personalized nature of the IAE seems to be

an especially strong agent in achieving this goal.
in

And again

a third goal the personalized nature of the IAE and the

learning it facilitates is important.

This third goal is that

the learners will solve problems that are important to them.

Finally, the Kennedy Program hopes to facilitate an environment in which there is an active commitment to discovery and

learning.

Although there is no direct link between the use
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of the IAE and these generalized
qualities,

I

believe that it

is reasonable to assume that in
a situation where learners are

learning things that are important to them,
in ways that are
appropriate to them, learning and discovery will
be highly
valued by those learners.
Realizing the generalized effects of the use of the
IAE
is also important in understanding how it helps
learners "live

beamingly" in the way the Parkway ‘Program
would hope they could.

I

in Philadelphia

believe, again, that it is reasonable

to assume that if learners have positive experiences as con-

cerns learning while they are in school, if they come to value

and enjoy learning as process, that it is likely that they will
not, indeed could not, operate "learningly" in school and

otherwise outside of school.

If the IAE can facilitate facile

learners in school, those same learners will probably deal

with all new experiences in a "learning" way.

Therefore, it

seems easily possible that the IAE can facilitate students

"living learningly in their life space."

And finally we come to one of the major aspects of the

Murray Road Annex Program.
VI,

I

Based on what we saw in Chapter

believe it will suffice to say that the IAE might well

be one of the most effective means for dealing with feelings

and emotions in the classroom.

If doing this contributes to

a more humane educational environment, then the IAE certainly

can be considered an important facilitator of a humane envi-

ronment

.
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In conclusion, we see that the
use of the IAE is tied

intimately, through common goals and
techniques, to many of
the approaches which facilitate a more
humane, more positive,
educational system.
In this ch apter we have seen that Silberman
and others

identify three characteristics of being "educated”
to which
we can connect the use of the IAE.
The first characteristic
was that the learner has the desire and capacity to
educate

him or herself.

Although there was no direct theoretical

connection between this characteristic and the use of the IAE,
we saw that the IAE stands ready as a vehicle which can help

learners in their attempts to educate themselves if they care
to.

The second characteristic was that learners will know

something of beauty.

In this case the connection between the

use of the IAE and the characteristic was obvious.

Finally,

the third characteristic was that learners will know something
of how to make their intentions effective in the real world.

Although the direct theoretical connection was again not evident in this instance, we saw that the use of the IAE can

facilitate this characteristic to some degree by allowing

opportunities for direct problem solving with materials.
In the second sub-section of the chapter we discussed

the relationship between the IAE and informal education

Through that discussion we saw that the IAE is

a

.

technique

that can fit easily into the repertoire of an informal teacher

because of the commonality, in terms of approach and goals,

between informal education and the IAE.
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And finally, in .the third sub-section
of the chapter we
have seen that the use of the IAE appears
to be connected with
establishing a more positive educational environment.
This

appears true because the use of the IAE seems to be
appropriate in terms of reaching some of the goals of three
programs
that are somewhat exemplary in their attempts to formulate
a

more humane educational environment.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
We have come to the end of this study.

In it

I

have

reviewed, examined, and discussed a tremendous
amount of
material.

ihis study has been divided into two sections.

The first dealt primarily with the' question

,

Can the IAE

facilitate conceptual learning and development?; the second

with the question, Should the IAE be used to facilitate conceptual learning and development?
In Part

I

we began with three questions.

(I) How is any concept learned?;

They were:

(2) What are the character-

istics of the IAE that might facilitate the learning of

*

concepts?; and (3) How can the IAE facilitate the learning of

concepts?

In general

I

answered the major question of this

section by using these three questions to form a syllogism.
We found that:

(a) the process by

which concepts are learned

can be represented by the construct called meaningful learning

,

and that meaningful learning has two criteria that must

be met if it is to obtain, nonarbitrary learning and substan-

tive learning

;

(b)

the IAE has three characteristics that allow

it to meet those criteria:

(1)

it allows an opportunity for

perceptual cognition to occur; (2) it allows an opportunity
for metaphorical modes of thinking to occur; and (3) it allows
the learner to make use of alternative modes of communication;
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therefore (c) the IAE might facilitate conceptual learning by
way of the relationship between its three characteristics and
the two criteria for meaningful learning.

In short, yes, it

does seem likely that the IAE can facilitate conceptual learning.

The means

I

chose to use in attempting to answer the

question, Should the IAE be used to facilitate conceptual
learning?, was to examine the relationships that exist be-

tween the use of the IAE and some of the major ideas of the

educational reform movement of the late 1960s and early '70s.
It seemed that the most efficient way of identifying some of

those ideas was to choose three major works from the reform
period, each of which represented a different segment of the

educational spectrum.

These works could then be used as the

focal points of our discussion and we could examine the rela-

tionships found between the ideas contained in those works
and the use of the IAE.

It is up to the individual readers

to accept or reject the validity of the ideas chosen from

these works, but to the degree that the use of the IAE seemed
in accordance with the ideas, goals, and formulations found

IAE was
in those works, we could state that the use of the

mentioned
likely to facilitate some of the goals of the above
value
reform movement, and therefore there was at least some

to its use.

Lcstacy by
The first work discussed was Education and

George Leonard.

This work contains views concerning the
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sociological, as well as anthropological,
aspects of education.
In examining the work we found that
Leonard defined

education as change.

In this sense, any activity or experi-

ence which resulted in change for the
participant could be
considered educative.
In order to put Leonard’s ideas into a form that
would

be easily accessible and useful for us,

goals for education which

Leonard’s views.

I

I

postulated four

believe accurately reflected

The first of these goals was:

Education

will encourage learners to be responsive to their environIn discussing this goal we noted that two processes

mentjs.

involved in the IAE appeared to facilitate such responsiveness.
The first process was dynamic concepts as postulated by

Arnheim.

Through this form of concept learners are more aware

not only of the generalities upon which any concept is formed,
but also of the particularities of the individual exemplars

of the concept.
tion.

The second process had to do with interac-

As Piaget has shown us, learners .both assimilate and

accommodate to learnings.

In this process the learner changes

or responds to his or her environment.

Since the IAE facili-

tates this process as it meets the criteria for meaningful

learning

,

we can also assume that it generally facilitates

learners being responsive to their environments.
The second goal for education that

I

formulated from

Leonard's views was that; Education will encourage learners
to realize as much of their potential as possible.

In our

.
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discussion of this goal' we found the IAE to take a passive
role in the facilitation of learners realizing their full

potential.

It appeared that the IAE was a vehicle tnrough

which learners could realize their potential.

It also

appeared, however, that the use of the IAE had little to do

with the volitional factors involved in this problem.

It

falls to agencies like the teacher, parents and most impor-

tantly, society as a whole to encourage the attitudes that

manifest themselves in the full realization of a learner’s

potential
The third goal for education discussed in this section
was that

:

Education will discourage detachment on the part

of learners.

We saw in this discussion that the use of per-

ceptual cognition, including dynamic concepts and direct
experience, that is characteristic of the IAE can play an
important role in attaining this goal.

And finally, the fourth goal for education was:

tion will be ecstatic.

Educa^

Leonard is not exceedingly clear in

defining ecstatic learning.

We saw, however, that there are

might be some relation
two factors that indicate that there
The first
learning.
between the use of the IAE and ecstatic
seems very similar to
of these was that ecstatic learning

intuitive knowing.

is a direct
If this is true, then there

and ecstatic learning berelation between the use of the IAE
metaphorical modes of thinking
cause the IAE often facilitates

intuitive knowing.
which are clearly related to

The second
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factor that implied a relation between the IAE and
ecstatic
.

learning was that it appeared that the ecstatic moment
as

I

believe Leonard would define it, seems exceedingly similar
to the aesthetic experience as it has been defined by many

authors.

Since the aesthetic experience is often a part of

the IAE we find, again, a potential connection between the
IAE and ecstatic learning.
The second work discussed was Fantasy and Feeling in

Education by Richard Jones.

This book dealt with the part of

the educational spectrum that concerns itself with emotions

and their relation to conceptual learning.
covers much material in his book,
be accurately condensed thusly:

I

Although Jones

believe his argument can

intellectual material con-

tains emotional concomitants; these emotional concomitant-s
can be used in facilitating the learning of the intellectual

material; it does so by imbuing the intellectual material
with personal relevance; but it can only do so if it is:
(1) controlled;

(2)

expressed; and (3) used.

We saw that

controlling emotional material was not usually a problem for
learners since it is a skill that is highly valued and strin-

gently taught by society-at-large.

We saw also that the IAE

appears to be a vehicle through which learners could express
and then use emotional material.

As such the IAE appears to

a valuable vehicle for attaining the type of educational

process that Jones advocates.
I

would also like to point out that Jones is very clear

material is more
in indicating that the use of emotional
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important
that

m

one kind. of learning than in
another.

m

He states

the attainment or discovery of
knowledge we must be
ante to control our emotions, however,
in the formation and
invention of knowledge that is not sufficient.
In that case
we need to express and control these
emotions.
Therefore,
there are certain cases in which the use of the
IAE is especially useful.

Finally we come to Crisis in
Silberman.

~the

Classroom by Charles

This book, actually the chairman's report of

the Carnegie Report on the Education of Educators
a massive amount of material.

into three major sections:
(2)

,

contains

It can be broken down,

however,

(1) The purpose of education;

Informal education; and (3) The effects of the educational

system on the learner.
In reviewing his discussion we find that, according to

Silberman, there are three purposes of education to which we
can connect, to differing degrees, the use of the IAE.

first of these was:

The

The person should have the desire and

ability to educate him or herself

.

Although the IAE appears

to be a vehicle which can help learners to do this, there

seems to be little or no reason to believe that the use of
the IAE will have a significant and direct effect on the

learner's desire to do so.

The second of these purposes was:

The person should know something of the experience of beauty

.

In this case the use of the IAE seemed integrally connected

with the attaining of the goal.

It

appeared that if there is
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no connection between the use of the IAE
and the learner knowing something of the experience of beauty,
the reason for this
probably lies not in the nature of the IAE itself,
but rather,
in the way it has been used.

The third purpose of education identified by
Silberman

was that

:

The person will know something of how to make his

or her intentions effective in the world

.

The use of the IAE

seemed at least minimally connected to the attaining of the
6°al

.

This is due to the fact that through the IAE learners

are allowed to attempt to implement solutions to problems,

thereby giving them practice in making their intentions
effective in an at least partially, real world.
The second section of the Silberman study deals with

specific methodology, namely, informal education

.

a

In examin-

ing the relation between informal education and the IAE, we

found that the IAE appeared to be a technique that would fit

easily into the repertoire of an "informal" teacher.

This

was due to the fact that informal education and the IAE share

commonalities in terms of techniques, e.g., structured environments, maximized opportunities and minimal but incisive

teacher intervention and goals.
The final section of the Silberman study was concerned

with the effects of the educational system on the learner.
We chose from Silberman'

s

work three programs that were exem-

plary in their attempts to create a more humane environment
in schools.

We examined the relationship that existed
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between the use of the IAE and those programs
and found that
the use of the IAE would certainly be a positive
factor in
any program's attempt to create a more humane school

environ-

ment

.

have learned that the IAE is a technique.

.

As such,

it is effective in reaching certain goals and not effective

in reaching others.

It appears that the types of learning

that call for responsiveness to the' environment and the indi-

vidual objects or events that are a part of that environment
are particularly well suited for the use of the IAE.

This is

due to the fact that the IAE allows 'for perceptual cognition

to occur.

Any learning situation in which the learner is

called upon to make use of his or her sensorial capabilities,
or in which significant advantages would accrue if he or she

were to do so, would certainly be positively related to the
use of the IAE.
It also appears that learning situations that call for

invention rather than discovery of knowledge are particularly
well suited to the use of the IAE.

Certainly invention of

knowledge is connected with intuitive knowing and metaphorical
modes of thinking.

This is especially true in those cases

when there is also a high degree of emotional impact involved
with a learning.

Jones has shown us both the importance of

this fact, and the role that emotions can play in learning.
I

have tried to make clear how the IAE can help in facilitat-

ing that process.
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We have also seen that the IAE can be an
effective

technique in helping learners experience beauty,
make their
intentions effective in the real world, and in creating
a

positive and humane educational environment.
can be said that

,

And finally it

as in the case of informal education

,

when-

ever the techniques and goals involved in a major methodology
are in accordance with the techniques and goals involved in
the use of the IAE, there will be a positive relationship

between the IAE and that methodology.

Whenever we speak of goals for education that lie beyond
the realm of any technique, goals such as encouraging learners

to realize their full potential, and giving learners the de-

sire to educate themselves, we speak necessarily, of goals

which lie beyond the realm of the IAE.
There are other instnaces in which the use of the IAE

will not be particularly effective.

enumerated these instances per se

,

Although we have not
we can certainly infer

them from much of what we have said.

Just as knowing the

particularities of a concept is most valuable in one instance,

understanding the general principle invovled, to the exclusion of the attributes of individual exemplars, can be most

valuable in other instances.

Whereas the use of the IAE cor-

relates positively to the first instance, its positive correlation to the second instance is not insured.

It may or may

not be an effective technique in the second instance, depending on the other attributes of the learning situation.

The

.
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same point can be made of all the other
characteristics and
goals to which we have positively connected
the use of the
IAE

First of all,

I

have asked the question, Should the

IAE be used to facilitate conceptual learning?

answer is, yes.

However,

I

I

believe the

believe it is also clear that the

IAE is a technique that should only be used under certain
con-

ditions.

have not.

Have those conditions been identified?

No, they

That is a function that can only be served by

thorough and careful empirical testing.

I

have, however,

investigated some of the theoretical areas from which those
empirical studies must derive, and have,

I

hope, begun to

identify some of the theoretical boundaries which will constitute the parameters within which the empirical studies
must fall.
What are some of the other implications of this work?
I

believe we now know that there is, or at least appears to

be, an effective means by which arts activities can become

an integral part of the repertoire of techniques used to

facilitate conceptual learning.

This would indicate that we

should study this method further so that we might come to

understand it better and be able to

use it more effectively.

It also implies that teachers in general should be made aware of

this technique and others like it so that they come to realize
the value arts activities might have in this area. And in addi-

tion, that teachers would come to know more about the arts
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and artistic experiences in general
so that they are more
able to understand and use techniques
like the IAE which
take advantage of these experiences.

Finally, and probably most important of all,

I

believe

that this study shows that there are other
techniques available to teachers than the ones they presently use.
Whether
the IAE turns out, in the end, to be an effective
methodology

or not, is probably not as importaht as the fact that
people

keep striving tor better and more effective ways of teaching,
ways that are not only effective in the sense that they convey information more quickly and accurately, but in terms of

influencing the learner positively as
as a human being.

a person,

as a thinker,

,
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